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ABSTRACT
SOCIAL SECURITY, SAVINGS, AND IABOR SUPPLY 
OF THE ELDERLY IN JAPAN
by
T e tsu ji  Yamada 
A dviser: P rofesso r M ichael Grossman
The study examines th e  c o n tro v e rs ia l, in c o n s is te n t a n p ir i-  
c a l r e s u l ts  o f  th e  e f fe c t  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  on personal savings 
and analyzes th e  interdependency in  th e  con tex t o f  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  between th e  personal savings and lab e r supply behavior o f  
e ld e r ly  workers.
Very few s tu d ie s  in  th i s  f ie ld  have been done, and i t  has 
no t th e o re t ic a l ly  and em p irica lly  been accomplished y e t  in  
Japan. T im e-series d a ta  sure used fo r 1946-1982, and th e  methods 
o f  technique a re  o rd inary  le a s t  squares and a  sim ultaneous- 
equation  model in  th e  l i f e  cycle  framework.
The study finds th a t  so c ia l s e c u r ity  a f fe c ts  personal sav­
ings and th a t  th e  b e n e f i t  e f f e c t  dominates th e  re tirem en t e f f e c t  
concerning th e  hypothesized dual e f fe c ts .  The study a lso  iden­
t i f i e s  an interdependency between personal savings and th e  lab o r 
force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  in  Japan.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Ever s ince i t s  in s t i tu t io n ,  th e  so c ia l s e c u r ity  system has 
a l le v ia te d  th e  f in a n c ia l problems o f  th e  e ld e rly  under changing 
economic and so c ia l cond itions. Recently, in  th e  United S ta te s , 
t h i s  system has ccme under f i r e .  Hie main th ru s t  o f  th i s  a tta c k  
i s  tvo fb ld : (1) th a t  p r iv a te  savings d ec lin e  as compulsory pub­
l i c  savings such as so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  increase  
and (2) th a t  so c ia l s e c u rity  re t ir e n e n t  b e n e f its  have created  
a tre n d  towards e a r l i e r  re tirem en t.
The pioneer study o f  th e  impact o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  b e n e f its  
on personal savings was done by F e ld ste in  (1974). Cn th e  b a s is  
o f  h is  estim ated  tim e -se rie s  r e s u l ts ,  expected so c ia l se c u rity  
b e n e f its  reduce personal savings by more than  30 percen t. The 
study by Munnell (1974) a lso  supports F e ld s te in 's  r e s u l t .
Barro (1978) includes, in  ad d itio n  to  th e  v a ria b le s  o f  
F e ld ste in * s  model, new explanatory  v a r ia b le s : government surp lus 
and household durable goods. As fo r estim ated c o e f f ic ie n ts ,  h is  
a l te rn a t iv e ly  sp ec ified  so c ia l s e c u rity  v a ria b le s  a re  negative 
and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  in s ig n if ic a n t ,  w hile F e ld s te in 1s sp e c if ic a tio n
1
2o f  so c ia l s e c u r ity  v a r ia b le s  examined by Barro a re  p o s itiv e , b u t 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  in s ig n if ic a n t .  Barro concludes th a t  s o c ia l secu­
r i t y  w ealth o r  b e n e f its  do not r e a l ly  a f fe c t  personal savings.
Darbey (1979) suggests th a t  th e  reduction  o f  personal savings 
i s  sm aller than F e ld s te in  and Munnell re p o rt. Leimer and Lesncy 
(1982) s ta te  th a t  th e  r e s u l ts  d i f f e r  no t only under sp e c if ic a tio n  
and co n stru c tio n  o f  s o c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth v a r ia b le s , b u t a lso  
according to  th e  period  o f  estim ation  examined. Lesncy and 
Leimer (1985) d iscu ss econometric modeling, the  in te rp re ta t io n  
o f  estim ated  c o e f f ic ie n t and a  sample o f  a  p a r t ic u la r  period  
o f  h i s to r ic a l  observations re la te d  to  an in c lu sio n  o f  tru e  value. 
They conclude th a t  th e  tim e-se rie s  d a ta  provide l i t t l e  s t a t i s ­
t i c a l  support fo r th e  p ro p o sitio n  th a t  so c ia l s e c u rity  has r e ­
duced personal savings in  th e  United S ta te s .
An in te re s t in g  study by M odigliani and S te rlin g  (1983) does 
not ex c lu siv e ly  d ea l w ith th e  United S ta te s  b u t i s  an aggregate 
cross-coun try  study o f  21 OECD co u n trie s  and takes an average o f  
each country over th e  decade 1960-1970. Unlike o th e r s tu d ie s , 
except fo r th a t  o f  Munnell (1974), M odigliani and S te r lin g , using 
a  GLS technique in  th e  l i f e  cycle  framework, estim ate  not only  
d i r e c t  b e n e f it  e f f e c t  b u t a lso  re tirem en t e f f e c t .  The r e s u l ts  
show th a t  th e  sm all b e n e f it  and la rg e  re tirem en t e f fe c ts  o f f s e t  
each o th e r .  ^ Hie n e t impact o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t bene­
3f i t s  i s  c lo se  to  zero. The study suggests th a t  an in crease  in  
so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  tends to  reduce p r iv a te  per 
c a p ita  sav ings, b u t n o t as dram atic as shown in  F e ld s te in 's  
r e s u l t .
There a re  o th e r s tu d ie s  c u rre n tly  using m icrodata. B linder, 
Gordon and Wise (1983) use an ex tensive  c ro ss -se c tio n a l d a ta  s e t  
beginning in  1969 and re in te rv iew ing  in  1979 (Longitudinal 
Retirem ent H isto ry  Survey). They propose th a t  th e re  may be seme 
displacem ent o f  p r iv a te  savings by s o c ia l  s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  w ith in  th e  l i f e  cy c le  framework. An in crease  o f  $1 in  
each so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth induces people to  depress th e i r  
f in a n c ia l w ealth by 39 c e n ts . This reasonable number i s  unfor­
tu n a te ly  unable to  convince th ese  re sea rch ers  o f  th e  hypothesis 
o f  b e n e f it  e f fe c t  because o f  a  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  in s ig n if ic a n t e s t i ­
mated r e s u l t .
Hamermesh (1984) ap p lie s  m icrodata to  a  l i f e  cycle  model.
He uses h is  own constructed  s o c ia l  s e c u r ity  w ealth v a ria b le , and 
h i s  em pirica l study shows th a t  s n a il  estim ated  c o e ff ic ie n ts  
compared to  pension w ealth  v a r ia b le s  revea l a  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s ig n if ic a n t  e f fe c t  on consumption.
Williamson and Jones (1983) analyze a sim ulation  o f  in p ac t 
o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  upon l i f e  cy c le  behavior. They s ta te  th a t  
because o f  an increasing  re tirem en t period  due to  e a r l i e r  r e ­
4tirem en t and increasing  l i f e  expectancy, th e  b e n e f it  e f fe c t  
o f  so c ia l s e c u r ity  i s  o f f s e t  by th e  re tirem en t e f fe c t ,  although 
a pay-as-you-go s o c ia l s e c u rity  system has a  la rg e  impact on 
savings. Beach, Boadway and Gibbons (1984) use sim ulation  meth­
odology, tak ing  U.S. annual n a tio n a l accounts da ta  fran  1929 
through 1974 (excluding 1941-1946), to  in v estg a te  th e  impact 
o f  d i r e c t  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  cn p r iv a te  savings and c a p ita l  
accvm ulation. Their econometric technique i s  a  n o n -lin e r FIML 
(a fu ll- in fo rm a tio n  maxirmxn l ik e lih o o d ) . The considerably  small 
and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  weak estim ated  r e s u l ts  do not provide s trong  
evidence fo r th e  impact o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth on p r iv a te  
savings.
The a n tic ip a tio n  o f  th e  value o f  s o c ia l s e c u rity  r e t i r e ­
ment b e n e f its  and an accunulation  o f  compulsory savings fo r  o n e 's  
re tirem en t period  may have th e  e f f e c t  o f  reducing vo luntary  p r i­
v a te  savings and o f  encouraging more consumption during th e  
working period than would otherw ise occur (F e ld ste in , 1974,
1982f Munnell, 1974; B linder, Gordon and Wise 1983; M odigliani 
and S te r lin g , 1983; and Hamermesh, 1984). In  th e  United S ta te s  
i t  may w ell be th a t  life tim e-g u aran teed  so c ia l s e c u rity  r e t i r e ­
ment b e n e f its  w il l  indeed a f f e c t  vo luntary  p r iv a te  savings.
The recen t development o f  a  so c ia l s e c u r ity  system i n  Japan 
could p o ssib ly  s tim u la te  an e a r l i e r  re tirem en t by o ld er workers.
r ~
5However, th e  r a t io  o f  personal savings to  d isposable income is  
remarkably h igh compared w ith th a t  o f  th e  United S ta te s . The 
r a t io s  were 18.7% in  1960, 18.2% in  1970, 19.2% in  1980, and 19.7% 
in  1981 in  Japan, w hile those r a t io s  in  th e  United S ta tes  have 
ranged h i s to r ic a l ly  between 5.0-8,5%. Why i s  th e  Japanese 
experience so d if f e r e n t  ? The h is to r ic a l  evidence should be 
examined.
Concerning Japanese s tu d ie s , an ambiguous argument by 
Takayama (1982) i s  th a t  an in crease  in  pub lic  pensions w ill  r e ­
duce "p riv a te  savings" only s l ig h t ly .  Public pensions a re  l ik e ­
ly  to  in c rease  t o t a l  savings by increasing  government c a p ita l  
form ation through th e  p a r t ia l ly  funded system o f  a  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  program. Noguchi (1983) shows th a t  h is  estim ated c o e f f i­
c ie n ts  o f  Feldstein* s  algorithm  (1974) o f  gross s o c ia l s e c u rity  
w ealth measure a re  negative and th a t  only one estim ated c o e f f i­
c ie n t  in  severed equations i s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t.  Another 
s o c ia l  s e c u r ity  w ealth measure, th e  value o f  p a s t accumulated 
c o n tr ib u tio n s  o f  p u b lic  pensions, rev ea ls  a  su b s ti tu tio n  fo r th e  
household n e t w ealth . Two estim ated  c o e ff ic ie n ts  in  sev era l 
equations shew p o s itiv e  s igns, however. Thus, Noguchi does not 
p resen t any d ec is iv e  conclusion concerning th e  e f f e c t  so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  has on savings.
In Japan th e  W elfare Pension i s  a p a r t ia l ly  funded system,
6n o t a pay-as-you-go one. The Japanese system s t i l l  provides 
for a demographic s h i f t  in  th e  near fu tu re . This so c ia l secu­
r i t y  program (Welfare Pension) was introduced in  1942. The 
program has been in  a  process o f  development. The W elfare 
Pension, which i s  s im ila r  to  th e  OASDI program in  th e  United 
S ta te s , covers a  m ajo rity  o f  Japanese workers.^ The tax  r a te  
o f  th e  W elfare Pension ( so c ia l s e c u r ity  tax  ra te )  i s  a t  a  f l a t  
r a te  o f  10.6% on monthly earnings up to  a  taxab le  maximum o f  
410 thousand yen f rom th e  tax ab le  minimum o f  45 thousand yen fa r  
male w orkers. The r a te  i s  an 8.9% f l a t  tax  r a te  fo r fem ales. 
H alf th i s  r a te  i s  shared by th e  employer, as i s  tru e  w ith  th e  
United S ta te s  so c ia l s e c u rity  system.
Japanese W elfare Pension re tirem en t b e n e f its  ( so c ia l  secu­
r i t y  re tirem en t b e n e f its )  comprise th e  sun o f  th re e  p a r ts :  (1) 
a  fixed amount (2,050 yen) i s  m u ltip lied  by th e  leng th  o f  tax  
payment (Welfare Pension tax) years o f  a  worker, (2) the  amount 
o f  r e la t iv e  earnings (average revalued earnings fo r  p a s t working 
years) i s  m u ltip lied  by 1/100 and by th e  length  o f  th e  ta x  pay­
ment (W elfare Pension tax ) years  o f  a worker, and (3) a  f l a t  
fixed  15,000 yen per month fo r  a  spouse^ and fixed  5,000 yen 
p er month fo r each e ld e s t  and second e ld e s t  dependents, as w ell
5
as  2,000 yen fo r th e  remaining younger dependents. In  o rd er 
to  c a lc u la te  th e  b a s ic  b e n e f its  o f  (1) and (2 ), th e  b e n e f its  a re
7indexed to  th e  p r ic e  le v e l. G enerally , th e  minimum y ears  o f  
c o n trib u tio n  requ ired  by law i s  20 years .
The normal re tirem en t age i s  60 fo r  men and 55 fo r women.6 
B asica lly , re tirem en t i s  a  requ ired  cond ition . I f  a person 
between th e  ages o f  60 and 64 h as  an earning incane o f  le s s  than 
150 thousand yen a month, he (asslining th a t  he i s  th e  main bene­
f ic ia ry )  g e ts  fran  20% to  80% o f  h is  r e t i r e d  b e n e f its , Which a re  
r e la t iv e  to  h is  earning incane. The sca les  o f  reduction  a re  
20% fo r  earnings o f  45-92 thousand yen a month, 50% on earnings 
o f  98-126 thousand yen and 80% on 134-150 thousnad yen. I f  h is  
earn ings exceed 150 thousand yen a  month, however, a b en e fic ia ry  
does no t g e t the  re tirem en t b e n e f its .  Over age 65 th e  p ic tu re  
changes somewhat. A b e n e fic ia ry  aged 65 o r  over w ith  earnings 
le s s  than 150 thousand yen i s  e n t i t le d  to  100% o f  the  so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its ,  reg a rd less  o f  h is  o ther sources o f
non-labor income. I f  a  b e n e f ic ia ry 1 s  earnings exceed 150 thou-
7sand, he w i l l  rece ive  80% o f  th e  re tirem en t b e n e f its .
The re c e ip ts  o f  th e  Wei fe re  Pension tax  (so c ia l se c u rity  
tax) a re  deposited  in  sp ec ia l Treasury accounts (T rust Fund 
Bureau) and a re  u t i l iz e d  through Treasury Investment and Loans. 
As o f  1985 th e  accumulated pension fend was 27,983 b i l l io n  yen.® 
The fund i s  used fo r housing, l i f e  environment improvement,
8sm all e n te rp ris e s , w elfare  c u ltu re , education, a g r ic u ltu re , 
fo re s try , f is h e r ie s , e tc .  The main purpose o f  these  u t i l i ­
za tio n s  i s  to  Improve and s ta b i l iz e  liv in g  co n d itio n s . The 
proceeds o f  th e  fond cure used fo r  th e  ad m in istra tio n  c o s ts  o f  
th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  program, Which i s  a lso  supported through 
th e  genera l accounts. The cu rren t su rp lus o f  W eifere Pension 
reserv es vould a l le v ia te  th e  growing burden o f  increased  so c ia l 
s e c u rity  b e n e f ic ia r ie s  in  th e  next decade as th e  demographic 
s tru c tu re  s h i f t s .
In  o rd e r to  c la r i f y  th e  aforementioned in co n s is te n t em pirical 
r e s u l t s  based upon th e  United S ta tes  d a ta  and to  exp lain  th e  
high saving r a t io s  in  Japan, i t  may be u sefu l to  apply previous 
re sea rch e rs ' consuner expenditure and saving functions to  ex­
panded functions fo r Japanese d a ta  (a tim e s e r ie s  d a ta  fo r th e  
years 1946-1982). This study examines th e  in fluence  o f  s o c ia l  
s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  on personal Bavings and labo r sup­
ply  over th e  age o f  s ix ty  under d if f e r e n t  demographic and socio - 
eoonanic backgrounds in  th e  con tex t o f  o rd inary  le a s t  squares 
and a  sim ultaneous-equation model.
The em pirica l work o f  t h i s  study, by using Japanese time- 
s e r ie s  d a ta , attem pts to  exp lain  th e  impact o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its  on personal savings and upon lab o r supply o f  
th e  e ld e r ly  in  Japan. Such a  study i s  necessary fo r p red ic tin g
b ehav io ra l p a tte rn s  concerning savings and re tirem en t and fo r 
guiding p o licy  a c tio n s . The study w il l  attem pt as w ell to  
provide th e o re tic a l  and em pirical explanations o f  savings and 
labor supply behaviors.
The o rg an iza tio n  o f  th e  subsequent sec tio n  i s  as follow s. 
Chapter I I  reviews th e  previous s tu d ie s . Chapter I I I  describes 
th e  a n a ly tic a l  framework, and th e o re t ic a l  arguments o f  a  s ta ­
t i s t i c a l  model o f  savings and lab o r supply. Chapter IV rep o rts  
th e  em pirica l r e s u l ts  o f  previous re sea rch ers  and a expanded 
l i f e - c y c le  savings model by ord inary  le a s t  squares. Chapter V 
analyzes th e  in p ac t o f  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  on 
savings and on labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  by a 
sim ultaneous-equation model. Chapter VI con ta in s th e  summary 
and conclusion.
NOTE TO CHAPTER I
1 B enefit e f fe c t  i s  defined as follow s. Workers s u b s ti tu te  
so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  fo r o rd inary  w ealth in  th e i r  
p o r tfo l io  o f  re tirem en t a s se ts .  Thus, workers save le s s  fo r 
re tirem en t in  a n tic ip a tio n  o f  premised fu tu re  so c ia l se c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its .  Retirem ent e f fe c t  i s  defined as follows. 
Social s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  induce workers to  r e t i r e  
e a r l i e r .  Workers have to  save over a sh o rt working l i f e  fo r a 
longer re tirem en t period . Thus personal savings in crease .
2 Another m jo r  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t program i s  th e  
N ational Pension fo r self-em ployed workers.
3 In  1986, th e  r a te s  w il l  be ra ise d  to  12.4% fo r a  male 
worker and 11.3% for a  female worker.
4 I f  a  spouse has con tribu ted  to  th e  N ational Pension 
progr am, she rece ives an ad d itio n a l b e n e f it  w ith  sane conditions
5 Most o f  th e  e ld e r ly  do n o t have dependent ch ild ren  a t  
t h i s  age.
6 A fte r 1986 th e  normal re tirem en t age fo r females w ill  
became 60, w ith c a re fu lly  graduated adjustm ents during th i s  
t r a n s i t io n .
7 The sources a re  given by Mr. Tatsuro  Matsue in  S ocial 
S ecu rity  Agency Japanese Government and in  Shakai Hoken Techo 
( ’83), pp. 137-197.
8 White Paper o f  W elfare (1981), pp. 387-394.
CHAPTER I I
REVIEW OF THE PREVIOUS STUDIES
2.1 Social S ecu rity  Retirem ent B enefits  and Savings
The a n tic ip a te d  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  in  o ld  
age a re  no t cn ly  an im portant fa c to r  in  household w ealth, bu t 
a lso  th e  major component o f  w ealth  in  most re tirem en t p o r tfo lio s . 
With i t s  compulsory governm ent-directed savings program, th e  
s o c ia l  s e c u rity  tax  payment system produces fu tu re  so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  fo r r e t i r e d  workers during th e i r  
re tirem en t period  and u n t i l  death .
The most im portant study o f  the  impact o f  so c ia l s e c u r ity  
b e n e f its  on personal savings was pioneered by F e ld s te in  (1974).
On th e  b a s is  o f  h is  estim ated  tim e -se r ie s  r e s u l ts ,  expected so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  b e n e f its  reduce personal savings by more than 30%. The 
study by Munnell (1974) supports F e ld s te in 1 s r e s u l t .  Barro 
(1978) however, shows th a t  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth o r  b e n e f its  
do no t r e a l ly  a f f e c t  personal sav ings. Darby (1979) suggests 
th a t  th e  reduction  i s  a n a lle r  than F e ld s te in  and Munnell re p o rt. 
Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) re p o rt th a t  r e s u l ts  w il l  d i f f e r  not
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only  under sp e c if ic a tio n  and c o n s tru c tio n  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  
w ealth  v a ria b le s  b u t a lso  according to  th e  period o f  estim ation  
examined. Again F e ld ste in  (1982) es tim a tes  th e  o r ig in a l  equation 
fo r th e  o r ig in a l  sample period  a f te r  c o rrec tin g  the  programming 
e r ro r ,  and he confirms th e  o r ig in a l  evidence o f  1974.
In  h is  p ioneer study o f  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its , 
F e ld s te in  (1974) adapts th e  l i f e  cycle  model used by Ando and 
M odigliani (1963), and in troduces th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth 
(SSW) v a r ia b le  in to  h i s  "consumption,C, function ,"  as  follows:
C = aQ + a^YD + 3 2 ^ -1  + a3RE + *4U + a5W + a 6SSW 1 *
YD i s  personal d isposab le  income. He includes re ta in ed  earnings 
(RE) to  examine th e  impact o f  co rpo rate  savings on personal 
consumption. U i s  unemployment r a te ,  and W i s  th e  value o f  
th e  per c a p ita  n e t w ealth . F e ld ste in  uses an aggregate tim e- 
s e r ie s  d a ta  fo r th e  years 1929-1971, excluding th e  Vtorld War 
I I  y ears, 1941-1946. The method o f  estim ation  i s  ordinary- 
le a s t  squares. His emphasis i s  th a t  a n tic ip a te d  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  b e n e f its  reduce th e  amount o f  l i f e  cycle  savings during 
th e  working years  by providing income a f t e r  th e  working period.
His study assu res  th a t  th e  c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  SSW r e f le c ts  both  th e  
b e n e f it  e f f e c t  ( a s s e t- s u b s t i tu t io n  e f fe c t)  and th e  re tirem en t
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effect.'* '
The so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  v a r ia b le  (SSW) i s  th e  essence o f  
F eldste in*s an a ly s is . Two d e f in itio n s  are  employed. Gross 
so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  (SSWG) i s  th e  p resen t value o f  th e  so c ia l 
s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  expected by th e  ind iv idual worker. 
The o th e r i s  n e t so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  (SSWN).
SSWN i s  g ross so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  minus th e  p resen t value o f  
th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t tax  expected by th e  in d iv id u a l 
workers. His major conclusion i s  th a t  on th e  b a s is  o f  h is  es­
tim ated tim e-se rie s  r e s u l ts ,  s o c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  
reduce personal savings by more them 30%.
F e ld s te in  (1982) reexamines h is  o r ig in a l  study(1974) w ith  
th e  c o rrec tio n  o f  th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth v a r ia b le  and con­
cludes th a t  th e  aggregate tim e -se rie s  evidence again  provides a 
38% reduction  o f  p o te n tia l t o t a l  p r iv a te  savings in  1976.
The study by Munnell (1974) a lso  concludes th a t  so c ia l se­
c u r i ty  re tirem en t b e n e f its  reduce personal savings. Munnell has 
th e  following "saving,S , function":
S = a Q+ a-jYD + a^fD.LF60 + a 3U + a4W + agSSOON o r 
a  SSW ........... 2.
Unlike F e ld ste in , Munnell enploys d isposab le  incane (YD) tim es
2labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  males aged 65 and over. YD.LF60
ET'
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ex p la in s  th e  re tirem en t e f fe c t  in  t h i s  study, a f te r  Munnell' s  
(1974) model. U and W are  unemployment r a te  and p r iv a te  n e t 
w ealth per c a p ita  re sp e c tiv e ly . SSCON i s  so c ia l s e c u rity  con­
tr ib u tio n , Which i s  th e  n e t to t a l  co n trib u tio n  to  the  QASDI 
program. Munnell uses th e  U.S. aggregate savings o f  a  time 
s e r ie s  d a ta  1929-1971 and concludes th a t  so c ia l se c u rity  con­
tr ib u tio n s  (SSOON)  ^ have been responsib le  fo r  a  $47-$64 decrease 
in  per c a p ita  savings and th a t  th e  d ec lin e  in  labor force p a r­
t ic ip a t io n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  a f f e c ts  an in c rease  in  per c a p ita  
saving o f  $31 to  $44. By using so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth (SSW, 
th e  same as F e ld ste in  used) in s tead  o f  SSOON, Munnell ob ta ins 
s im ila r  r e s u l ts  o f  th e  inpact o f  both SSW and YD.LF60 on per­
sonal savings.
F e ld s te in 's  and M unnell's s ta r t l in g  r e s u l ts  a re  th a t  so c ia l 
se c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  depress personal sav ings. They 
both s t r e s s  th e  ex istence  o f  a  la rg e  su b s ti tu tio n  o f  expected 
so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  fo r p r iv a te  savings.
B arro 's  th e o re t ic a l  challenge (1978) does not support 
F e ld s te in 1 s  hypothesis o f  th e  p o s itiv e  e f f e c t  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  
on consumption expenditure. He employs th e  a l te rn a t iv e  so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  measure (SS) based on cu rre n t b e n e f it  r a te s  and cu rren t 
worker coverage under th e  so c ia l s e c u r ity  system. His "consump­
t i o n , ^  fu n ctio n ,"  i s  as follows:
His consumption expenditure function  anplqys ad d itio n a l v ari­
a b le s : government su rp lus (SUR) and stock o f  household durables 
excluding housing ( D U R ) B a r r o ,  as did F e ld s te in , includes 
cu rren t personal d isposab le  inccme (YD) and lagged personal d is ­
posable incane as  proxy v a r ia b le s  fo r a  permanent incane e s t i -  
m a tia  . He m aintains th a t  unemployment r a te  tim es d isposable  
incane (U.YD) i s  more reasonable fo r measuring th e  dev ia tio n  
o f  incane from i t s  normal p o s itio n  than  a l in e a r  form unemploy­
ment r a te ,  U. B arro 's  em pirica l r e s u l t  i s  th a t  SSW, as  defined 
by F e ld ste in , i s  p o s itiv e  and in s ig n if ic a n t ,  b u t h is  so c ia l 
se c u r ity  measure (SS) i s  negative  w ith  in s ig n ifican ce . His 
argument suggests th a t  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  a re  
n o t l ik e ly  to  have a  s u b s ta n tia l e f f e c t  on personal savings.
Darby's major finding  (1979) i s  employing th e  permanent- 
incane consimption model, in co rp o ra tin g  F e ld s te in 's  so c ia l 
s e c u rity  w ealth v a r ia b le  and in troducing  a stock o f  r e a l  money 
balance as one o f  th e  explanatory  v a r ia b le s .^  The estim ates 
depend upon th e  functiona l form and th e  tim e period  used in  th e  
estim ation . He re p o rts  th e  r e s u l ts  o f  an extended consumer 
expenditure function based on F e ld s te in 's  and B arro 's  so c ia l
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s e c u r ity  w ealth v a riab les  frcm 1929 to  1974. He s ta te s  th a t  
th e  reduction  o f  savings w il l  be much a n a lle r  than th e  e s t i ­
mation fcy F e ld ste in .
Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) r e p lic a te  F e ld s te in 's  so c ia l 
se cu rity  v a ria b le  and produce another so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth 
v a r ia b le  which i s  a  d if fe re n t  algorithm : constan t r a t io ,  c u rre n t 
r a t io ,  adaptive expecta tions, p e rfe c t fo res ig h t and a c tu a r ia l
p ro jec tio n . The estim ated  c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  so c ia l se c u rity  
w ealth v a riab le s  not only have s n a il  t - r a t i o s ,  bu t a lso  vary 
according to  th e  period  o f  estim ation  examined, which produces 
r e s u l ts  co n trad ic tin g  F e ld s te in 's .  Although th e  r e s u l ts  de­
pend upon th e  choice o f  d e f in it io n  as to  how so c ia l s e c u rity  
w ealth v a riab le s  a re  formulated and what period  o f  estim ation  i s  
in  eluded, Leimer and Lesnoy conclude th a t  th e i r  r e s u l ts  imply 
l i t t l e  o r no e f fe c t  on personal savings in  th e  United S ta te s . 
Lesnoy and Leimer (1985) a s s e r t  th a t  the  tim e-se rie s  d a ta  o f  th e  
United S ta tes  f a i l  to  support th e  hypothesis th a t  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  reduces savings.
Very few em pirical s tu d ies  o f  th e  e f fe c t  o f  so c ia l se c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its  on savings have been done in  Japan. One 
reason fo r th is  lack o f  a t te n t io n  i s  an excess o f  o r  s u f f ic ie n t  
savings in  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  in  Japan as  opposed to  in s u f f i­
c ie n t  savings in  th e  United S ta te s . As fa r  as th e  au thor o f
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t h i s  study knows, th e  only e n p ir ic a l  study on th e  Japanese case 
i s  a  recen t one by Noguchi (1983) which uses tim e -se rie s  d a ta . 
There i s  no micro d a ta  study o f  th e  impact o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  
r e t ir s n e n t  b e n e f its  on savings in  Japan. There i s  a  lack o f  
th e o re t ic a l  and em pirica l development. As Noguchi (1983) men­
t io n s ,  i t  i s  extrem ely d i f f i c u l t  fo r research ers  to  gain  access 
to  in d iv id u a l d a ta .^
Takayama (1982) s ta te s  th a t  among th e  Japanese th e  moti­
v a tio n  fo r saving i s  much more complex than simply fo r purposes 
o f  re tirem en t. He id e n t i f ie s  (1) a  myopic saving a t t i tu d e  among 
th e  young generation  fo r  th e i r  re tirem en t and (2) a  se rio u s  
saving a t t i tu d e  among those  aged 50 and over fo r th e i r  r e t i r e ­
ment. He mentions th a t  an in c rease  in  pub lic  pension w ill  reduce 
p r iv a te  savings only s l ig h t ly  among th e  r e la t iv e ly  young popula­
t io n  in  Japan. With l i t t l e  m otivation  fo r th e  re tirem en t period , 
th e  to t a l  amount saved ( in  which T&kayama includes government 
forced savings, namely government-funded so c ia l s e c u rity  tax  
c o n tr ib u tio n s) w il l  in c rease  due to  a  r i s e  in  th e  tax  c o n tr i­
b u tio n  under th e  p a r tia lly -fu n d e d  Japanese system. This forced 
saving allow s th e  government to  in crease  goverrment investm ent, 
which a f fe c ts  p ro d u c tiv ity  and in  tu rn  r e s u l ts  in  ra is in g  t o t a l  
savings. Takayama's th e o re t ic a l  argument concludes th a t  th e re  
have been no adverse e f fe c ts  o f  the  so c ia l s e c u rity  tax  upon
18
personal o r  p r iv a te  savings. I t  seems th a t  he argues th e  cur­
r e n t  h igh  savings from an aggregate po in t o f  view. As he men­
t io n s ,  we s t i l l  need an em pirica l study o f  th e  impact o f  so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  upon personal o r p r iv a te  savings 
in  Japan.
Shinohara (1983) poses two questions about a  constan tly  
and unusually  h igh savings r a t io  and i t s  upward tre n d  in  th e  
savings r a t io s  through th e  post-w ar period . The method o f  h is  
a n a ly s is  re la te d  to  abso lu te  and r e la t iv e  incane hypotheses i s  
m ainly a  d e sc rip tiv e  one compiled by reading c ro se -sec tio n  and 
tim e -se r ie s  d a ta . He gives sev era l reasons fo r h igh  savings: 
in su ff ic ie n c y  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its ,  bonus 
e f f e c t ,  a s s e t  e f fe c t ,  age com position, growth r a te  and n a tio n a l 
c h a ra c te r . He emphasizes an in creasin g  cu rren t incane, a  bonus 
payment and a  lump sun re tirem en t payment to  in fluence savings. 
Using tim e -se r ie s  d a ta  fo r 1963-1978, he found a  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s ig n if ic a n t  re la t io n s h ip  between re a l  savings and re a l  d ispos­
a b le  income. Shinohara favors an abso lu te  income hypothesis 
t o  ex p la in  th e  high sav ings. Shinohara (1983) mentions th e  
in flu en ce  o f  s o c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  on savings, 
b u t h e  dees not em piricaly  study i t s  in flu en ce .
Noguchi (1983) examines th e  in fluence o f  th e  expected pre­
s e n t value o f  public  pensions, which correspond to  F eldstein*s
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g ro ss  so c ia l s e c u r ity  w ealth  measure (1974), as w ell as th e  in ­
fluence o f  th e  value o f  p a s t co n trib u tio n s  accumulated to  th e  
p resen t on housdnold n e t v e a lth . He uses th e  d a ta  o f  th e  Ecunily 
Saving Survey and the  Family Incane and Expenditure Survey fo r 
th e  period  1968 through 1980. The expected p resen t values o f  
p u b lic  pensions a re  a l l  negative, b u t not a l l  o f  them are  s ta ­
t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t .  He suggests th a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  
conclude a p e rfe c t s u b s ti tu tio n  between the  expected p resen t 
value o f  p u b lic  pensions and n e t w ealth  among Japanese house­
h o ld s. He s ta te s ,  however, th a t  a  s u b s titu tio n  e x is ts  between 
th e  p re re tirem en t w ealth  accumulation and th e  accumulated con­
t r ib u t io n  o f  public  pensions.
Ishikawa and Ueda (1984) ex ten siv e ly  examine Japanese house­
hold saving behavior by using c ro ss  sec tio n  and tim e-se rie s  d a ta . 
They concentrate  on th e  bonus e f f e c t  upon savings, hypothesize 
a h a b it-b u ffe r  incane, and r e fu te  th e  permanent in ccm e/life  
cycle  hypothesis. However, they do not examine th e  in fluence 
o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  on savings. They conclude th a t  th e  bonus 
incane has a  la rg e  p o s itiv e  in fluence on Japanese savings be­
h av io r. ^
Thus, th e  e f f e c t  o f  so c ia l secu rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  on 
savings i s  s t i l l  open to  question  both in  th e  United S ta tes  and 
Japan.
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2.2 S ocial S ecu rity  Retirem ent B enefits  and Labor Supply
Fran the  l i f e - c y c le ,  labor-supply  hypothesis p o in t o f  v ie w ,  
accumulated t o t a l  w ealth in  one period  a f fe c t  labor supply in  
another period . Thus, a n tic ip a te d  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  in  one period  in fluence labor supply in  another period, 
and v ice  versa .
In  an ea rly  study M ichael Boskin (1977) analyzed th e  e f f e c t  
o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  on re tirem en t by ex trac tin g  frcm th e  Panel 
Study o f  Incane Dynamics d a ta  fo r  131 households headed by w hite 
m arried males aged 61 through 65 fo r th e  fiv e  years o f  survey. 
Incorporating  th e  inccm e-leisure choice theory , h is  r e s u l ts  
suggest th a t  income-guaranteed so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t bene­
f i t s  c le a r ly  reduce th e  expected nunber o f  work years by more 
than  2 years in  th e  61-70 age in te rv a l .  The acceptance o f  so ­
c i a l  s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  induces th e  e ld e r ly  to  leave 
th e  job o r  to  r e s t r i c t  market work and thereby  to  reduce th e  
lab o r supply. He a lso  rev ea ls  th a t  th e  h igh im p lic it  tax  r a te  
on earnings has an enormous in fluence on th e  re tirem en t dec i­
s ion  o f  the  e ld e r ly .
PelleC hio (1979) estim ates  th e  impact o f  h is  constructed  
so c ia l s e c u r ity  w ealth v a r ia b le : th e  a c tu a r ia l  p resen t value 
o f  fu tu re  b e n e f its  discounted a t  th e  market in te r e s t  r a te  on the
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re tirem en t behavior fo r th re e  age groups: 60-61, 62-64 and 65- 
70. An in crease  in  so c ia l s e c u r ity  w ealth frcm $35 thousand 
to  $55 thousand ra is e s  th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  re tirem en t by 0.22 
r e la t iv e  to  a  0.78 re tirem en t r a te  {age group 65-70) and by 
0.15 r e la t iv e  to  a 0.41 re tirem en t r a te  (age group 62-64), 
w hile th e  estim ated c o e f f ic ie n t i s  small and in s ig n if ic a n t 
labor supply.
among the  age group 60-61, However, ca lcu a tio n s  based on the  
Longitudinal Retirem ent H isto ry  Survey by B linder, Gordon and 
Wise (1980) provide th a t  th e  earning t e s t  fo r so c ia l s e c u rity  
does no t discourage work e f f o r t  for th e  worker aged 62-64. The 
reason they  suggest i s  due to  a  recouping o f  d eferred  b e n e f its  
fo r 'the worker aged 62-64. Mathematical and th e o re tic a l  analy­
ses  by Crawford and L ilie n  (1981) seem to  support the  statem ent 
o f  B linder, Gordon and Wise (1980). Under the assumption: un­
c e r ta in ty  o f  life sp a n , fa irn e ss  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its ,  and p e rfe c t c a p ita l  m arket, th e  mathematical model 
by Crawford and L ilie n  tends to  delay  re tirem en t o f  th e  e ld e r ly  
who expect an in crease  in  deferred  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f i t s .
Burkhauser and Turner (1982 b) reexamine th e i r  previous 
study (1978) a f te r  c o rrec tin g  th e  so c ia l se c u rity  w ealth v a r i­
a b le  in  which Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) id e n tify  an e r ro r  in  th e
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i s  a  tim e-se rie s  an a ly s is  to  examine th e  e f fe c t  o f  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  on th e  market work behavior o f  prime-age males. They recon­
firm  th e  r e s u l ts  th a t  so c ia l s e c u rity  r a is e s  th e  work week 2-3 
hours in  t h i s  age group. The r e s u l t  im plies th a t  i f  th e  earning 
t e s t  a f fe c ts  th e  labor supply o f th e  e ld e r ly , so c ia l s e c u rity  re ­
tirem en t b e n e f its  induce th e  prime-age worker to  work more hours 
during th e  unconstrained p erio d  in  th e  l i f e -c y c le  labor supply.
The main purpose o f  th e  s tu iy  by Hamermesh (1984) i s  to  ex­
amine th e  jo in tn ess  o f  leisure-consum ption behavior o f th e  e ld ­
e r ly  under l i f e  cycle  framework. He co n stru c ts  a  le isu re  v a r i ­
ab le  and does n o t spec ify  th e  work s ta tu s  o f  th e  e ld e rly , using 
th e  Retirem ent H istory  Survey d a ta  fo r  1969, 1973 and 1975. The 
in v erse  re la tio n sh ip  between le is u re  (negative  sign) and goods 
consuntion (p o sitiv e  sign) v a ria b le s  w ith estim ated c o e ff ic ie n ts  
on th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth v a riab le  suggests th a t  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  w ealth a f fe c ts  p o s itiv e ly  on work e f fo r t  o f  th e  e ld e r ly .
Hanoch and Ho nig (1983), using d a ta  in  a  sample from th e  
Retirem ent H istory  Survey (RHS) fo r  the  y ea r 1969-1975, look 
a t  various in f lu e n t ia l  fa c to rs  on re tirem en t and p rere tirem en t 
behavior o f  w hite males and unmarried females aged 58-69. They 
use Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) as th e  p o te n tia l so c ia l secu­
r i t y  income to  examine th e  e f fe c t  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  on th e  lab o r fo rce p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f th e  e ld e r ly . The
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use Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) as th e  p o te n tia l  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  incane to  examine th e  e f f e c t  o f  so c ia l se c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  on th e  labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly . The 
estim ated c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  v a r ia b le  fo r  both  
sexes in d ic a te  an in cen tiv e  to  r e t i r e  among th e  e ld e r ly . Their 
study  (1985), using RHS fo r th e  years 1967-1973, e x p l ic i t ly  d ea ls  
w ith  t r a n s i t io n a l  behavior among n o n -re tired , p a r t ia l ly  r e t i r e d  
and fu lly  r e t i r e d  w hite m arried males aged 62-67. The estim ated 
lo g i t  c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) show a 
p o s itiv e  s ign  on th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  n o n -re tired  fu ll- tim e  work, 
and a  negative sign  on th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  th e  p a r t ia l ly  r e t i r e d  
(p a rt-tim e  work) and fu lly  r e t i r e d  e ld e r ly .
Hurd and Bo sk in  (1984) find a cause fo r th e  d ec lin e  in  
labo r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  e ld e r ly  workers in  th e  e a r ly  1970s. 
The cause i s  explained by th e  la rg e  in crease  in  so c ia l s e c u r ity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its .  They s ta te ,  however, th a t  the  e f fe c t  o f  
so c ia l s e c u r ity  on th e  re tirem en t o f  th e  e ld e r ly  i s  no t y e t 
s u f f ic ie n t ly  advanced to  exp la in  thoroughly th e  la rg e r  p ic tu re  
using th e  a v a ila b le  sp e c if ic  d a ta  and theory . The more p rec ise  
and e x p l ic i t  study by M itch e ll and F ie ld s  (1984) provides ev i­
dence fo r a  so c ia l s e c u rity  e f f e c t  encouraging re tirem en t. They 
use unique d a ta  compiled on 8,700 workers covered by 10 d i f f e r ­
e n t pension p lans: surveyed in  1978, and concen tra te  thoroughly
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on when and why the  workers r e t i r e  and what i s  th e  nature o f  
th e  workers' pension p lans. The estim ated lo g i t  c o e ff ic ie n ts  
rev ea l th a t  an increase  o f  so c ia l s e c u r ity  b e n e f its  and pensions 
induces e a r l i e r  re tirem en t.
As fa r  as Japanese s tu d ie s  a re  concerned, Takayama (1982) 
s ta te s  th a t  th e  so c ia l se cu rity  system i s  u n lik e ly  to  a f fe c t  
many employment d ec is ions because o f  th e  s c a rc ity  o f  job oppor­
tu n i t ie s  fo r  th e  e ld e r ly  in  Japan (though Takayama's i s  not an 
em pirica l s tu d y ). He m aintains th a t  th e  impact o f  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  re tirem en t b e n e f its  on th e  e ld e r ly 's  r e t ir s n e n t  d ec is io n  
i s  sm aller than th a t  o f  th e  job market s i tu a t io n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly .
I to  (1983) e x p lic i te ly  id e n t i f ie s  th e  re la tio n sh ip  between 
th e  re tirem en t process o f  e ld e r ly  men and so c ia l se c u rity  re ­
tirem en t b e n e f its .  His a n a ly tic a l method. Automatic In te ra c tiv e  
D etector (AID) i s  app lied  to  survey data.®  He examines th e  
in f lu e n t ia l  fa c to rs  on th e  t r a n s i t io n  from a main life tim e  job to  
a  second job before  ocmplete re tirem en t. Most o f  th e  e ld e r ly  
men attem pt to  g e t a  job again w hile rece iv in g  so c ia l s e c u rity  
r e t i r s n e n t  b e n e f its .  His an a ly s is  finds th a t  th e i r  in cen tiv e  o f  
work e f f o r t  (w ithout com pletely withdrawing fron  th e  labor mar­
ket) i s  la rg e ly  a ffec ted  by th e  amount o f  so c ia l se c u rity  re ­
tirem en t b e n e f its .  He s ta te s  th a t  as so c ia l se c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  in c rease , th e  e ld e r ly  men a re  n o t eager to  find jobs
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during th e i r  re tirem en t period  because o f  th e  a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  
both  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  and unemployment in su r­
ance b e n e f its .  They tend to  s tay  in  th e  labo r market u n t i l  t h e i r  
unemployment b e n e f its  ex p ire , and only then w ill  they  compromise 
on th e  conditions and wages o f  a  new job.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I I
1 B enefit e f fe c t  i s  defined as fb llcw s. Workers su b s ti tu te
s o c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  fo r o rd inary  w ealth in  th e i r  
p o r tfo l io  o f  re tirem en t a s se ts .  Thus workers save le s s  fo r re ­
tirem ent in  a n tic ip a tio n  o f  premised fu tu re  so c ia l s e c u rity  re ­
tirem en t b e n e f i ts .  Retirem ent e f fe c t  i s  defined as follow s. So­
c ia l  s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  induce workers to  r e t i r e  ear­
l i e r ,  Workers have to  save over a  sh o rt working l i f e  fo r a 
longer re tirem en t period , thus, personal savings in c rease .
2 Since a  mandatory re tirem en t age im p lic it ly  e x is ts  a t  th e
age o f  55 o r  60 under th e  Japanese l ife - t im e  enpplcyment system, 
t h i s  study uses th e  labo r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  males aged 60 
and over. Munnell (1974) uses a labo r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  
males aged 65 and over fo r th e  U.S. study. The s ta r t in g  age o f  
rece iv ing  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  i s  s ix ty  in  Japan.
3 In Munnell (1974) so c ia l s e c u rity  co n trib u tio n s  rep resen t
th e  n e t t o t a l  co n trib u tio n s  to  th e  OASI T rust Fund in  th e  United 
S ta te s .
4 The d a ta  o f  stock  o f  household durables i s  no t a v a ilab le  
from 1946. The da ta  fo r expenditure o f  durable goods p resen t 
a  proxy v a r ia b le  fo r stock o f  household durables frcm 1946 to  
1982. The d a ta  cire in  th e  Japanese Economic Planning Agency’s 
White paper o f  N ational Income," 1960 and "N ational Economic 
C a lcu la tio n ,"  1965-1983.
5 A permanent income v a r ia b le  by Darby (1979) i s  estim ated 
as a weighted average o f  p a s t income by th e  exponen tia lly  de­
c lin in g  w eight method.
6 We w a it fo r  th e  a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  in d iv id u a l d a ta  fo r fu rth e r  
in s ig h t in to  th e  re tirem en t behavior o f  th e  e ld e r ly  in  Japan. 
O btaining m icro-based d a ta  i s  extrem ely d i f f i c u l t  un less a  
re search er i s  a f f i l i a t e d  w ith  th e  Japanese government agencies.
7 Bonus income i s  a  non-regular income. Most o f  Japanese 
firm s d is t r ib u te  bonus payments to  t h e i r  employees tw ice a  year: 
August and December.
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8 B asically  the  method o f  Automatic In te ra c tio n  D etector 
(AID) i s  th a t  samples a re  successively  d iv ided  in to  two p a r ts  by 
a  s ig n if ic a n t explanatory v a r ia b le  o f  a  fac to r.
CHAPTER I I I
ANALYTICAL ERAMEWCJRK
3.1 The Inpact o f  S ocial S ecu rity  R e tirsn en t B enefits  on
Personal Savings
Most r e t i r e d  Japanese b e n e f it  frcm th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  
re tirem en t system a f t e r  th e  age o f  s ix ty , as was d iscussed  in  
Chapter I .  In  Japan th e  Wei fe re  Pension was in s t i tu te d  in  1942, 
and th e  N ational Pension in  1961. (Both programs comprise th e  
s o c ia l s e c u rity  r e t ir s n e n t  b e n e f its .)  However, in  s p ite  o f  the  
completion o f  income-guaranteed r e t ir s n e n t  b e n e f its , th e  r a t io  
o f  personal savings to  personal d isposab le  income has been sur­
p r is in g ly  and continuously  h igh  (regarded by many a s  in s u f f i ­
c ie n t  fo r t h e i r  needs), approxim ately 19% on th e  average since 
1961. In  p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  r a t io s  averaged above 21% during th e  
h ig h ly  in f la t io n a ry  period  between 1973 and 1978. The question  
a r is e s  whether o r  no t so c ia l se cu rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  d is ­
courage personal savings.
In  the  debate over so c ia l s e c u r ity  and savings, ambiguous 
th e o re tic a l  and em pirica l conclusions by F e ld ste in  (1974), 
Munnell (1974), Barro (1978), Darby (1979), and F e ld ste in  and
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P e llech io  (1979) have been advanced as to  whether so c ia l secu­
r i t y  re tirem en t b e n e f its  tend to  in crease  o r  decrease personal 
savings under th e  p ressure  o f  changing re tirem en t experiences 
(Leimer and Lesnoy, 1982? F e ld ste in , 1982? B linder, Gordon, 
and Wise, 1983? M odigliani and S te r lin g , 1983? Hamermesh, 1984? 
and Lesnoy and Leimer, 1985.
But everyone seems to  agree th a t  personal savings w il l  be 
reduced by th e  a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  expected fu tu re  so c ia l se c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its  providing incane fo r th e  consunpticn o f  th e  
re tirem en t period , i . e . ,  th e  "b en e fit e f fe c t" ,  and th a t  personal 
savings w i l l  be increased by inducing e a r l i e r  re tirem en t caused 
by expected fu tu re  so c ia l s e c u rity  r e t ir e n e n t  b e n e f its . The 
e a r l i e r  re tirem en t means a  longer period  o f  re tirem en t fo r a  
given l i f e  span, and th i s  req u ire s  an accumulation o f  savings 
during th e  working period , i . e . ,  th e  "re tirem ent e f fe c t ."
Thus, th e  n e t e f fe c t  o f  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  
on personal savings depends upon th e  r e la t iv e  s tren g th  o f  these  
o f fe e t t in g  e f f e c ts .  I f  th e  b e n e f it  e f fe c t  i s  s tro n g er them 
th e  re tirem en t e f fe c t ,  personal savings w il l  be reduced. On 
th e  o th e r hand, i f  th e  re tirem en t e f fe c t  i s  s tro n g er than th e  
b e n e f it  e f fe c t ,  personal savings w il l  be increased . Leimer and 
Lesnoy (1982), however, doubt th a t  s o c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  induce an in crease  in  savings in  th e  United S ta te s .
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The significant progress in the Japanese social security 
retirement program since the Second World Weir has not yet clearly 
revealed its influence on the behavioral pattern of personal 
savings (Takayama, 1982; Noguchi, 1983; and Shinohara, 1983).
Under th e  Japanese life tim e  employment system, a  mandatory 
re tirem en t age im p lic itly  e x is ts  a t  th e  age o f  55 o r  60, although 
employees who d e s ire  to  continue can remain a t  th e i r  jobs on 
cond ition  th a t  th e i r  wages are  lower compared to  th e i r  wages 
befo re  th e  age o f  55 o r  60 (Osaka, 1982; and Takayama, 1982). 
However, in d iv id u a ls  have cane to  expect prolonged re tirem en t 
years  due to  a  s ig n if ic a n t r i s e  in  th e  Japanese life sp a n . This 
expecta tion , since  i t  forces in d iv id u a ls  to  contemplate th e  
amount o f  th e i r  own fu tu re  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  
fo r th e  re tirem en t period , i s  based upon th e  fe e t  th a t  a  gradual 
in c rease  in  expected re tirem en t y ears  i s  an im portant fac to r in  
a life tim e  a llo c a tio n  o f  savings p lan  (M odigliani and S te rlin g , 
1983; and M odigliani, 1986). Hamermesh (1984) finds th a t  annual 
r e a l  consunption spending i s  lower amoung people w ith long l i f e  
expectancy. Cue can sa fe ly  say th a t  th e  strong s tim u la tio n  on 
th e  behavior o f  saving p a tte rn s  during  th e  l a s t  four decades 
has been th e  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  v is ib le  in crease  in  th e  l i f e  span 
o f  th e  Japanese (see TABLE 2).
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3.2 T h eo re tica l Model and Function
M otivations fo r saving came fran  severa l sources. There 
a re  th e  l i f e  cycle purpose, th e  p recau tionary  purpose, and th e  
sp ecu la tiv e  purpose. I t  i s  p o ssib le  th a t  m otivations a re  in te r ­
changeable w ith in  th e  range o f  life tim e  planned savings. With 
th e se  d iv e rse  m otives, one might find  any su b s ti tu tio n  e f f e c t  
o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth in  any component o f  savings. Although 
th e  m otivations o f  saving c o n s is t  o f  severed, types, th e  l i f e  
cycle hypothesis provides a  s u ita b le  framework fo r arguing th e  
e f f e c t  o f  s o c ia l s e c u r ity  on personal savings (F e ld s te in , 1974; 
Darby, 1979; B linder, Gordon and Wise, 1983; King, 1983; 
M odigliani and S te r lin g , 1983; W illiamson and Jones, 1983; and 
Hamermesh, 1984).
The an a ly s is  expands th e  p rev iously  te s te d  models w ith in  
th e  framework o f  th e  l i f e  cycle  model to  a  more general framework 
com prising th e  idea  o f  l i f e  cycle savings, which h o pefu lly  w il l  
in d ic a te  th e  importance o f  th e  extended t r a d i t io n a l  model by r e ­
la t in g  th e  age o f  r e t i r s n e n t  to  economic circum stances. Munnell 
(1974), and M odigliani and S te rlin g  (1983) e x p l ic i t ly  observe 
b e n e f it  and r e t ir s n e n t  e f fe c ts .  In  th i s  study we use personal 
savings as a  dependent v a r ia b le .
The form o f  th e  savings equation  in  th e  main a n a ly s is  i s  as
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follows:
S = a Q + a-jYD + a 2YD + a^RE + ^SUR + ^U.YD + a^ W
+ a LF60 + a  SSW o r  a  SS o r a  SSCON . . . . .  4,
7 8
where S i s  personal savings, YD i s  personal d isposab le  income,
RE i s  re ta in e d  earn ings, SUR i s  government su rp lu s , U.YD i s  th e  
product o f  unanplqyment r a te  (U) and d isposab le  incane (YD), W 
i s  per c a p ita  n e t w ealth , and LF60 i s  labor force p a r tic ip a tio n  
o f  males age 60 and over. SSWs (SSWG and SSWN) o r SS o r  SSCON 
is  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth . The model w i l l  assu re  th a t  in d i­
v id u a ls  a re  forward- and backward-looking ra tio n a l p lanners 
because o f  th e  in c lu sio n  o f  lagged v a r ia b le s . TABLE 1 rep o rts  
th e  d e f in it io n s  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s .
Since th e  r e la t io n  between so c ia l s e c u rity  co n trib u tio n s  by 
ta x a tio n  and by b e n e f its  during a  re tirem en t period  i s  not a 
one-to-one re la tio n s h ip , so c ia l s e c u rity  taxes do no t d i r e c t ly  
o r  accu ra te ly  measure s o c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  as 
w ealth  in  th e  fu tu re . A measure o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  should consider th e  fu tu re  consumption behavior for 
th e  re tirem en t period .
The so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth v a r iab le  (SSW) introduced by 
F e ld s te in  (1974) and Munnell (1974) r e f le c ts  su rv iv a l proba­
b i l i t i e s  and th e  p resen t d iscounted value o f  fu tu re  re c e ip ts  as
w ealth . I t  a lso  takes in to  account no t only th e  cu rren t so c ia l 
s e c u rity  tax  h u t a ls o  th e  p resen t discounted value o f  a l l  fu tu re  
s o c ia l s e c u r ity  tax es . I f  in d iv id u a ls  behave m yopically, an­
t ic ip a te d  so c ia l s e c u rity  tax  and b e n e f its  do no t a f fe c t  th e i r  
cu rren t behavior (Williamson and Jones, 1983). Therefore, i t  
seems le g itim a te  to  assume th a t  th e  SSW i s  th e  amount o f  bene­
f i t s  which in d iv id u a ls  can expect to  receive  in  th e  re tirem en t 
period  as accumulated w ealth which has been saved in  th e  working 
period  (F e ld ste in , 1974). However, as Leimer and Lesnoy (1982), 
and Lesnoy and Leimer (1985) p o in t o u t, the  co n stru c tio n  o f  a 
so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  v a r iab le  should r e f le c t  change in  l i f e  
expectancy, age s tru c tu re , population, r e a l  income, in te r e s t  
ra te , so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its , so c ia l s e c u rity  re ­
tirem en t tax , and change in  th e  benefit-incom e r a t io  during th e i r  
observed periods. The p resen t study tak es  in to  account th e  sug­
g estio n s  o f  Leimer and Lesnoy (1982), and Lesnoy and Leimer 
(1985).
Our so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  v a riab le  (SSOON) w il l  rep resen t 
another aspect showing how cu rren t so c ia l s e c u rity  tax  c o n tr i­
bu tions a f f e c t  behav io ra l p a tte rn s  o f  personal savings. The 
so c ia l s e c u r ity  w ealth  v a r ia b le  (SS) w il l  r e f le c t  how cu rren t 
so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  a f fe c t  behavioral p a tte rn s  
o f  personal savings.
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In  th i s  study so c ia l s e c u rity  e f fe c ts  a re  measured by four 
v a ria b le s :
(1) gross so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth (SSWG) , as constructed  by 
F e ld ste in ,
(2) n e t so c ia l s e c u rity  wealth (SSWN) , as constructed  by 
F e ld ste in ,
(3) so c ia l s e c u rity  tax  co n trib u tio n s  (SSCON) ^ paid by an em­
ployee and an employer, as defined by M annell,
(4) so c ia l s e c u rity  (SS)^ constructed  by Barro.
The p resen t an a ly s is  uses and compares various so c ia l secu­
r i t y  w ealth  measures: F e ld s te in 's  and Munnell1 s d e f in it io n  o f  
s o c ia l s e c u r ity  w ealth  (SSW), Munnell*s o th e r d e f in it io n  (SSCON) 
and Barro1 s d e f in it io n  (SS). I t  i s  p o ssib le  th a t  r e s u l ts  ray  
d i f f e r  under a  d if f e r e n t  sp e c if ic a tio n  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth 
measure.
I t  i s  cannon to  r e la te  consumption to  permanent income by 
using a d is tr ib u te d  lag  on p a s t income. Therefore, i t  i s  r e a ­
sonable to  anploy th e  lagged d isposab le  income in  th e  extended 
l i f e  cycle  saving model (Barro, 1978; Darby, 1979; and Leimer and 
Lesnoy, 1982). ^ Even though th e  lagged d isposab le  income does 
no t a f f e c t  th e  cu rre n t flow o f  resou rces, i t  has a  p o s itiv e  
e f f e c t  on personal savings i f ,  given th e  value o f  cu rren t 
d isposab le  income and o th er v a r ia b le s , th e  v a r ia b le  has a  p o s i-
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t i v e  impact on cu rre n t personal savings.
R etained earn ings a re  business savings in  th e  p r iv a te  sec to r 
and proxies fo r cu rren t and fu tu re  c a p ita l  g a in s . They a re  
tre a te d  as exogenous w ith  re sp ec t to  th e  persona], savings deci­
sion  because th e re  a re  sep ara te  in cen tiv es  governing th e  behavior 
o f  houshold and corporate  sec to rs  {Auerbach, 1982). Looking a t  
re ta in ed  earn ings another way, we might find  th a t  re ta in e d  earn­
ings imply a  su b s ti tu tio n  fo r personal savings (M odigliani and 
S te rlin g , 1983). They would negative ly  in fluence  personal sav­
ings .
The government surp lus has an in d ire c t  e f f e c t  on personal 
savings through an increase  in  fu tu re  d isposab le  incane by a re ­
duction  in  fu tu re  ta x a tio n , and through an in crease  in  fu tu re  
r e a l  d isposab le  incane by a  lowering o f  fu tu re  p r ic e  le v e ls  which 
a re  p o s itiv e ly  a sso c ia ted  w ith  goverrment spending. As fo r  a 
d i r e c t  e f f e c t ,  th e  su rp lus i s  in  excess o f  th e  goverrment reve­
nue, which co n s is ts  o f  ta x e s , minus to t a l  goverrment spending on 
goods, se rv ices  and t r a n s f e r  payments o r , more s p e c if ic a lly , 
incane tax  c o lle c tio n  minus payment o f  goverrment spending and 
goverrment t r a n s fe r s .  This d i r e c t  e f f e c t  on personal savings i s  
in v e rse ly  a sso c ia ted  w ith  government su rp lus. Because govern­
ment su rp lus i s  a sso c ia ted  w ith  ta x e s . The n e t e f f e c t  depends 
upon th e  r e la t iv e  s iz e s  o f  th e  d i r e c t  and in d ire c t  e f fe c ts .
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The product o f  U and YD (U .YD) i s  included in  th e  savings 
function  to  a d ju s t fo r th e  c y c lic a l v a r ia tio n  o f  personal savings 
and fo r th e  d ev ia tio n  o f  inccme fran  th e  normal p o s itio n  (Barro, 
1978). The unemployment r a te  would respond p o s itiv e ly  to  consumer 
spending i f  fu tu re  incane p o s itiv e ly  re la te d  to  th e  unemployment 
r a te  as a  p red ic tio n  o f  fu tu re  inccme and i f  unemployment b e n e f its  
a lso  a ffe c ted  consumer spending through income re d is tr ib u tio n , 
which i s  below permanent income (Ando and M odigliani, 1963; and
7
Barro, 1978). Thus, U.YD would negatively  a f fe c t  personal 
sav ings. From another p o in t o f  view, U.YD would a lso  have a 
negative in fluence on personal savings in  order to  m aintain th e  
le v e l o f  consumption o r  th e  standard o f  l iv in g .
Workers b u ild  up w ealth in  th e  form o f  r e a l  a s se ts  such 
as  housing, f in a n c ia l a s s e ts  (stocks and bonds) and various 
types o f  insurance during th e  working period  in  o rder to  provide 
fo r consumption in  o ld  age. B linder, Gordon and Wise (1983), 
using th e  L ongitudinal Retirem ent H isto ry  Survey, estim ate  the  
s t r i c t  form o f  th e  l i f e  cycle  model. They conclude th a t  a 
bequest motive increasing  w ith  th e  number o f  ch ild ren  on w ealth  
accum ulation i s  a  weak one fo r w ealth accumulation, i . e . ,  s ta ­
t i s t i c a l l y  in s ig n if ic a n t in  th e  United S ta te s . The l i f e  cycle 
theory  ho lds th a t  accumulated w ealth i s  drawn down to  zero during 
re tirem en t by consumption. King (1983) p resen ts  King and Dicks-
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M ireaux 's study (1982) describ ing  a harp-shaped a s s e ts  p a tte rn  
o f  a  l i f e  cycle  model by using c o lle c tiv e  d a ta  fran  th e  Survey 
o f  GDnsuner Finances in  Canada. The authors estim ate  permanent 
inccme fo r each household and co n s tru c t th e  average value o f  
th e  r a t io  o f  a sse t-h o ld in g s  to  permanent inccme. They confirm 
th e  hump-shaped a s se ts  p a tte rn  which d e c lin e  a f te r  re tirem en t. 
Household o r  personal w ealth  i s  emphasized by Ando and M odigliani 
(1963) and M odigliani (1966) in  th e i r  th e o re tic a l  and em pirical 
analyses o f  th e  l i f e  cycle model. The d i r e c t  p o s itiv e  e f fe c t  
o f  w ealth  on cons oner spending means a  d i r e c t  negative e f fe c t  
e f f e c t  on savings.
D isposable personal incane, re ta in e d  earnings and goverrment 
su rp lus would measure th e  cu rren t flow o f  resources av a ilab le  
to  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  fo r consumer expenditure and savings.
Above th ese  incane measures, unemployment r a te  and w ealth would 
cap tu re  l i f e  cycle  savings, permanent inccme and t r a n s i to ry  
inccme (Barrow, 1978; and Darby, 1979). Boskin and K o tlik o ff 
(1985) a lso  p o in t o u t th a t  th e  s t r i c t  l i f e  cycle  model i s  not 
enough to  exp la in  The United S ta te s 's  saving behavior. There­
fo re  th is  study expands th e  l i f e  cy c le  model by employing addi­
t io n a l  explanatory  v a r ia b le s .
Why i s  th e  labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  a t  age s ix ty  and 
over one o f  th e  independent v a r ia b le s  7 B arro 's  and F e ld s te in 's
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in te rp re ta t io n  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  measured in  th e i r  models 
do not include a v a r ia b le  Which e x p l ic i t ly  measures th e  r e t i r e ­
ment e f f e c t  o f  s o c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  (Leimer and 
Lesnoy, 1982). SSW and SS alone measure both  e f fe c ts ,  b u t do no t 
allow  fo r th e  sep ara te  estim ation  o f  each one. An ad d itio n a l
Qv a ria b le  i s  needed to  exp lain  th e  re tirem en t e f fe c t .
I f  th e  labo r supply i s  given during th e  l i f e  cycle period, 
th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f  a  so c ia l s e c u rity  program w il l  reduce personal 
savings, b u t cannot in c rease  i t .  under th e  l i f e  cycle  hypoth­
e s is ,  i f  th e  combination o f  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t tax  and 
s o c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  do n o t have an inccme e f fe c t  
(a given lab o r supply in  th e  l i f e  cycle  period  means no change 
in  budget c o n s tr a in ts ) , personal savings w il l  be reduced, w ith  
an in c rease  in  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its ,  y e t leaving 
enough consumption fo r th e  re tirem en t period  (M odigliani and 
S te rlin g , 1983).
Currant so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  a f f e c t  th e  length 
o f  re tirem en t years by s tro n g ly  encouraging th e  re tirem en t age o f  
s ix ty  in  Japan. However, no t n e ce ssa rily  a l l  th e  workers w ill  
withdraw from th e  labor market a t  age s ix ty . The p ro b ab lity  o f  
re tirem en t a t  age s ix ty  and over w il l  be in d ica ted  by a labor 
force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  age o f  s ix ty  and over under th e  normal 
d is t r ib u t io n  o f  re se rv a tio n  wages and market wages (Ben-Porath,
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1973), bo th  o f  which can d i f f e r  among in d iv id u a ls . Even i f  in ­
d iv id u a ls  have id e n tic a l  ta s te s ,  in d iv id u a ls  w ill  have d if f e re n t  
market wages. The re se rv a tio n  wage o f  people over s ix ty  a f fe c ts  
th e  re tirem en t p a tte rn s  o f  th e  cu rren t working fo rce . Social 
s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  reduce th e  co s t o f  an unemployed 
in d iv id u a l whose age i s  s ix ty  and over, as w ell as th a t  o f  th e  
in d iv id u a l no t in  th e  lab o r m arket. Thus, s o c ia l  s e c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its  induce an in crease  in  th e  in d iv id u a l 's  
re se rv a tio n  wage. The in crease  in  th e  re se rv a tio n  wage o f  
people s ix ty  and over w i l l  lead  t o  an increase  in  th e  minimun 
acceptance wage, w hile employers w il l  lower th e  o ffe red  wage 
under a  l ife t im e  employment system w ith  mandatory re tirem en t 
due to  th e  s e n io r i ty  wage s tru c tu re  in  Japan. The above rear- 
soning would lead  th e  e ld e r ly  to  withdraw from th e  lab o r m arket.
I f  we assume th e  labor supply to  be endogenous a f t e r  th e  
s ta r t in g  age o f  receiv ing  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its ,  
th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  program w il l  reduce th e  lab o r supply o f  those 
aged people who a re  induced in to  e a r l i e r  re tirem en t, b u t no t 
v ice  v ersa . The arguments, however, suggest th a t  th e re  no# 
e x is ts  room t o  consider th e  ever in creasin g  Japanese life sp a n , 
which has increased  conspicuously s in ce  th e  1940s. The in crease  
in  expected life sp a n  as  formulated undoubtedly has in fluence on 
an in d iv id u a l l i f e -c y c le  saving plan.
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For the above-mentioned reasons, the probability of an indi­
vidual over sixty finding an acceptable job will be cane analler.
The lower th e  p ro b a b ility , th e  lower th e  finding o f  acceptable 
jcb s, and th i s  w ill  lead  to  a  withdrawal from th e  labor m arket.
The planned re tirem en t age and th e  expected leng th  o f  re tirem en t 
y ears  have an in fluence on th e  in d iv id u a l 's  savings p lan  (P e ld s te in  
and P e llech io , 1979: M odigliani and S te r lin g , 1983; and Hamermesh 
1984). Therefore, LP60 would revea l the  re tirem en t e f f e c t .
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3.3  Hie Impact o f  S ocia l S ecu rity  Retirem ent B enefits  on
Savings and on th e  Labor Force P a r tic ip a tio n  o f  th e  E lderly
Hie rap id  progress o f  technology and th e  s ig n if ic a n t increase  
in  m arried women's labo r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  Japan has forced 
a change in  th e  ocmposition o f  th e  lab o r force during th e  l a s t  
30 y ears . As a  r e s u l t  o f  th i s  change, i f  they continue to  s ta y  
in  th e  labo r market, a  h igh  s tru c tu ra l  unemployment r a te  among 
th e  e ld e r ly  may be expected, ra th e r  than  f r ic t io n a l  and c y c lic a l 
unemployment. However, rap id  progress in  Japanese so c ia l secu­
r i t y  programs has had th e  e f fe c t  o f  d iscouraging e ld e r ly  workers 
from remaining in  th e  labo r market when they  become e l ig ib le  
fo r so c ia l s e c u rity  b e n e f i ts .  Hie l i t e r a tu r e  in  th i s  f ie ld  
rev ea ls  so c ia l s e c u r ity  to  be one o f  th e  major stim u lan ts  in  
th e  recen t r i s e  in  e a r l i e r  re tirem en ts  (Boskin, 1977; P ellech io , 
1979; Burkhauser and Turner, 1982a; Hurd and Boskin, 1984; and 
M itchell and F ie ld s , 1984), b u t th i s  f ie ld  has not been s tu d ­
ied  th e o re t ic a l ly  and em p irica lly  in  Japan.
Social s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  in crease  th e  re se rv a tio n  
wages fo r th e  e ld e r ly  who a re  e l ig ib le  fo r th e  b e n e f its .  Con­
v e rse ly , p o te n tia l  employers tend to  lower o ffe red  wages to  th e  
e ld e r ly  due to  th e  fe e t  th a t  th e re  e x is t  r e la t iv e ly  h igh un­
employment r a te s  among them and th a t  labor p ro d u c tiv ity  cn th e i r  
p a r t  tends to  d ec lin e . Consequently, th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  th e
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e ld e r ly 's  finding  acceptable jobs w i l l  becane lower, and th e  
du ra tion  o f  searching fo r jobs w il l  he longer. These circum­
stances created  by so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  lead the  
e ld e r ly  to  withdraw fran  th e  labor m arket, ( in  ad d itio n , th e  
in crease  in  th e  average life sp a n , a s  shown in  columns 5 and 6 
o f  TABLE 2, a lso  prolongs th e i r  re tirem en t y e a r s .)
Workers su b s itu te  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  fo r 
w ealth in  t h e i r  p o r tfo lio s  o f  accumulated a s se ts  for the  r e t i r e ­
ment period . Thus, workers who expect fu tu re  so c ia l s e c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its  would save le s s  fo r consumption during th e i r  
re tirem en t period  (b en e fit e f f e c t ) . In  ad d ition , th e  amount o f  
savings during th e  working period  depends upon th e  in d iv id u a l 's  
expected re tirem en t age, le v e l o f  consumption, and number o f  
re tirem en t y ea rs . These l a t t e r  fa c to rs  d i r e c t ly  a f f e c t  th e  
p ropensity  to  save during th e  working period . Accumulated sav­
ings and so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  in  tu rn  e x e rt in ­
fluence on th e  re tirem en t d ec is ion . S o c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  may induce e a r l i e r  re tirem en t, Which r e s u l ts  in  a 
prolonged re tir a n e n t period th a t  may p o ssib ly  cause an in crease  
in  savings during th e  working period  (re tirem en t e f f e c t ) . 
M odigliani and S te r lin g  (1983) estim ate  b e n e f it  and re tira n e n t 
e f fe c ts  by using d a ta  on a  c ro ss -se c tio n  o f  co u n trie s  and tak ing  
an average over th e  period 1960-1970, though th e  model i s  no t a
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s t r i c t l y  sim ultaneous one. Fran th e  above reasons, i t  i s  pos­
s ib le  to  deduce th a t  th e re  su re ly  e x is ts  interdependency between 
personal savings and th e  labo r supply o f  th e  e ld e r ly  (King,
1983; Thompson, 1983; Hamermesh, 1984). S ocial s e c u rity  tax  
and so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  a re , however, exogenous 
in  th e  system, and they  a re  co n tro lled  by government p o licy , 
namely by le g is la t io n .
Oolunn 2 o f  TABLE 2 shews th e  r a t io  o f  personal savings to  
d isposab le  incane s in ce  1946. Ooltmns 3 and 4 show th e  labo r 
force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  males and females age 60 and over. In  
1953 th e  r a t io  o f  personal savings t o  d isposab le  income suddenly 
declined  frcm 17.6% in  1952 t o  11.2% in  1953, and th e  low r a t io  
continued u n t i l  1958. Then th e  r a t io  o f  personal savings t o  
d isposab le  incane increased  to  16.7% in  1959 frcm 13.5% in  1958.
C oinciden ta lly  th e  labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  o f  males 
age 60 and over increased  to  73.5% in  1953 frcm 68.5% in  1952.
The high lab o r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  la s te d  u n t i l  1958. Then 
th e  p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  declined  to  69.9% in  1959 frcm 74.3% in  
1958. A s im ila r  phenomenon can be seen fo r th e  female lab o r 
force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te s  beteen 1953 and 1958 (colunn 4 ) .  The 
r e la t iv e ly  h igh female labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  la s te d  u n t i l  
1961. The r a t io s  o f  personal savings to  d isposab le  income has 
been r e la t iv e ly  h igh; 18.9% on th e  average since  1960. The labor
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fo rce  p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te s  fo r both  sexes had been g radually
4
d ec lin in g  s in ce  1960. Therefore, th e re  seems to  be sane nega­
t iv e  re la tio n s h ip  between th e  r a t io  o f  personal savings to  d is ­
posable incane and labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  age 60 and over.
The o v e ra ll lab o r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  th e  e ld e rly , however, 
has s l ig h t ly  declined  about 10% fo r males and 4% fo r females 
sin ce  1946.
In  Japan th e  question  i s  whether personal savings accu­
mulated during th e  working period s u b s ti tu te  fo r so c ia l s e c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its  fo r oonsunption in  th e  re tirem en t period  
o r  whether so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  s u b s ti tu te  fo r 
personal savings fo r  consu ip ticn  in  th e  re tirem en t period . I f  
th e  former i s  t r u e ,  th e  prim ary source o f  consumption during 
th e  re tirem en t period  i s  personal savings accumulated during 
th e  working period , and thus saving r a te  w il l  be h igh . I f  th e  
l a t t e r  i s  tru e , th e  prim ary purpose o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  b e n e f its  
i s  to  rep lace  incane during th e  re tirem en t period, and th e re fo re  
th e  saving r a te  w i l l  be low.
TABUS 3 shows th e  source o f  income o f  e ld e r ly  couple 
households where th e  w ife i s  age 60 and over. In  bo th  ru ra l  
and urban a reas  Japanese e ld e r ly  couples r e ly  h eav ily  upon 
earn ing  income, non-earning income and o th e r sources befo re  th e  
age o f  65, although they a re  e l ig ib le  to  rece iv e  so c ia l s e c u rity
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re tirem en t b e n e f its .  They g e t 50% o f  th e i r  income frcm so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  r e t ir a n e n t  b e n e f its  around th e  age o f  70. E lderly  
couples over 75 in  ru ra l  a reas depend more upon so c ia l se c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its  a s  compared to  those o f  urban a re a s . The 
urban aged couples rece iv e  about h a l f  th e i r  incane from so c ia l 
s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  a f te r  th e  age o f  70. TABLE 3 shows 
th a t  th e  major source o f  consumption during  th e  re tirem en t pe­
r io d  i s  no t so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its . R etiranen t 
b e n e f its  b a re ly  cover th e  needs o f  th e  e ld e r ly .
The e f fe c t  o f  th e  s ig n if ic a n t  progress in  th e  Japanese so c ia l 
s e c u rity  re tirem en t program since  World War Two has no t y e t  been 
in te n s iv e ly  and em pirica lly  s tud ied  concerning i t s  in fluence on 
th e  behavioral p a tte rn  o f  h igh  personal savings and the  labor 
force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly . The em pirical study o f  th e  
in fluence  o f  s o c ia l s e c u rity  cn household savings by Noguchi
(1983) i s  one o f  th e  few s tu d ie s  in  th is  f ie ld .  An em pirical 
and th e o re tic a l  study o f  th e  e f f e c t  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  cn r e ­
tirem en t behavior was made by I  to  (1983) re c en tly . I  to  exp lic­
i t
i t l y  and p re c ise ly  ap p lie s  th e  Automatic In te ra c tio n  D etector 
to  examine th e  e ld e r ly 1 s  re tirem en t d ec is ion  a ffe c te d  by so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  and unemployment insurance b e n e f its .
In  th e  debate over so c ia l s e c u r ity  and savings in  th e  United 
S ta te s , th e o re t ic a l  and a r p i r ic a l  conclusions by F e ld ste in
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(1974), Munnell (1974), Barro (1978), Darby (1979), and F e ld ste in  
and P e llech io  (1979) have been advanced a s  to  whether so c ia l 
s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  tend  to  increase  o r decrease per­
sonal savings under th e  p ressure  o f  changing re tirem en t expe­
rien ce  (F e ld s te in , 1982? Learner and Lesncy, 1982; B linder,
Gordon and Wise, 1983; King, 1983; M odigliani and S te rlin g , 1983; 
Hamermesh, 1984; and Lesnoy and Leimer, 1985).
In  th e  United S ta tes  an e a r ly  and frequently  c i te d  study 
by Boskin (1977) sheds some l ig h t  on th e  r e la t io n  between so c ia l 
s e c u rity  and th e  re tirem en t behavior o f  e ld e r ly  workers. He 
s tre s s e s  th a t  th e  in crease  in  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t bene­
f i t s ,  along w ith  th e  rap id  growth o f  th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  system 
in  th e  United S ta te s , induces th e  dec lin e  o f  labor force par­
t ic ip a t io n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly , namely,] e a r l i e r  re tirem en t. The 
tim e -se rie s  an a ly s is  by Burkhauser and Turner (1978 and 1982 b) 
suggest a  negative  re la tio n sh ip . B linder, Gordon and Wise (1980) 
and Hamermesh (1984), however, m aintain  th a t  so c ia l s e c u rity  r e ­
t i r a n e n t  b e n e f its  tend to  delay  th e  re tirem en t o f  th e  e ld e r ly  
because o f  a  recouping o f  deferred  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tira n e n t 
b e n e f i ts .  Hurd and Boskin (1984), and M itchell and F ie lds
(1984) id e n tify  induced re tirem en t by so c ia l s e c u rity . The 
study by M itchell and F ie ld s  (1984) e sp e c ia lly  concentrates on 
workers covered by ten  pension plans which include so c ia l secu-
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r i t y  re tirem en t b e n e f its .  A rec en t study ty  Honig and Hanoch
(1985) t r i e s  to  exp lain  a t r a n s i t io n a l  s ta te  frcm th e  main l i f e ­
tim e job to  p a r t ia l  re tirem en t and then  to  complete re tirem en t.
I t  i s  t h i s  w r i te r 's  opinion th a t  a l l  th e se  in c o n s is ten t and 
d if f e r e n t  r e s u l ts  stem frcm th e  s p e c if ic  choice o f  data , age 
group, and lim ita tio n s  on th e  scope o f  th e  s tu d ie s  as applied  
to  the  e ld e r ly .
D espite the, fecrt th a t  l i f e - c y c le  savings and lab o r supply 
behavior a re  m utually determined, th e re  i s  l i t t l e  agreement o f  
th e  e f f e c t  o f  s o c ia l  s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  on lab o r supply 
behavior and savings behavior (Thompson, 1983). King (1983) 
d iscu sses thoroughly, from a  th e o re tic a l  p o in t o f  view, th e  
mutual determ ination  o f  consumption and labor supply and th e  
n o n -sep a rab ility  and s e p a ra b il i ty  o f  consumption and le is u re .
A lack  o f  understanding o f  th e  behavioral p a tte rn s  o f  th e  
lab o r supply dec is io n  (namely, re tirem en t decision) and l i f e ­
cycle  saving behavior can lead to  m isleading p o licy  im plica­
t io n s .  Therefore, t h i s  study w i l l  examine th e  interdependency 
between personal savings and th e  labo r force p a r tic ip a tio n  o f  
th e  e ld e r ly  (vhich explains re tirem en t from th e  labor market) 
and so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its .  The development o f  a  
sim ultaneous-equation model o f  personal savings and labor force 
p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  w i l l  hopefu lly  produce c o n s is te n t
estim ates  o f  th e  s tru c tu ra l  param eters.
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3 .4  T heore tica l Model and Function
S o c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  have two b a s ic  elements 
which a f fe c t  l i f e -c y c le  lab o r supply and l i fe -c y c le  saving deci­
s io n s . Since personal savings and labor supply d ec is io n s  sure 
in te r r e la te d ,  a  model should r e f l e c t  th e  e f fe c t  o f  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  re tirem en t b e n e f its  upon personal savings and th e  labor 
supply o f  th e  e ld e r ly . 1 0
In  a  lab o r supply function , th e  e f fe c t  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its  depends upon how workers perceive and a d ju s t 
t h e i r  behav io ral responses in  personal l i f e  cycle  p lans to  both 
c u rre n t tax  payments and expected fu tu re  b e n e f its  under th e  so­
c i a l  s e c u rity  program. In  t h i s  re sp e c t, a  l i f e  cycle  approach 
o f fe r s  a  more s u ita b le  a n a ly tic  method (P e llech io , 1979), as  op­
posed to  an attempt  to  estim ate  whether o r not th e  e f f e c t  o f  a 
so c ia l s e c u r ity  ta x  d iscourages labor force supply, which in ­
volves the  slope o f  a  lab o r supply curve.
Hie m otivations o f  l ife t im e  planned savings a re  in te r ­
changeable among th e  l i f e - c y c le  purpose, th e  p recau tionary  pur­
pose and th e  sp ecu la tiv e  purpose. Hie expected value o f  so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its ,  cu rre n t so c ia l s e c u rity  ta x  con­
t r ib u t io n ,  and cu rren t so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  on 
personal savings depend upon hew in d iv id u a ls  form ulate th e  co sts
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and b e n e f its  and hew they a d ju s t c o s ts  and b e n e f its  to  th e i r
i
l ife tim e  planned savings.
In th i s  study so c ia l s e c u rity  e f fe c ts  upon both  th e  labor 
supply behavior o f  th e  e ld e r ly  and personal savings a re  meas­
ured by four v a ria b le s :
(1) gross so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth (SSWG), as constructed  by 
F e ld ste in ,
(2) n e t so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  (SSWN), as  constructed  by 
F e ld ste in ,
(3) so c ia l s e c u r ity  tax  co n trib u tio n  (SSOCN) paid  by an em­
ployee and an employer, as defined  by Mannell, and
(4) so c ia l s e c u rity  (SS), as constructed  by B a rro .^
The p resen t an a ly s is  uses and compares th e  following v a r i­
ous so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  measures: Feldstein* s  and Munnell* s 
d e f in it io n s  o f  so c ia l s e c u r ity  w ealth (SSW), M unnell's o th e r 
d e f in it io n  (SSGON) and Barro* s  d e f in it io n  (SS). I t  nay be pos­
s ib le  th a t  r e s u l ts  w il l  vary under a  d if f e r e n t  sp e c if ic a tio n  
o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth measure by using a  time s e r ie s  da ta  
fo r th e  years 1946-1982.
The m athsnatical sp e c if ic a tio n  o f  a  simultaneous equation 
model i s  as  follow s:
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LF60 = a  + a ,S  + a  YD + a„YD + a „WREESTA + a^WLIQUID 0 1 2 3 4 5
+ a IMALE.YD + a AGRI + a  ED + a  SSWG o r  a  SSWN 
6  7 8  9
o r  a  SSGON o r a  SS .......... 5,
S = a Q + a^LF60 + a 2YD + a3YD + a^WREESTA + agWLIQUID
+ a IMALE.YD + a RE + a  SUR + a SSWG o r  a  SSWN o r
6  7 8  9
a  SSGCN o r  a SS ............ 6 ,
w ith  th e  v a ria b le s  in  th e  equations being defined  in  TABLE 1.
Most re sea rch ers  agree that, th e  l i f e -c y c le  model approach 
w i l l  exp la in  th e  impact o f  permanent income upon in d iv id u a l sav­
in g s. Boskin and K o tlik o ff  (1985) a lso  suggest th a t  an expanded 
o r  a m odified l i f e  cyc le  model i s  more e f f ic ie n t  fo r explain ing  
savings behavior than a r e s t r ic te d  one. The c u rre n t and lagged 
d isposab le  incomes a re  leg itim a te  to  be proxy v a r ia b le s  o f  per­
manent income (Barro, 1978). They shew th e  magnitude o f  inpact 
o f  life tim e  earnings on th e  re t ir a n e n t  d ec is ion .
In  th e  l i f e  cycle  model th e  ro le  o f  bequests in  savings has
been amphasized. The e f fe c t  o f  bequested savings on th e  next
generation , however, has been under emphasized. In  the case o f  
Japan, physica l a s se ts ,  such as housing, r e f l e c t  a  bequest motive 
as a  n a tio n a l c h a ra c te r is t ic .  The Japanese a re  s tro n g ly  moti­
vated to  own a house and to  pass i t  on to  th e  fu tu re  generation , 
and th e  long mortgages have an in p ac t upon th e  re tirem en t dec i­
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sio n . Hie m otivation fo r holding o th e r a s se ts ,  such as  stocks, 
bonds, t r u s t s  and insurance, i s  p recau tio n ary . Unlike non­
liq u id  a s se ts , such as expected so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t bene­
f i t s  fo r  the  re tirem en t period , liq u id  a s se ts  may have a d i f f e r ­
e n t magnitude fo r th e  labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  th e  e ld e rly , 
i . e . ,  th e  re tirem en t dec is io n .
Every in d iv id u a l v a i l  have d if f e r e n t  re se rv a tio n  wages 
a f fe c tin g  h is  re tirem en t d ec is ion  (Ben-Porath, 1973). Under 
th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  program in d iv id u a ls  age s ix ty  and over 
would r a is e  th e  minimun acceptance wages, and th i s  could reduce 
th e  c o s t o f  being unemployed. Takayama (1982) mentions th a t  
under a  mandatary re tirem en t system, employers w il l  probably 
o f fe r  lower wages than  th e  e ld e r ly  w orker's  acceptance wages 
(namely re se rv a tio n  wages). Thus, th e  widening gap between 
th e  e ld e r ly  w orker's  o f fe r  and th e  em ployer's o f f e r  causes the  
e ld e r ly  to  leave th e  lab o r market when th e  unemployment i s  h igh . 
This i s  because s o c ia l  s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  would r e ­
duce th e  opportun ity  co s t o f  being unemployed. Hie t o t a l  labor 
force p a r tic ip a tio n  r a te  fo r those age s ix ty  and over i s  67% 
a t  th e  sample mean, and th i s  g re a tly  a f f e c ts  th e  work e f fo r t  
due to  a  dec lin e  in  market wages. Hie r e s u l t  i s  a  c a rp ie te  w ith­
drawal frcm th e  labor m arket, w ith  th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  unem­
ployment r a te  upon th e  lab o r force p a r tic ip a tio n  r a te  o f  those
r:
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60 and over being negative .
The d ec lin e  o f  th e  a g r ic u ltu ra l  se c to r  due to  th e  changing 
in d u s tr ia l  s tru c tu re  s ince th e  1940s a f fe c ts  th e  re tirem en t 
behavior o f  th e  e ld e r ly . In d u s tr ia l  development induces than 
to  e n te r  th e  labor market. I t  provides an expansion o f  job 
o p p o rtu n itie s , as w ell as nonpecuniary b e n e f its , such as being 
ab le  to  so c ia liz e  w ith o th e r people and avoiding th e  psycho­
lo g ic a l s t r a in  a t  heme usu a lly  following re tirem en t (Shapiro 
and Shaw, 1983). A v a r ia b le  (AGRI) would reveal hew th e  change 
in  in d u s tr ia l  s tru c tu re  in flu en ces th e  labo r supply o f  th e  e ld ­
e r ly , i . e . ,  re tirem en t dec is ion  behavior.
Human c a p ita l  can be defined in  terms o f  q u a li ty  o f  edu­
c a tio n , working experience, q u a li ty  o f  h e a lth , a h igher a b i l i ty ,  
e tc .  The q u a li ty  o f  education (ED) r e f le c ts  human c a p ita l  and 
in fluences the  e ld e r ly  in  th e i r  d ec is ion  to  withdraw from th e  
labor market. An in c rease  in  th e  q u a lity  o f  education induces 
people to  work more hours during the  year and thus add fu rth e r  
y ears  o f  p a r tic ip a tio n  in  th e  l i f e  cycle (Hanoch and Honig, 1983; 
and M odigliani, 1986). A h igher education no t only  widens th e  
choice o f  job opportunity , b u t can a lso  in fluence th e  re tirem en t 
p lan by making p o ssib le  a  new type employment befo re  withdrawing 
c a rp ie te ly  frcm th e  labor market.
Hie l i f e - c y c le  saving plan  i s  influenced by th e  following
ET
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fa c to rs : physical a s se ts ,  l iq u id  a s se ts , unenployment ra te , 
re ta in e d  earnings and c e n tra l government su rp lus, in  ad d itio n  
to  th e  l i f e - c y c le  labor supply d ec is io n  and th e  permanent incane 
o f  in d iv id u a ls  (namely, l i f e  tim e ea rn in g s).
Workers b u ild  up w ealth in  th e  form o f  physical a s se ts , 
l ik e  housing, and liq u id  a s se ts , such as stocks, bonds, t r u s t s  
and insurance. In  p a r t ic u la r ,  th e  amount o f  liq u id  a s se ts  
h e ld  by households has more than t r ip le d  in  Japan s in ce  1975. 
Lesnoy and Leimer (1985) b ring  ou t th e  ambiguity o f  th e  e f f e c t  
o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  because workers have 
o th e r  motives fo r  saving, e .g . ,  providing fo r contingencies by 
leaving  a  bequest in  ad d itio n  to  re tirem en t purpose. Motives 
fo r saving d iv e rs ify  to t a l  personal savings. M odiglini (1986) 
p o in ts  o u t th a t  th e  co nside ra tion  o f  bequest motives in  th e  l i f e  
cycle  framework i s  c o n s is te n t, although during th e  re tirem en t 
period  a s s e ts  d ec lin e  and reach zero in  th e  b as ic  l i f e  cycle  
hypo thesis . Hence, w ealth  i s  sp ec ified  by two ca teg o rie s . One 
i s  p hysica l a s s e ts  (WREESTA) -  housing -  and th e  o th e r i s  liq u id  
a s s e ts  (WLIQUID) -  s tocks, bonds, t r u s t s  and insurance. This 
s p e c if ic a tio n  w i l l  g ive an in s ig h t in to  th e  behavioral p a tte rn  
o f  w ealth  accumulation.
Japanese housing conditions a re  s t i l l  inadequate, and people 
want to  own a house w ith in  th e i r  l ife t im e  (Takayama, 1982;
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Shinohara, 1983). This d e s ire  stems fran  a  b a s ic a lly  ag ricu l­
tu r a l ,  n a tio n a l c h a ra c te r is t ic  which "h is to rica lly  has influenced 
th e  behavior o f  holding physical a s s e ts .  In Japan physical 
a s s e ts ,  such as housing, a re  u su a lly  h e ld  for l i f e  and fo r 
th e  purpose o f  bequests in  th e  l i f e  cycle  framework ra th e r  than 
fo r th e  sp ecu la tiv e  purpose o f  w ealth accumulation, a s  o ften  
occurs in  th e  U nited s ta te s .  This bequest purpose o f  ob tain ing  
o n e 's  own house seems to  s tim u la te  personal savings.
More recen tly  in  Japan l iq u id  a s se ts  have been c rea tin g  
a d d itio n a l w ealth as a  form o f  sav ings. I t  seems th a t  th e  lowers 
and m iddle-incane c la sse s  a re  stim ulated  and m otivated t o  en te r  
the  l iq u id  a s se ts  market formerly ta rg e ted  ex c lu siv e ly  fo r th e  
h ig h er incane c la s s , as w ell a s  fo r co rporations p re fe rr in g  to  
deploy th e i r  holdings in  more sp ecu la tiv e  investm ent. However, 
th e  newly crea ted  market u t i l iz e d  by lower- and middle-income 
Japanese b rin g s  about a  savings expansion asso c ia ted  w ith  l i f e  
cyc le  and p recau tional purposes.
As fo r th e  e f f e c t  o f  unemployment on personal savings, th e  
unenployment o f  a  main wage earn er rev ea ls  a  c le a r  in fluence  on 
h is  l i f e - c y c le  savings p lan . Ihe c y c lic a l  v a r ia tio n  o f  unem­
ployment and th e  r e s u l ta n t  concern over th e  d ev ia tio n  o f  incane 
fran  th e  normal p o s itio n  w il l  make people anxious about fu tu re  
p ro sp ec ts , and thus m otivate them to  increase  l i f e  cycle sav­
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in g s . The unanplcyment r a te  would a lso  respond p o s it iv e ly  to
consigner spending i f  fu tu re  inocme p o s it iv e ly  re la te d  to  the  un-
12employment r a te  as a  p re d ic tio n  o f  fu tu re  incane. The product 
o f  th e  male unemployment r a te  and d isposab le  incane (IMALE.YD) 
rev ea ls  i t s  p o ss ib le  e f fe c t .
For t h e i r  employees Japanese business firms accumulate r e ­
tirem en t pensions and t ra n s fe r  them to  re ta in ed  earn ings, which 
a re  tax  d ed u c tib le . Noguchi (1985) in te n s iv e ly  d iscu sses the  
e f fe c ts  o f  ta x - f re e  reserv es re la te d  to  re tirem en t payment for 
Japanese business firm s. Although th e re  a re  sep ara te  incen­
t iv e s  fo r th e  saving a t t i tu d e s  between households and business 
firm s (Auerbach 1982), under th e  Japanese tax  system re ta in ed  
earn ings imply a  s u b s ti tu tio n  fo r personal savings. An in c rease  
in  re ta in e d  earn ings im plies an in c rease  in  re tirem en t pensions 
in  business firm s and thereby a f fe c ts  th e  behav ioral p a tte rn s  
o f  workers' sav ings.
Boskin and K o tlik o ff  (1985) argue th a t  government purchases 
w il l  in flu en ce  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r . In  t h i s  aase, th e  p r iv a te  
s e c to r  means n e t n a tio n a l product, NNP, minus government pur­
chases, G. Therefore, NNP minus G equals consumption in  th e  
p r iv a te  se c to r  p lus n e t p r iv a te  dom estic investm ent. An increase  
in  government surp lus w il l  u ltim a te ly  decrease government p u r­
chases, which must be financed by th e  p r iv a te  se c to r . As aiming
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th e  n e t p r iv a te  dom estic investm ent, I ,  equals p r iv a te  savings, 
an in c rease  in  th e  government surp lus w il l  induce a r i s e  in  p r i ­
v a te  consumer expenditure and /or p r iv a te  domestic investm ent.
One would expect th a t  savings in  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  o r personal 
savings would even tually  r is e .
The th e o re t ic a l  arguments o f  o th er view points should be 
considered, too . Government su rp lus has an in d ire c t  e f fe c t  on 
personal savings by increasing  fu tu re  d isposab le  income through 
fu tu re  ta x a tio n  and fu tu re  re a l  d isposab le  income by lower 
fu tu re  p r ic e  le v e ls  which a re  p o s itiv e ly  asso c ia ted  w ith  gov­
ernment spending. As fo r  a  d i r e c t  e f fe c t ,  th e  su rp lus i s  in  
excess o f  th e  government revenue -  which c o n s is ts  o f  tax es , 
minus to t a l  government spending on goods, se rv ices  and tra n s ­
fe r  payment -  o r ,  more s p e c if ic a l ly ,  income tax  c o lle c tio n  minus 
th e  payments o f  government spending and government tra n s fe r .
This d i r e c t  e f f e c t  on personal savings i s  in v erse ly  a sso c ia ted  
w ith  government su rp lu s . The n e t e f fe c t  i s  determined by th e  
sun o f  th ese  in d ire c t  and d i r e c t  e f fe c ts  upon personal savings. 
For th e  above reasons, th e  c e n tra l government surp lus w il l  have 
an ambiguous e f fe c t  on personal savings.
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3.5 Data
In  Japan th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  re t ir a n e n t  b e n e f its  program 
was in s t i tu te d  in  1942. The chao tic  period  during th e  Second 
World War, 1941-1945, i s  excluded since  Darby(1979), Leimer and 
Lesnoy (1982), and Lesnoy and Leimer (1985) s ta te  th e  s e n s i t iv i ty  
o f  the  period  o f  estim ation  to  th e  estim ated  reg ressio n  o f  th e  
US r e s u l t s .  This study employs tim e -se rie s  da ta  fo r th e  years 
1946 to  1982 in  Japan. A ll v a riab le s  a re  in  re a l  per c a p ita  
value except fo r LF.60, U, U.YD, UBMALE.YD, AGRI and ED in  
TABLE 1. King (1983) s ta te s  th a t  an advantage o f  using tim e- 
s e r ie s  d a ta  i s  th a t  “i t  would enable th e  v a r ia t io n  o f  re a l  in ­
te r e s t  r a te s  over tim e to  be e x p lo i t e d a s s u n in g  in d iv id u a ls  
face th e  same read in te r e s t  r a te .  T im e-series da ta  avoid the  
absence o f  v a r ia tio n s  in  in te r e s t  r a te s  in  c ro ss -se c tio n  d a ta  
which dea l w ith  reg ions and in d iv id u a ls  a t  a  s in g le  p o in t in  
tim e.
Sources o f  Data
S ocia l S ecu rity
S ocial s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  (1944-1983): “Social
Insurance Agency Annual R eport," 1965-1983, S ocial Insurance 
Agency Japanese Government.
Social s e c u r ity  tax  (1944-1983): "Social Insurance Agency 
Annual R eport," 1965-1983, S ocial Insurance Agency Japanese 
Goverrment.
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Savings
Savings (1946-1982): "Annual Economic S ta t i s t i c s ,"  1960-1983, 
Bank of Japan.
"White Paper o f  N ational Income," 1930-1960, and "tfetional 
Economic C a lcu la tio n ,"  1951-1983, Economic Planning Agency.
Labor FOrce P a r tic ip a tio n  Rate
Labor fo rce  p a r tic ip a tio n  r a te  (1946-1982): "Labor Survey," 
1948-1983, S ta t i s t i c s  Bureau, Prime Minister* s  O ffice , and 
Department o f S ta t i s t ic a l  Inform ation in  M inistry o f  Labor, 
and Department o f  Population Census in  Prime M in is te r 's  O ffice .
Consumption
consumption (1946-1982): "White Paper o f  N ational Income," 
1930-1960, and "National Economic C alcu la tio n ,"  1951-1983, 
Economic Planning Agency.
Income
Personal income (1946-1982): "N ational Income c a lcu la tio n ,"  
1951-1983, Economic Planning Agency.
"White Paper o f  N ational Income," 1930-1960, Economic 
Planning Agency.
"Annual Econcmic S ta t i s t i c s ,"  1965, Bank o f  Japan.
unemployment Rate
Unemployment r a te  (1946-1982): " lab o r Survey," 1948-1983, 
S ta t i s t i c s  Bureau, Prime M in is te r 's  O ffice, and Department 
o f  S t a t i s t i c a l  Inform ation in  M inistry  o f  Labor.
Taxes
Income tax  (1946-1982): "N ational Income C alcu la tion ,"  1951- 
1983, Economic Planning Agency.
"White Paper o f  N ational Income," 1930-1960, Economic 
Planning Agency.
"Annual Economic S ta t i s t i c s ,"  1965, Bank o f  Japan.
P rice  Index
consumer p r ic e  index (1945-1982): "Annual Econcmic S ta t i s t ic s ,"  
1960-1983, Bank o f Japan, and Department o f  S ta t i s t i c a l  
C onsultation  in  Bank o f  Japan.
GNP d e f la to r  (1945-1983): "Annual Economic S ta t i s t i c s ,"  1960- 
1983, Bank o f  Japan, and Department o f  S ta t i s t i c a l  con­
s u lta t io n  in  Bank o f  Japan.
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Population
Population (1945-1983): "V ita l S t a t i s t i c s  o f  Jap an ," 1960- 
1983, M in istry  o f  H ealth and W elfare.
L ife  Expectancy
L ife  Expectancy (1945-1983): "L ife  Table," 1935-1983,
Japanese Insurance O rganization.
Interest Rate
Market and d iscoun t r a te s ,  and y ie ld  o f  10 y ea rs  long term 
bond (1940-1983): "Annual Econcmic S t a t i s t i c s ,"  1960-1983, 
Bank o f  Japan, and Department o f  S t a t i s t i c a l  C onsultation  
in  Bank o f  Japan.
Durable Goods
Purchase o f  durbale  goods (1946-1982): "White Paper o f  
N ational Inccme," 1930-1960, and "N ational Econcmic Calcu­
la t io n ,"  1951-1983, Japanese Econcmic Planning Agency.
Retained Earnings
Retained earnings (1946-1983): "Annual Econcmic S ta t i s t i c s ,"  
1960-1983, Bank o f  Japan.
"White Paper o f  N ational Inccme," 1930-1960, and "National 
Econcmic C a lcu la tio n ,"  1951-1983, Econcmic Planning Agency.
Government Surplus
Government surp lus (1946-1983): "Annual Econcmic S ta t i s t i c s ,"  
1960-1983, Bank o f  Japan.
"White Paper o f  N ational Inccme," 1930-1960, and "National 
Econcmic C a lcu la tio n ,"  1951-1983, Econcmic Planning Agency. 
Department o f  Survey in  th e  M in is try  o f Finance.
Education
Education 1946-1982: "Educational S t a t i s t i c a l  Survey," 
1980-1983, Department o f  Education.
W ealth, P hysical A ssets, and L iq u id ity  A ssets
"Annual Econcmic S ta t i s t i c s ,"  1960-1983, Bank o f  Japan. 
"N ational Inccme C alcu la tion ,"  1951-1983, Econcmic Planning 
Agency.
"Family Inccme and Expenditure Survey," 1951-1983, S ta t i s t i c s  
Bureau, Prime M in is te r 's  O ffice .
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NOTES TO CHAPTER I I I
1 The study by F e ld ste in  and P e llech io  (1979) uses household 
n e t wealth as a dependent v a ria b le  in stead  o f  consumption o r 
savings. The d a ta  used in  th e i r  research  i s  th e  Federal Reserve 
Board's Survey o f  F inancial C h a ra c te r is tic s  o f  Oonsuners con­
ducted in  1963.
2 The c a lc u la tio n  o f  SSWs, g ross so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth (SSWG) 
and n e t so c ia l s e c u r ity  w ealth (SSWN) v a ria b le s  a re  based on 
F e ld s te in  (1974) and Munnell (1974). th e re  a re  sane m odifica­
t io n s  o f  c a lc u la tio n , th e  r a te  o f  b e n e f its  and so c ia l s e c u rity  
tax  payments p er c a p ita  in  r e la t io n  to  d isposab le  incane i s  
changed each year by using th e  cu rren t r a te .  L ife expecta tion  
i s  based on cu rren t male l i f e  expectancies, th e  r a te  o f  in ­
t e r e s t  i s  a  c u rre n t y ie ld  le v e l o f  te n  years long term  bond.
3 Net so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth (SSWN) equals gross so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  w ealth  (SSWG) minus th e  p resen t value o f  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  tax es .
4 SSCON rep resen ts  th e  per person co n trib u tio n s  (o ld-age, 
su rv ivors and d i s a b i l i ty  insurance under th e  W elfare Pension 
program div ided  by CPI). Munnell examines th e  inpac t o f  th i s  
s o c ia l s e c u r ity  w ealth measure on personal savings in  h e r  study 
(1974).
5 SS i s  based on the  study by Barro (1978). SS i s  b e n e f its  
payments per re c ip ie n t  in  o ld -age, su rv ivors and d i s a b i l i ty  
insurance programs under th e  W elfare Pension program, d iv ided  
by CPI, tim es th e  r a t io  o f  th e  number o f  workers w ith earnings 
taxab le  by so c ia l s e c u rity  to  th e  to t a l  labo r force.
6  A permanent inccme v a r ia b le  by Darby (1979) i s  estim ated 
a s  a  weighted average o f  p a s t incane by th e  exponen tia lly  de­
c lin in g  weight method.
7 One simple model i s
C = a 0 + 01X 3 .........1, where C i s  consumption and Y i s
perment inccme.
Y = Yp + Yt  2, where Yt  i s  t r a n s i to ry  incane and Y
i s  measured inccme.
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Fran equqticns 1 and 2,
C = oij + otjY -  djY ^- 3.
Suppose Yt  = 3 0 + 6 ^  4, where u i s  unemployment ra te
and 3i < 0 -
Ih e re fc re , fran  equqtions 3 and 4 we g e t
C = a 0 + ctjY -  a ^ U ............5, where -  o^Sx > 0.
With Y fixed , an in crease  in  U means th a t  Y„ r is e s  and Y. 
f a l l s .  p
8  The in s ig n if ic a n t and/or weak e f fe c ts  in  o th e r  s tu d ie s  a re  
due to  f a i lu re  to  hold  labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  (LF) constan t. 
Munnell enploys LF w ith  inccme. She assumes th a t  savings i s
a  function  o f  income and i s  in d ire c tly  a  function  o f  re tirem en t 
years vhich a f fe c t  a  leng th  o f  working years, namely, earn ings. 
Munnell uses LF65 (lab o r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  o f  age 65 
and o ld e r ) , w ith  income as a  proxy v a r ia b le  to  measure r e t i r e ­
ment p a tte rn .
To be s p e c if ic  consider th e  following v a r ia b le s  model:
S = ot0 + otiSSW + <*2L F ............1,
vhere S i s  personal savings, SSW i s  so c ia l s e c u rity  re t ir a n e n t  
b e n e f its  and LF i s  labo r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  v a r ia b le s , a i < 0, 
and a 2 < 0 .
I f  we em it LF, th e  estim ate  i s
S = ao + c fe s w  2.
From equation 1,
E S.SSW/E SSW2  = a i + a 2  ElF.SSW / ESSW ........... 3.
From equation  2, we g e t
E S.SSW/E SSW2 =  4 .
Based on th e  em itted  v a r ia b le  formula we have
a* = a x + a ^ b  5,
where a i  < 0 , a 2  < 0 , b  < 0 , and ot2b > 0 . b  i s  th e  reg ressio n  
c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  LF on SSW ( LF = b  o + bSSW ) .
I f  magnitudes o f  a i  and oc2b  a re  equal, bo th  o f f s e t  each
o th e r , a* = 0. Q* tends to  b ia s  toward zero , i f  LF i s  em itted 
from th e  savings fa n c tio n .
9 B asica lly  th e  method o f  Automatic In te ra c tio n  D etector 
(AID) i s  th a t  samples a re  successively  divided in to  two p a r ts  by 
a s ig n if ic a n t explanatory  v a r ia b le  o f  a  fa c to r .
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10 See FOOTNOTE 8  to  estim ate  a  p rec ise  e f f e c t  o f  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  r e t ir a n e n t  b e n e f its .
11 The same so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  v a ria b le s  -  SSWG, SSWN, 
SSCON and SS -  a re  used in  th i s  sim ultaneous equation model as 
b efo re . See FOOTNOTES 2, 3, 4 and 5.
12 See FOOTNOTE 7 for a reason of negative relationship be­
tween personal savings and unemployment.
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TABLE 1
D efin itio n s  o f  V ariab les
V ariable
Name
D efin ition
S re a l  per c a p ita  personal savings in  1 , 0 0 0  yen.
LF.60 labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  o f  males age 60 and 
over.
SSWG r e a l  per c a p ita  gross so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth , in  
1,000 yen, based on OASDI program, a s  defined by 
F e ld ste in  and Munnell. There a re  sane m odifications 
o f  c a lc u la tio n . The r a te  o f  b e n e f its  and so c ia l s e ­
c u r i ty  tax  payments per c a p ita  in  r e la t io n  to  d is ­
posable incane i s  changed each year by using th e  
cu rren t r a te .  L ife  expecta tion  i s  based on cu rren t 
male l i f e  expectancies.
SSWN re a l  p er c a p ita  n e t so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth, in  1 , 0 0 0  
yen, based on OASDI program as defined by F e ld ste in  
and Munnell. N et so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth (SSWN) equals 
gross so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  (SSWG) minus th e  p resen t 
value o f  so c ia l s e c u r ity  tax es .
SSCON re a l  per person co n trib u tio n s , in  1,000 yen (OASDI 
program: o ld -age, su rv ivors and d is a b i l i ty  insurance 
under th e  W elfare Pension program), o f  workers w ith 
earnings tax ab le  by so c ia l s e c u rity  as  defined  by 
M unnell.
SS reail so c ia l s e c u rity  b e n e f its  (OASDI program: o ld - 
age, su rv ivors and d i s a b i l i ty  insurance under the  
W elfare Pension program) p e r re c ip ie n t in  1,000 yen, 
m u ltip lied  by th e  r a t io  o f  th e  nimber o f  workers w ith 
earnings tax ab le  by so c ia l s e c u r ity  to  th e  to t a l  labor 
fo rce, as defined by Barro (1978).
YD re a l  per c a p ita  personal d isposable incane in  1 , 0 0 0  
yen.
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Definitions of Variables
V ariable
Name
D efin itio n
WREESTA re a l  per c a p ita  expense o f  personal r e s id e n tia l  
co n stru c tio n  in  1 , 0 0 0  yen in  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r  a t  
th e  beginning o f  the  year.
WLIQUID re a l  p er c a p ita  n e t l iq u id i ty  w ealth: s tocks, bonds, 
t r u s t s  and l i f e  insurance in  1 , 0 0 0  yen, a t  th e  begin­
ning o f  th e  y ear.
U unemployment r a te  in  th e  to t a l  labo r force.
U.YD th e  product o f  unemployment r a te  and r e a l  per c a p ita  
personal d isposab le  incane.
IMALE.YD th e  product o f  male unemployment r a te  and re a l  per 
ca p ita  personal d isposable incane.
RE re a l  per cap ita  corporate  re ta in ed  earnings in  1 , 0 0 0  
yen.
SUR re a l  per c a p ita  surp lus o f  th e  c e n tra l government 
sec to r  in  1,000 yen in  equations 4 and 6 .
ACHI th e  r a t io  o f  th e  number o f  workers in  th e  a g r ic u ltu ra l  
se c to r  to  th e  t o t a l  labor force.
ED th e  r a t io  o f  th e  number o f  g raduates from koto- 
senmon gakko (in  Japan, equ ivalen t to  ju n io r c o lle g e ) , 
ju n io r co lleg e , sen io r co llege  and u n iv e rs ity  gradu­
a te s  to  ju n io r  high school graduates who complete 
th e  n ine-year compulsory education in  Japan.
W r e a l  per c a p ita  n e t w ealth, in  1 , 0 0 0  yen, a t  the 
th e  beginning o f  th e  year, excluding durable a s se ts  
in  equation  4.
Year
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
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TABLE 2
R atio  o f 
Personal Savings 
to
Disposable Incane
Labor FOrce 
P a r tic ip a tio n  
aged 60 and over 
(male) (female)
Lifespan 
(male) ( female)
% % % year year
24.9 6 8 . 6 31.7 42.6 51.1
-46 .6 69.3 32.4 50.1 54.0
-47.2 69.0 29.4 55.6 59.4
-19 .9 74.3 36.3 56.2 59.8
12.5 64.4 30.2 59.5 62.9
18.9 6 6 . 0 31.2 59.6 63.0
17.6 68.5 30.7 61.9 65.5
1 1 . 2 73.5 36.4 61.9 65.7
10.4 72.9 38.0 63.4 67.7
12.4 75.0 39.3 63.9 68.4
13.3 74.1 37.8 63.6 67.5
14.2 73.8 37.4 63.2 67.6
13.5 74.3 36.3 65.0 69.6
16.7 69.9 34.3 65.2 69.9
18.7 70.9 34.3 65.4 70.3
20.9 71.4 35.3 6 6 . 0 70.8
18.3 72.1 31.4 6 6 . 2 71.2
18.3 69.4 31.1 67.2 72.3
18.4 69.3 31.5 67.7 72.9
15.8 69.6 30.7 67.7 72.9
15.1 69.3 31.1 68.4 73.6
15.6 6 8 . 2 31.2 68.9 74.2
16.7 67.0 29.2 69.1 74.3
17.3 6 6 . 8 28.8 69.2 74.7
18.2 65.5 28.5 69.3 74.7
17.9 64.7 27.6 70.2 75.6
18.2 63.6 26.5 70.5 75.9
20.9 64.0 27.6 70.7 76.0
23.7 63.0 26.8 71.2 76.3
2 2 . 1 61.9 26.7 71.7 76.9
22.4 61.6 26.2 72.2 77.4
2 1 . 0 60.4 26.4 72.7 78.0
2 0 . 6 60.0 27.1 73.0 78.3
18.7 59.1 27.1 73.5 78.9
19.2 59.4 27.2 73.4 78.8
19.7 58.8 27.1 73.8 79.1
17.7 57.4 27.3 74.2 79.7
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Source: "Family Incane and Expenditure Survey," 1951-1983, 
S ta t i s t i c s  Bureau o f  Prime M in is te r 's  O ffice . "National Incane 
C alcu la tion ,"  1965-1983, Economic Planning Agency. "Annual 
Econanic S ta t i s t i c s ,"  1966-1983, Bank o f Japan. "Labor Survey," 
1951-1983, S t a t i s t i c s  Bureau o f  Prime M in is te r 's  O ffice . " l i f e  
T able ," 1950-1983, Japanese Insurance O rganization.
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TABLE 3
Source o f  Incane o f  Aged Couple Households w ith 
Wife aged 60 and over
RURAL
Household Social Earning Non Earning Other
Age S ecurity  (%) Incane (%) Incane (%) (%)
under 60 7.237 86.582 1.159 4.589
60-64 26.768 68.766 1.273 3.054
65-69 37.598 57.180 1.156 4.075
70-74 49.809 42.008 1.532 6.651
75-79 57.204 29.217 2.273 11.306
80-84 61.732 19.462 2.921 15.885
85 and over 68.577 11.145 3.139 17.139
URBAN
Household Social Earning Non Earning Other
Age S ecurity  (%) Incane (%) Incane (%) (%>
under 60 6.238 85.467 2.967 4.356
60-64 29.857 64.356 3.242 2.406
65-69 40.112 53.100 4.067 2.605
70-74 50.018 39.152 5.894 4.776
75-79 52.939 29.394 8.639 8.831
80-84 53.028 22.094 11.401 13.212
85 and over 54.612 16.151 13.593 15.186
Note: "Non Earning Incane" i s  re n t, in te re s t ,  d ividend and 
insurance. "Other" i s  w elfare , rem ittance and o th e r liv e lih o o d  
p ro te c tio n .
Source: "1980 Population Census o f  Japan ," O ffice  o f  th e  Prime 
M in is te r, Bureau o f  S ta t i s t i c s .
CHAPTER IV
THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ON PERSONAL 
SAVINGS IN JAPAN: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 The R esu lts  o f  Regressions: F e ld ste in , Munnell and Barro
In  TABLE 1 two versions o f  F e ld s te in ’ s consumption function
model a re  estim ated . One employs gross so c ia l se c u rity  w ealth
(SSWG),  ^ w hile th e  second anplqys n e t so c ia l se c u rity  w ealth 
2(SSWN). The signs o f  a l l  c o e f f ic ie n ts  a re  as  expected, as 
a re  th e  signs o f  a l l  c o e ff ic ie n ts  fo r v a r ia b le s . The c o e ffi­
c ie n ts  o f  SSWG and SSWN a re  only .0014 and .0016 re sp ec tiv e ly  
and a re  not s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t .  TABLE 5 rep o rts  th e  
d e f in itio n s  o f  th e  v a r ia b le s .
The p o in t estim ates o f  th e  incane e l a s t i c i t i e s  a re  .69 in  
the  equation w ith SSWG and .70 w ith SSWN a t  che sample means.
In  the  equation w ith  SSWG and SSWN, th e  sh o rt-ru n  marginal 
p ro p en sitie s  to  consume ou t o f  d isposab le  incane are  both about 
.57, r e la t iv e ly  la rg e r  in  Japan than th a t  reported  by F e ld ste in  
(1974) fo r th e  United S ta te s  (abou t.54).
The c o e ff ic ie n ts  o f  re ta in ed  earnings v a riab le s  (RE) a re  s ta b le  
and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t a t  th e  5% s ig n if ic a n t le v e l. The
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c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  unemployment r a te  (u) a lso  a re  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig ­
n if ic a n t.  Both p o in t estim ates o f  th e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  con- 
sunption w ith  re sp ec t to  th e  unenplqyment r a te  a re  very small 
(0 .045). More e x p l ic i t ly  th e  c o e ff ic ie n ts  imply th a t  a  one- 
percen tage-po in t in c rease  in  U would r a is e  consunption by 13,000 
yen ($52) per person and 12,830 yen (about $51) per person in
3
th e  equation w ith  SSWG and SSWN, resp ec tiv e ly .
TABLE 2 shows th re e  estim ates o f  th e  Munnell model (equation 
2 in  I I ,  "Review o f  th e  Previous S tu d ie s" ) . The signs o f  a l l  
c o e f f ic ie n ts  in  th e  f i r s t  two equations w ith SSWG and SSWN have 
th e  proper signs, b u t none o f  th e  c o e ff ic ie n ts  o f  independent
v a riab le s  a re  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t.  As fo r th e  l a s t  equa-
4 . .t io n  w ith  SSOCN , one would expect th a t  th e  c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f
2YD.LF60 and SSCON would be negative . The ad justed  R in  a l l  the  
reg ressio n s  a re  r e la t iv e ly  lew compared to  those in  F e ld s te in 's  
study. In a d d itio n , th e  Durbin-Watson s t a t i s t i c s  a re  r e la ­
t iv e ly  lew compared to  th e  r e s u l ts  o f  reg ressions frcm th e  
models by F e ld ste in  and Barro.
Estim ates o f  Barro1 s model (equation 3 in  I I ,  "Review o f  th e  
Previous S tudies") a re  reported  in  TABLES 3-A and 3-B. TABLE 
3-A includes th e  in te rc e p t, and TABLE 3-B excludes i t .  Barro 
(1978) p o in ts  ou t th a t  since th e  d e le tio n  o f  th e  in te rc e p t changes 
high standard e r ro rs  o f  estim ated c o e ff ic ie n ts  to  low standard
e r ro rs  o f  estim ated c o e f f ic ie n ts ,  th e  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  in s ig n if i­
can t in te rc e p t i s  d e le ted . The major change between TABLE 3-A 
and 3-B w ith th e  absence o f  in te rc e p t i s  th a t  so c ia l sec u rity  
w ealth v a ria b le s  (SSWG and SSWN) change the s igns, namely posi­
t iv e  in  TABLE 3-A t o  negative in  TABLE 3-B. None o f  the so c ia l 
s e c u rity  w ealth v a riab le s  a re  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t.
The sho rt-ru n  m arginal p ro p en sitie s  to  consune ou t o f  d is ­
posable income range between .59 and .64 w ith in te rc e p t and,
.64 and .71 w ithout in te rc e p t. These marginal p ro p en sitie s  to  
consume are  sm aller in  Japan than th a t  reported  fo r the  United 
S ta te s  by Barro in  1978 (about .8 ) . These marginal p ro p en sitie s  
to  consume in  th e  model by Barro ( in  TABLES 3-A and 3-B) a re  
la rg e r  than th a t  o f  th e  model by Eteldstein ( in  TABLE 3-A). The 
c o e f f ic ie n t o f  re ta in e d  earnings a re  s tab le  and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s ig n if ic a n t in  TABLES 3-A and 3-B, except fb r th e  column o f  3-3 
w ith SS in  TABLE 3-B. The Durbin-Watson s t a t i s t i c s  became 
ra th e r  small in  TABLE 3-B.
The v a ria b le  o f  consumer expenditure includes nondurable 
and durable goods (excluding housing expend itu re). Employing 
expenditure o f  durable goods as an independent v a ria b le  may lead 
to  a  s p e c if ic a tio n  e r ro r , w hile involves th e  c o rre la tio n  o f  the  
consumer expenditure w ith  s h i f t s  in  th e  household expenditure 
o f  durable goods.
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In  t h i s  sec tio n , th e  models by F e ld ste in , Munnell and Barro . 
were applied  to  examine th e  e f fe c t  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  retirem ent, 
b e n e f its  on personal savings in  Japan. The r e s u l ts  do no t provide 
a c le a r  ansver, perhaps because our an a ly sis  concen trates on th e  
s tru c tu re  o f  previous re sea rch ers ' models, t h e i r  th e o re tic a l  
frameworks remain usefu l to o ls , however. These p rev io u sly -te s ted  
models a re  adap tab le  and allow  us to  expanc. in to  a new model, 
th e  an a ly s is  in  th e  next sec tio n , w ith  th e  expanded l ife -c y c le  
savings model, may lead to  b e t te r  s tru c tu ra l  parameter estim ates 
and h e lp  us understand th e  e f f e c t  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  on savings and re tirem en t behavior in  Japan.
4 .2  The R esu lts  o f  an Expanded L ife-C ycle Savings Model
What i s  o f  sp ec ia l in te r e s t  about th e  reg ressio n  r e s u l ts
6
in  TABLE 4 (equation 4 in  I I I ,  "A nalytical Framework") i s  th a t  
th e  so c ia l se c u rity  w ealth v a riab les  a re  a l l  negative and s ta ­
t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t,  except fo r th e  SS v a r ia b le . The signs 
o f  th e  o th e r estim ated c o e f f ic ie n ts  fo r v a riab le s  a re  as ex­
pected . th e  v a r ia b le s  a re  defined in  TABLE 5.
The margined, p ro p en sitie s  to  save w ith  re sp ec t to  SSWG,
SSWN, and SSCON a re  -.0027, -.0030, and -.7 0 1 , re sp ec tiv e ly . The 
p o in t estim ates o f  th e  corresponding e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  personal 
savings a t  th e  sample means Eire -1 .0 6 , - .9 9 , and - .3 5 , respec­
t iv e ly .  I t  seems th a t  a n tic ip a te d  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  (represen ted  by SSWG and SSWN) a f fe c t  more personal 
savings than do so c ia l s e c u rity  tax  co n trib u tio n s  (represen ted  
by SSCON) in  th e  long run. The r e la t iv e ly  la rg e  estim ated co­
e f f ic ie n t  o f  m arginal p ropensity  to  save w ith  re sp ec t to  SSCON 
(so c ia l s e c u rity  tax  co n trib u tio n ) r e f le c ts  th a t  a  ra is in g  o f  
th e  tax  d ire c t ly  lcwers personal savings in  th e  sh o rt run.
Marginal p ro p en sitie s  to  save w ith re sp ec t to  LP60 a re  
-1 .588 , -1 .639 , and -1.585 in  th e  columns o f  SSWG, SSWN, and 
SSCON in  TABLE 4, re sp ec tiv e ly . The p o in t estim ates o f  th e  
corresponding e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  personal savings w ith  re sp ec t to
LF60 a re  -1 .065 , -1 .099, and -1 .063 a t  th e  sample means, 
re sp e c tiv e ly . The estim ated m arginal p ro p en sitie s  in d ic a te  th a t  
a  one percentage p o in t d ec lin e  in  LF60, i . e . ,  e a r l i e r  re tirem en t, 
r a is e s  personal savings by approxim ately 1,600 yen per c a p ita  
per year in  re a l  term s. Since th e  estim ated e l a s t i c i t i e s  a re  
alm ost u n ita ry , a  1% decrease in  LF60, i . e . ,  e a r l i e r  re tirem en t, 
w i l l  lead  to  a  1% in c rease  in  personal savings in  Japan.
With re sp e c t to  th e  n e t impact o f  both  b e n e f it  and re tirem en t 
e f f e c ts ,  th e  estim ated  e f fe c ts  a re  evaluated using c o e f f ic ie n ts  
in  TABLE 4 , m u ltip lied  by a  change in  re lev a n t v a r ia b le s  between 
y ears  o f  1946 and 1982. The b e n e f it  e f fe c t  dominates th e  r e t i r e ­
ment e f f e c t .  This i s  because th e  an tic ip a te d  so c ia l s e c u r ity  
re tirem en t b e n e f i ts  (SSWG and SSWN) depress about 250 thousand 
yen re a l  per c a p ita , w hile e a r l i e r  re tirem en t (represen ted  by 
LF60) causes an in crease  o f  about 18 thousand yen r e a l  per 
c a p ita . Moreover, th e  SSWG and SSWN impacts o f  depressing  per­
sonal savings by 255 thousand yen and 243 thousand yen respec­
t iv e ly  a re  more than  tw ice as much a s  th a t  o f  th e  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  tax  c o n trib u tio n  by 107 thousand yen ( represen ted  by SSCON) P
As fo r personal d isposab le  income (YD), m arginal p ro p en sitie s  
to  save w ith  re sp ec t to  YD a re  .430 and .416 in  th e  columns 
SSWG and SSWN in  TABLE 4, re sp e c tiv e ly . Marginal p ro p en sitie s  
to  consume w ith  re sp e c t to  YD a re  .565 in  the  equation w ith
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SSWG and .571 in  th e  equation w ith  SSWN in  TABLE 1. Marginal 
p ro p en sitie s  to  save w ith  respec t to  YD in  TABLE 4 a re  .224 in  
coluxn SS and .154 in  the  colunn SSCON are  too sn a il  t o  be 1 
(=MPC + MPS) in  th e  l ig h t  o f  m arginal p ro p en sitie s  to  consune 
in  th e  colunn o f  SS in  TABLE 3-A. The rev ised  l i f e -c y c le  
savings model using e i th e r  SSWG o r  SSWN as an independent 
v a ria b le  seems more r e l ia b le  and leg itim ate  than th e  model 
using th e  v a riab le  SS.
Retained earnings (RE) has th e  expected negative e f f e c t .  An 
increase  in  th e  re ta in ed  earnings reduces personal savings because 
o f  a  s u b s titu tio n  between them (M odigliani and S te r lin g , 1983). 
There seems to  e x is t  sep ara te  incen tiv es  between personal savings 
and re ta in ed  earnings. An in crease  o f  1,000 yen re ta in ed  earn­
ings tends to  depress personal savings from 300 to  400 yen. Re­
fe rrin g  to  TABLE 1, 3-A and 3-B, an increase  o f  1,000 yen re ta in ed  
earnings (RE) w il l  lead to  an increase  in  personal consumption 
approximately fircm 300 t o  360 yen. In  TABLE 4, th e  p o in t e s t i ­
mates o f  th e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  on re ta in ed  earnings range from - .1 0  
to  -  .07, and a 1% in crease  in  re ta in ed  earnings w il l  r e s u l t  in  
a .07% to  a .1% decline  in  personal savings.
In  TABLE 4 th e  m arginal p ropensity  to  save ou t o f  th e  
w ealth v a r ia b le  i s  negative, s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t,  and 
la rg e r  than th e  p ropensity  to  save ou t o f  th e  so c ia l se c u rity
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w ealth v a ria b le  (SSWG, SSWN and SSOON). This d iffe ren ce  may 
r e f le c t  th e  fa c t  th a t  w ealth i s  h e ld  by in d iv id u a ls  Who consider 
th e  accunulaticn  o f  w ealth more im portant than expected so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  b e n e f its  due to  in su ffL c ian t so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  in  Japan. Shinohara (1983) suggests th a t  th e  in su f­
f ic ie n t  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  make people s tr iv e  
toward more savings fo r th e  re tirem en t period . Hamermesh (1984), 
using s e ts  o f  m icrodata on th e  United S ta te s , p o in ts  o u t th a t  
th e  sm all, estim ated  c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  the  marginal p ropensity  
to  consune ou t o f  th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  wealth v a ria b le  stem frcm 
an u n certa in ty  o f  th e  fu tu re  flow o f so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its .
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4.3 Summary o f  an Expanded L ife-C ycle Savings Model 
by Ordinary Least Squares
This study attem pts to  d isen tan g le  popular, ir re c o n c ila b le  
arguments about th e  b e n e f it and re tirem en t e f fe c ts  o f  so c ia l 
se c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  on personal savings w ith in  a frame­
work o f  th e  l i f e  cyc le  model. The em pirical evidence fo r a 
behavioral p a tte rn  o f  savings in  Japan supports th e  hypothesis 
th a t  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  depress personal sav­
in g s. As fo r th e  u su a lly  hypothesized "dual e ffe c ts "  o f  so c ia l 
s e c u rity  r e t ir e n e n t  b e n e f its ,  th e  b e n e f it  e f fe c t  dominates th e  
re tirem en t e f fe c t  in  Japan.
Researchers define  and co n s tru c t th e i r  own v a riab le s  o f  
so c ia l s e c u rity  wealth according to  th e i r  assumptions o f  hew 
in d iv id u a ls  form expecta tions o f  fu tu re  so c ia l se c u rity  r e t i r e ­
ment b e n e f its .  The previous re sea rch ers ' conclusions, which are  
derived frcm d if f e re n t  measures o f  th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth 
v a ria b le , about th e  e f fe c ts  o f  th e  v a ria b le  on personal savings 
lack  consensus in  th e  United S ta te s . Darby (1979) p o in ts  ou t 
th a t  the  s iz e  o f  the  impact o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t bene­
f i t s  on personal savings depends mainly upon th e  time period used 
in  th e  estim ation  and whether th e  unemployment r a te  i s  included 
in  o r excluded frcm th e  reg ressio n  equation in  the  United S ta te s . 
Using Japanese d a ta  fo r th e  period 1946-1982, I  find  support fo r
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th e  F e ld s te in 's  and M unnell's hypotheses th a t  personal savings 
a re  a ffe c te d  by expected so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  and 
cu rren t so c ia l s e c u r ity  tax  co n trib u tio n s  ra th e r  than cu rren t 
so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its .
The Japanese em pirical evidence shows th a t  th e  b e n e f it e f fe c t  
i s  g re a te r  than  th e  re tirem en t e f fe c t .  The r e s u l ts  reveal th e  
in v erse  re la t io n s h ip  between personal savings and lab o r force 
p a r t ic ip a tio n . A h igh personal savings r a t io ,  however, e x is ts  
fo r th e  consumption o f  a  prolonged re t ir e n e n t  period  in  Japan. 
Although th e  high m arginal p ropensity  to  save rev ea ls  d if f e re n t  
so c ia l norms and n a tio n a l c h a ra c te ra s tic s  toward saving in  
Japan and th e  United S ta te s , th e  Japanese high savings r a t io  
i s  p a r t ia l ly  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  the  in s u f f ic ie n t  so c ia l se c u rity
g
re tirem en t b e n e f its ,  to  th e  goverrment ta x  p o licy  (Which i s  
re la te d  to  the  goverrment su rp lu s , th e  in cen tiv e  o f  w ealth 
accumulation to  th e  household se c to r, and th e  tax  deductable 
fo r re ta in ed  ea rn in g s), and t o  th e  h is to r ic a l ly  lew unemployment 
r a te .  Even i f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  reduce per­
sonal savings, th e  em pirical r e s u l ts  suggest th a t  th e  e f fe c t  
on personal savings depends upon hew im portant re tirem en t sav­
in g s, owing to  th e  in su ffic ien cy  and u n ce rta in ty  o f  so c ia l se­
c u r i ty  re tirem en t b e n e f its  in  th e  fu tu re , i s  r e la t iv e  to  to t a l  
l i f e  savings fo r th e  re tirem en t period .
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As a p o licy  im p lica tion  derived  frcm h i s to r ic a l  Japanese 
experience, personal savings possib ly  could be ra ise d  o r crea ted  
by goverment p o licy : th e  replacement r a te s  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its ,  th e  tax  r a te  on in te r e s t  earnings from 
savings, and th e  leng th  and amount o f  unemployment b e n e f its .
The Japanese h igh  savings r a t io  has had a remarkable in fluence 
on p r iv a te  c a p ita l  form ation and consequently c rea te s  th e  growth 
o f  n a tio n a l ou tpu t in  th e  long run.
4  » > %
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV
1 The c a lc u la tio n  o f  SSWs, g ro ss  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth 
(SSWG), and n e t so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  (SSWN) v a r ia b le s  a re  
based upon F e ld ste in  (1974) and Munnell (1974). There a re  sane 
m odifica tions o f  c a lc u la tio n . The r a te  o f  b e n e f its  and so c ia l 
s e c u rity  tax  payments per c ap ita  in  re la t io n  to  d isposab le  
incane i s  changed each year by using th e  cu rren t r a te .  L ife  
expectancy i s  based on cu rren t male l i f e  expectancies. The r a te  
o f  in te r e s t  i s  a  c u rre n t y ie ld  le v e l o f  10 years long term bond.
2 Net so c ia l s e c u r ity  w ealth  (SSWN) equals gross so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  w ealth (SSWG) minus th e  p resen t value o f  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  ta x e s .
3 One simple model i s
C = ot0 + otiY p 1, vhere C i s  consumption and Y i s
perment incane. p
Y = Yp + Y - t  2, where Yt  i s  t r a n s i to ry  incane and Y
i s  measured incane.
Fran equqtions 1 and 2,
C = ot0 otjY -  o t j Y t  3 .
Suppose Yj. = So + S iU  4, vhere U i s  unemployment ra te
and Si < 0.
Therefore, fron equqtions 3 and 4 we g e t
C = ao+ otiY -  o iiB iU ............5, vhere  -  a iS i > 0*
With Y fix ed , an in crease  in  U means th a t  Yn r i s e s  and Y*. 
f a l l s .  e
4 SSOON rep re sen ts  th e  p er person co n trib u tio n s  (o ld-age, 
su rv ivo rs  and d i s a b i l i ty  insurance under th e  W elfare Pension 
program d iv ided  by C3?l). Munnell examines th e  impact o f  th i s  
so c ia l s e c u r ity  w ealth measure on personal savings in  h e r study 
(1974).
5 SS i s  based on th e  study by Barro (1978). SS i s  th e  bene­
f i t  payments p er re c ip ie n t  in  o ld -age, surv ivors and d i s a b i l i ty  
insurance programs under th e  Wei fe re  pension program, d iv ided  
by CPI, tim es th e  r a t io  o f  th e  number o f  workers w ith  earnings 
tax ab le  by so c ia l se cu rity  to  th e  to t a l  lab o r fo rce.
6 F e ld ste in , and Lesnoy and Leimer s ta te  a  m u ltico l1in e a r i ty  
prbblem. This study observes and takes in to  account covariances
between estim ated param eters to  have lew covariance between es­
tim ated param eters. A h igh  degree o f  c o l l in e a r i ty  w il l  be a s ­
soc ia ted  w ith  a r e la t iv e ly  high ( in  ab so lu te  value) covariance 
between estim ated  param eters. See R.S. Pindycik and D.L. Rubiri­
fe  Id, Econometric Models and Economic fo re c a s ts , McGraw H ill ,  
1976, pp .60-71.
7 A method o f  c a lc u la tio n  i s  adapted frcm Shapiro and Shaw 
(1983) • The in s ig n if ic a n t  and /or weak e f fe c ts  in  o th e r s tu d ie s  
a re  due to  f a i lu re  to  hold labor force p a r tic ip a tio n  (LF) h e ld  
co n s tan t. Munnell employs LF w ith income. She assumes th a t  
savings a re  a  function  o f  income and a re  in d ire c tly  a  function  
o f  re tirem en t years which a f f e c t  a leng th  o f  working y ears: 
namely earn ings. Munnell uses LF65 (lab o r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  
r a te  o f  age 65 and o lder) w ith income as a  proxy v a r ia b le  to  
measure re tirem en t p a tte rn .
To be sp e c if ic  consider th e  follow ing v a r ia b le s  model:
S = a 0 + aiSSW + a 2L F  1,
where S i s  personal savings, SSW i s  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  and LF i s  lab o r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  v a r ia b le s . c*i < 0, 
and a 2 < 0.
I f  ve em it LF, th e  estim ate  i s
S = cc0 + c tts sw  2.
Frcm equation  1,
ES.SSW/ ESSW2 = ctx + a 2Z LF.SSW/ L SSW2 ......... 3.
Frcm equation  2, we g e t
ZS.SSW/ ZSSW2 = a t  .........4 .
Based on th e  em itted  v a r ia b le  formula we have
oti — cii “t  a 2b  . . . . .  5, 
where a 2 < 0, a 2 < 0, b  < 0, and a 2b  > 0. b 0i s  the  reg ressio n  
c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  LF on SSW ( LF = b  + bSSW ) .
I f  magnitudes o f  a i  and a 2b  a re  equal, bo th  o f f s e t  each
o th e r . S* = 0. a *  tends to  b ia s  toward zero, i f  LF i s  em itted  
frcm th e  savings fanction .
8 The p o licy  i s  th a t  th e  goverrment does no t impose tax es on 
th e  in te r e s t  frcm savings in  banks, posted savings, and n a tio n a l 
bonds. The upper l im i t  o f  th e se  amounts o f  savings and bonds i s  
$12,500 each per person. T his tax  p o licy  g re a tly  s tim u la tes  th e  
savings p ropensity  amoung th e  Japanese, a s  o f  October 1984.
9 The Durbin-Watson t e s t  i s  no t ap p licab le  to  reg ression  equ­
a tio n s  in  which th e re  i s  no constan t term. See Jan  Kmenta, Mac­
millan# 1986, pp.328-330.
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TABLE 1
O onsuner E x p e n d i tu re  E q u a tio n  (E te ld s te in )
YD RE U W SSWG SSWN INTER D.W. SER R2
.565
(3.95)
.051
(.50)
.353
(2.51)
13.00
(2.05)
.130
(.78)
.0014
(1.44)
16.85
(1.07)
1.88* 9.29 .991
.571
(4.12)
.051
(.50)
.355
(2.52)
12.83
(2.02)
.131
(.79) -----
.0016
(1.46)
16.88
(1.07)
1.88* 9.28 .990
Note: INTER i s  th e  in te rc e p t. A sterisk s fo r  the  Durbin-Watson 
s t a t i s t i c s  rep re sen t th e  acceptance o f  th e  n u ll hypothesis a f te r  
c o rrec tio n  fo r  s e r ia l  c o rre la tio n  ** 2.5% le v e l and * 5% le v e l. 
SER i s  th e  standard  e rro r  o f  th e  reg ressio n . Rz i s  th e  adjusted  
R-squared. The parentheses below th e  c o e f f ic ie n t estim ates g ive 
t - s t a t i s t i c s . Bor explanations o f  th e  symbols, see TABLE 5 (Def­
in i t io n s  o f  V ariables) .
TABLE 2
Saving Equation (Munnell)
YD YD.LF60 U W SSWG SSWN SSCON INTER D.W. SER R2
.280
(.94)
-.0002
(-.07 )
-10.86
(-1.53)
-.030
( -1 9 )
-.0005
(-.31 ) -----
-7 .90
(-.4 2 )
1.55 10.14 .800
.284 
( .95)
-.0003
(-.09 )
-10.80
(-1.53)
-.031
(-.19 )
-.0006
(-.32 ) -----
-8.01
(-.43 )
1.55 10.14 .800
.114
(.59)
.0014
(.53)
-11.69
(-1.63)
-.013
(-.08 )
----- ------ .180
(.57)
-3 .12
(-.1 9 )
1.49 10.10 .788
Note: INTER i s  th e  in te rc e p t. A sterisk s fo r  th e  Durbin-Watson 
s t a t i s t i c s  rep re sen t th e  acceptance o f  th e  n u ll hypothesis a f te r  
c o rrec tio n  fo r  s e r ia l  c o rre la tio n  ** 2.5% le v e l and * 5% le v e l.  
SER i s  th e  standard  e r ro r  o f  th e  reg ress io n . R2 i s  the  adjusted  
R-squared. The parentheses below th e  c o e f f ic ie n t  estim ates  g ive 
t - s t a t i s t i c s .  For explanations o f  th e  symbols, see TABLE 5 (Def­
in i t io n s  o f  V ariables) .
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TABLE 3-A
C onsum ption  E x p e n d itu re  E q u a tio n  (B a rro )  w i th  i n t e r c e p t
Independent 3-1 w ith  3-2 w ith  3-3 w ith  3-4 w ithout so c ia l
V ariable SSWG SSWN SS se c u rity  v a ria b le
YD .596
(3.91)
.598
(3.99)
.641
(4.18)
.620
(4.52)
YD_i .052
(.44)
.052
(.44)
.050
(.42)
.059
(.51)
RE .366
(2.35)
.365
(2.35)
.323
(1.87)
.350
(2.36)
U.YD .031
(1.33)
.031
(1.30)
.036
(1.91)
.036
(1.93)
W .163
(.85)
.162
(.85)
.135
(.67)
.156
(.83)
SIR .085
(.30)
.085
(.30)
.129
(.51)
.133
(.53)
DIR -.184
(-.21 )
-.180
(-.21)
-.069
(-.08)
-.093
(-.11 )
SSWG •005E-1
(.39)
SSWN .006E-1
(.39) ----- -----
SS ----- -.037(-.34 ) -----
INTER 26.02
(1.50)
25.88
(1.52)
18.31
(1.64)
20.32
(2.16)
D.W. 1.91** 1.91** 1.89* 1.87*
SER 9.62 9.62 9.63 9.48
R2 .991 .991 .991 .991
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Note: INTER i s  th e  in te rc e p t.  A ste risk s  fo r  th e  Durbin-Watson 
s t a t i s t i c s  rep resen t th e  acceptance o f  th e  n u ll  hypothesis a f te r  
c o rre c tio n  fo r s e r ia l  c o rre la tio n  ** 2.5% le v e l and * 5% le v e l. 
SER i s  th e  standard e r ro r  o f  th e  reg ress io n . R2 i s  th e  ad justed  
R-squared. Hie parentheses belcw th e  c o e f f ic ie n t  estim ates  give 
t - s t a t i s t i c s .  EOr explanations o f  th e  symbols, see TABLE 5 (Def­
in i t io n s  o f  V a ria b le s ) .
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TABLE 3-B
G o n sa n p tio n  E x p e n d itu re  E q u a tio n  (B a rro )  w i th o u t  i n t e r c e p t
Independent 3-1 w ith  3-2 w ith  3-3 w ith  3-4 w ithout so c ia l
V ariable SSW3 SSWN SS se c u rity  v a r ia b le
YD .687
(4.78)
.682
(4.76)
.712
(4.68)
.647
(4.65)
™ -l .075(.64)
.075
(.64)
.032
(.27)
.059
(.51)
RE .315
(2.02)
.315
(2.01)
.257
(1.49)
.316
(2.05)
U.YD .050
(2.51)
.051
(2.52)
.041
(2.05)
.042
(2.03)
W .107
(.57)
.107
(.57)
.038
(.20)
.109
(.61)
SUR .309
(1.31)
.311
(1.31)
.238
(.96)
.231
(.94)
DIR -.083
(-.10 )
-.097
(-.11 )
-.273
(-.32 )
-.236
(-.28 )
SSWG -.011E-1
(-1 .39) ----- -----
s sm -.012E-1
(-1.37)
----- ------
SS ------ -.114(-1.17) ------
INTER ----- -----
D.W. 1.78 1.78 1.87 1.83
SER 9.79 9.80 9.85 9.80
R2 .997 .997 .997 .994
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Note: INTER i s  th e  in te rc e p t. D.W. i s  th e  Durbin-Watson s t a t i s t i c s ,  
ad justed  fo r th e  gap fo r th e  years 1946-1982. 9 SER i s  the  standard 
e r ro r  o f  th e  reg ress io n . R2 i s  th e  ad justed  R-squared. The 
paren theses below th e  c o e f f ic ie n t  estim ates g ive t - s t a t i s t i c s .  Ebr 
explanations o f  th e  symbols, see TABLE 5 (D efin itions o f  V a riab le s ) .
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TABLE 4
Saving Equation (Expanded Life-Cycle Saving Model)
Independent
v a riab le
w ith
SSW3
with
SSWN
w ith
SS
w ith
SSCON
YD .430
(3.34)
.416
(3.32)
.224
(1.83)
.154
(1.44)
™ -l .130(1.08)
.133
(1.11)
.119
(.92)
.248
(2.07)
RE -.414
(-3.57)
-.417
(-3.61)
-.279
(-1.84)
-.343
(-3 .11)
SUR .840
(3.27)
.861
(3.35)
.434
(1.21)
.795
(3.17)
U.YD -.017
(-1.88)
-.016
(-1.67)
-.028
(-2.59)
-.005
(-.4 1 )
W -.572
(-2.48)
-.574
(-2.49)
-.440
(-1.82)
-.666
(-2 .83)
LF60 -1.588
(-2.11)
-1.639
(-2.16)
-.916
(-1.20)
-1.585
(-2 .01)
SSWG -.027E-1
(-2.87) -----
-----
SSWN ------ -.030E-1
(-2.92) ----- ------
SS ----- -.312E-1(-.26) -----
SSOCN ----- ----- -.701(-2 .65)
UTTER 72.050
(1.41)
75.902
(1.47)
48.635
(.86)
91.542
(1.62)
D.W.
SER
Rz
1.89*
8.66
.985
1.89*
8.64
.985
1.99**
9.19
.939
1.93**
9.01
.986
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Note: INTER i s  th e  in te rc e p t. A sterisk s fo r  th e  Durbin-Watson 
s t a t i s t i c s  rep resen t th e  acceptance o f  th e  n u ll hypothesis a f te r  
c o rre c tio n  fo r  s e r ia l  c o rre la tio n  ** 2.5% le v e l and * 5% le v e l. 
SER i s  th e  standard e r ro r  o f  th e  reg ressio n . R2 i s  th e  ad justed  
R-squared. The parentheses below th e  c o e f f ic ie n t  estim ates give 
t - s t a t i s t i c s .  For explanations o f  th e  symbols, see TABLE 5 (Def­
in i t io n s  o f  V ariables) .
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TABLE 5
D efin itio n s  o f  V ariab les
V ariable
name
D efin itio n
C re a l  per c a p ita  consuner expenditure in  1,000 yen.
S re a l  per c a p ita  personal savings in  1,000 yen.
SSWG re a l  per c a p ita  g ross so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth, in  
1,000 yen, based on QASDI program as defined by 
F e ld ste in  and Munnell. There a re  sane m odifications 
o f  c a lc u la tio n . The r a te  o f  b e n e f its  and so c ia l se­
c u r i ty  tax  payments per c a p ita  in  r e la t io n  to  d is ­
posable income i s  changed in  each year toy using the  
c u rre n t r a te .  L ife  expectancy i s  based on c u rre n t 
male l i f e  expectancies.
SSWN re a l  per c a p ita  n e t so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth , in  1,000 
yen, based cn OASDI program as  defined by F e ld ste in  
and Munnell. Net so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth (SSWN) equals 
. gross so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth (SSWG) minus th e  p resen t 
value o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  tax es.
SSOCN re a l  per person c o n tr ib u tio n s , in  1,000 yen, (QASDI 
program: o ld -age, su rv ivors and d i s a b i l i ty  insurance 
under th e  Wei fe re  Pension program), o f  workers w ith 
earnings tax ab le  by so c ia l sec u rity  as defined by 
Munnell.
SS re a l  so c ia l s e c u rity  b e n e f its  (OASDI program: o ld - 
age, su rv ivors and d is a b i l i ty  insurance under th e  
W elfare Pension program) per re c ip ie n t in  1,000 yen,
m u ltip lied  by th e  r a t io  o f  th e  number o f  vrarkers w ith 
earnings tax ab le  by so c ia l s e c u rity  to  th e  t o t a l  lab o r 
fo rce , as  defined by Barro (1978).
YD read, per c a p ita  personal d isposab le  income in  1,000 
yen.
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 5 (continued)
D efin itio n s  o f  V ariab les
V ariab le D efin itio n
name
RE re a l  per c a p ita  corporate  re ta in ed  earnings in  1,000
yen.
SUR r e a l  per c a p ita  su rp lus, in  1,000 yen, o f  th e  to ta l
government sec to rs  in  TABLES 3 and th e  c e n tra l gov­
ernment se c to r  in  TABLE 4.
U unemployment r a te  in  th e  to ta l  labor fo rce.
U.YD th e  product o f  r e a l  per c a p ita  personal d isposable
income and unemployment r a te .
IE .60 labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  o f  males aged 60 and
over.
YD.LF60 th e  product o f  reed p er c a p ita  personal disposable
inccme and labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  o f  males 
aged 60 and over.
W re a l  per c a p ita  n e t w ealth in  1,000 yen, a t  the
beginning o f  the  year in  TABLES 1, 2, 3-A and 3-B, 
and re a l  per c a p ita  n e t w ealth  in  1,000 yen, a t  
th e  beginning o f  th e  year excluded durab le  a s se ts  
in  TABLE 4 .
DDR re a l  per c a p ita  household durable expenditure in
1,000 yen a t  th e  beginning o f  th e  year.
CHAPTER V
THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY ON PERSONAL SAVINGS 
AND CN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF THE ELDERLY
5.1 Ehipirical R esu lts
This chap ter p resen ts  th e  r e s u l ts  o f  a  sim ultaneous-equation 
model estim ated  by tw o-stage le a s t  squares. One s tr ik in g  aspect 
o f  th e  r e s u l ts  o f  TABLE 2-A by th e  method o f  tw o-stage le a s t  
squares (equation  5 and 6 in  Chapter I I I ,  "A naly tical Frame­
work") i s  th a t  r e s u l t s  seen t o  confirm  th e  hypothesis th a t  th e re  
have been two o ffs e tin g  fa c to rs : e a r l i e r  r e t ir e n e n t  encourages 
personal savings ( re t ir e n e n t  e f f e c t ) ,  and so c ia l s e c u r ity  re ­
tirem en t b e n e f its  discourage personal savings (b e n e fit e f f e c t ) . 
Another su rp ris in g  r e s u l t  i s  th a t  an in crease  in  personal sav­
ings induces an e a r l i e r  re tirem en t, whereby an in d iv id u a l plans 
o r  t r i e s  to  save more in  o rder to  r e t i r e  e a r l i e r .  Thus, simul­
ta n e ity  and interdependency e x is t  betw eexipersonal savings and 
laboe force p a r t ic ip a tio n , i . e . ,  th e  re tirem en t in d ic a to r  ( re ­
presented by LF60). The v a r ia b le s  a re  defined in  TABLE 1.
M arginal p ro p en sitie s  to  save w ith  re sp ec t to  so c ia l se cu rity  
w ealth v a r ia b le s  a re  - .0 0 4 , -.005  and -.979  in  th e  columns S£WG^
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and SSWN2 in  TABLE 2-A and SSOON3 in  TABLE 2-B, re sp ec tiv e ly .
A ll a re  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t.  The p o in t estim ates o f  the 
corresponding e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  personal savings a re  -1..56, -1 .65  
and - .4 9  re sp e c tiv e ly  a t  th e  sample means. The r e s u lts  suggest 
th a t  th e  magnitude o f  a n tic ip a ted  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  (represen ted  by SSWG o r SSWN) i s  much g re a te r  than cu r­
re n t so c ia l sec u rity  tax  co n trib u tio n s  (SSGCN). Fran 1961 to  
1982, a f te r  th e  implementation o f  a so c ia l s e c u rity  re tire n e n t 
program, th e  abso lu te  amount o f  impact on personal savings due 
to  an tic ip a te d  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  (SSWG or SSWN) 
was reduced by 314 thousand yen r e a l  per c ap ita , w hile th a t  o f  
so c ia l s e c u rity  tax  co n trib u tio n s  (SSOON) was reduced by 134 
thousand yen re a l  per c a p ita . In  the  p a s t fran  1970 t o  1982, 
th e  estim ated impact o f  SSWG o r SSWN was approximately a  173 
thousand yen reduction  o f  personal savings, w hile th a t  o f  SSOON 
was 97 thousand yen. A su b s ta n tia l reduction  in  personal sav­
ings due to  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  i s  understood.
In term s o f  a l i fe -c y c le  savings approach in d iv id u a ls  plan to  
save more w ith  a  view to  long-range l i f e  aspect ra th e r  than a
4sh o rt range one.
M arginal p ro p en sitie s  to  save w ith re sp e c t to  LF60 a re  -2 .031, 
-2 .172 and -1.539 in  th e  columns SSWG and SSWN in  TABLE 2-A and 
SSCDN in  TABLE 2-B, re sp ec tiv e ly . The p o in t estim ates o f  the
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corresponding e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  personal savings w ith re sp ec t to  LF60 
a re  -1 .3 6 , -1 .46  and - .7 6  a t  th e  sample means. The e l a s t i c i ­
t i e s  o f  SSWG and SSWN a re  s im ila r  in  magnitude. E a r lie r  r e t i r e ­
ment req u ires  in d iv id u a ls  to  save fo r th e  consumption o f  a  long 
period  o f  re tirem en t. The estim ated impact on personal savings 
by e a r l i e r  re tirem en t (represen ted  by LF60) was a  29 thousand 
yen re a l  per c a p ita  in crease  in  personal savings frcm 1961 to  
1982, and 17 thousand yen frcm 1970 t o  1982. The abso lu te  
amount o f  upward impact o f  th e  e a r l i e r  re tirem en t e f f e c t  was 
about one-ten th  th e  a n tic ip a te d  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  e f fe c t  (SSWG o r  SSWN) and o n e - f if th  th e  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  tax  co n trib u tio n s  (SSOON).
Although th e  b e n e f it  e f f e c t  was g re a te r  than th e  re tirem en t 
e f f e c t ,  th e  r a t io  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  to  d is ­
posable inccme in  r e a l  per c a p ita  was only about 50% on the  
average during th e  p a s t 10 years (1972-1982), a s  observed in  
TABLE 3 on colunn 3. A ldrich (1982) a lso  re p o rts  th a t  th e  re ­
placement r a te s  o f  a  so c ia l s e c u rity  o ld-age pension fo r a  s in ­
g le  worker in  Japan were 26% in  1969, 37% in  1975 and 54% in  
1980. This in su ff ic ie n c y  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  
probably induced th e  Japanese to  save. The r a t io  o f  personal 
savings to  d isposab le  incane in  r e a l  per c a p ita  was about 20% 
on th e  average during th e  p a s t 10 y ears  (1972-1982), as indi­
cated  in  TABLE 3 on colunn 2. This r a t io  i s  remarkably high 
canpared to  the  r a t io  (about 5% on th e  average) in  th e  United 
S ta te s .
TABLE 4 shews incanes o f  aged couples in  both ru ra l and 
urban a re a s . Ihe  so c ia l s e c u r ity  program provides so c ia l secu­
r i t y  re tirem en t b e n e f its  a t  th e  age o f  6 0  and over in  Japan; 
n ev erth e less , th e  main sources o f  incanes a re  earning, non 
earning and o th e rs  a t  th e i r  e a r ly  age o f  60s. A fte r th e  age o f  
75 th e  aouple in  a  ru ra l  area r e l ie s  more upon so c ia l s e c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its  than  do those  couples in  urban a reas . The 
r a t io  o f  incane fran  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  to  
t o t l e  incanes before  age 74 i s  r e la t iv e ly  s im ila r  fo r both  ru ra l 
and urban e ld e r ly  couples. The r e la t iv e ly  high, non-earning 
incane o f  an aged couple in  a urban area  as canpared to  th ese  
in  a r u ra l  a rea  rev ea ls  th a t  an urban aouple accumulates a sse ts  
fo r th e i r  re tirem en t period .
H is to r ic a l evidence o f  th e  replacement r a te s  and th e  1980 
Population Census o f  Japan prove th a t  th e  aged couple considers 
so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  as le ss  im portant than any 
o th e r incane in  th e  ea r ly  s tag e  o f  th e  re tirem en t period , in ­
s u f f ic ie n t  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  force in d iv id u a ls  
during th e  working period  to  save fo r th e  consumption o f  th e  
re tirem en t period .
97
Another major estim ated impact i s  r e a l  d isposable  incctne. 
Shinchara (1983) emjiiasizes the  importance o f  re a l  d isposable 
inocme. Fran 1970 to  1982 c u rre n t and p a s t r e a l  d isposab le  in ­
canes to g e th e r  con tribu ted  about 134 thousand yen re a l per c a p ita  
personal savings, according to  th e  c a lc u la tio n  based on the  
r e s u l ts  in  TABLE 2-A under the  SSWG colunn. R e la tiv e ly  high 
marginal p ro p en sitie s  to  save about .4 ( in  TABLE 2-A) may sup­
p o rt th e  previous argument concerning h igh personal savings- 
inccme and lew so c ia l se c u rity  re tirem en t bene f i t  s-disposatole 
income r a t io s .  We recognize th a t  o th e r explanatory  v a riab le s  
- s o c ia l  norms and a t t i tu d in a l  behavior- a re  n o t included in  
th i s  a n a ly s is .
P o sitiv e ly -estim a ted  c o e ff ic ie n ts  o f  physica l a s se ts , rep ­
resen ted  by WREESTA in  TABLES 2-A and 2-B, show th e  s tim u la tion  
o f  saving e f fo r ts  fo r th e  purpose o f  ob ta in ing  o n e 's  cwn house, 
as w ell as th e  encouragement o f  work e f fo r ts  to  meet housing 
co n s tru c tio n  expenses. In  Japan th e  awning o f  o n e 's  own house 
(physical a s se ts )  i s  m otivated by th e  bequest purpose in  l i f e ­
cycle  w ealth accixnlation (Darby, 1979; and Shinchara, 1983). 
Shinohara (1983) p o in ts  ou t a strong  caim unity o r ie n ta tio n  be­
tween genera tions. I t  may tend to  have a  h igher p ropensity  to  
bequest than  in  o th e r c o u n tr ie s . The study by B linder, Gordon 
and Wise (1983) find  weak evidence fo r th e  bequest motive in
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th e  case o f  th e  United S ta te s .
Estim ated c o e ff ic ie n ts  o f  re ta in ed  earnings (EE) a re  nega­
t iv e  and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t in  TABLES 2-A and 2-B and 
th re e  explanations for th is  r e s u l t  a re  p la u s ib le . One i s  th a t  
business firms accumulate re tirem en t pension allowances for 
th e i r  employees in  Japan. The allowances a re  40% ta x  deductib le  
and tra n s fe ra b le  by th e  firm s in to  re ta in ed  earn ings. These 
business savings cure thus taken o u t o f  one1 s  personal savings 
share in  th e  p r iv a te  sec to r. Another reason i s  th a t  increased 
re tirem en t pensions undertaken by business firms fo r th e i r  
workers tend to  discourage workers from personal savings because 
o f  an increase  in  a n tic ip a te d  re tirem en t pensions provided by 
the  firm  in  th e  fu tu re . The l a s t  reason i s  th a t  an increase 
in  re ta in ed  earnings i s  re la te d  to  improving business prospects 
(Auerbach, 1982). This s i tu a t io n  causes an increase  in  con­
sumption and leads to  a  decrease in  personal savings.
As fo r government su rp lus (SIR), estim ated c o e ff ic ie n ts  
a re  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t.  The p o s itiv e ly  estim ated co e ffi­
c ie n ts  (SUR) r e f le c t  th e  in d ire c t  e f fe c t  upon personal savings. 
An increase in  government su rp lus u ltim a te ly  causes th e  p riv a te  
sec to r to  increase  savings, vhich means p r iv a te  investm ent, and 
fu tu re  consumer expenditure. The em pirical r e s u l ts  support th e  
th e o re tic a l  arguments o f  Boskin and K o tl i to f f  (1985), which were
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dicussed in  3 .4  T heore tica l Model and Function. The government 
surp lus a lso  has an in d ire c t  influence on personal savings 
through an in crease  in  fu tu re  d isposab le  inccme by lowering 
fu tu re  taxes and p r ic e  le v e l.
As fo r th e  fa c to rs ' in fluence on th e  labor force p a r t ic i ­
pa tio n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly , estim ated c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  savings (S) a re  
a l l  negative (-.0 3 9 , - .0 3 9 , - .0 4 0  and -.0 3 5  in  th e  column SSWG 
and SSWN in  TABLE 2-A, and SSCON and SS in  TABLE 2-B respec­
tiv e ly )  . As p rev iously  d iscussed , m arginal p ro p en sitie s  to  save 
w ith re sp ec t to  LF60 a re  a l l  negative . The r e s u l ts  r e f l e c t  th e  
interdependency between personal savings and labor force par­
t ic ip a t io n .  The r e s u l ts  in fe r  th a t  an increase  in  l i fe -c y c le  
savings a f fe c ts  th e  re tirem en t d ec is io n  o f  e ld e rly  workers. The 
r e s u l ts  a lso  imply th a t  ind iv id u als  t r y  to  save more during th e  
working period  under th e  cond ition  o f  l ife t im e  lab o r supply 
because o f  planned e a r l i e r  re tirem en t. Therefore, l i fe - c y c le  
savings and l i f e -c y c le  labor supply a re  m utually determined 
(Thompson, 1983).
According to  th e  estim ated e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  a  1% in c rease  
in  personal savings w il l  lead  to  a range o f  between a .052 to  
a .060 p e rcen t decrease in  th e  lab o r force p a r tic ip a tio n  o f  
those age 60 and over a t  th e  sample means. Thus, th e  changes 
in  personal savings have a  s l ig h t  d ec lin e  in  th e  labor force
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p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h e  e l d e r l y .
S ta t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t estim ated c o e ff ic ie n ts  o f  cu rren t 
r e a l  d isposab le  inccme (YD) and lagged re a l  d isposab le  inccme 
(YD_^) , shown in  th e  LF60 colunns in  TABLES 2-A and 2-B, p resen t 
a  l i f e - c y c le  earning by labor supply. Hie p o in t estim ates o f  
e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  by th e  e ld e r ly  (LF60) 
w ith  re sp ec t to  d isposab le  inccme a re  -1 .05 (YD) and .49 (YD_1 ) 
a t  th e  sample means, in  th e  LF60 colunns w ith  SSWG in  TABLE 2- 
A. The negative ly  estim ated s ign  by YD r e f le c ts  inccme e f fe c t ,  
which encourages e ld e r ly  workers to  choose le is u re  ra th e r  than 
work. The p o s itiv e ly  estim ated sign  by YD_ 1  r e f le c ts  a  su b s ti­
tu t io n a l  e f f e c t ,  which i s  q u ite  sm all. These v a riab le s  a re  
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  in  the  LP60 colunns.
Margined, e f fe c ts  o f  physical a s se ts  (WREESTA) on labor 
force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  age 60 and over a re  .246, .24"1, .259 and 
.233 in  th e  colunns SSWG, SSWN, SSOCN and SS in  TABLES 2-A 
and 2-B, re sp e c tiv e ly . The estim ated c o e ff ic ie n ts  a re  con­
s is te n t  and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t .  The bequest motive o f  
owning a  house has a strong in fluence, namely, a re tirem en t 
d ec is io n , on th e  labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  those 60 and over. 
The estim ated margined e f fe c ts  reveal th a t  a  1,000 yen increase  
in  holding physica l a s se ts ,  such as housing, r a is e  th e  labor 
force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  people 60 and over by approximately
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.25 o f  a percentage p o in t. Hie r e s u l ts  suggest th a t  th e  long 
mortgage payment p o ssib ly  postpones withdrawal frcm th e  labor 
m arket.
Since World War I I  Japan has experienced an acce le ra tin g  
d ec lin e  in  th e  labor force frcm th e  a g r ic u ltu ra l  sec to r and in  
h e r  economic development. S ta t i s t i c a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t and e s t i ­
mated negative c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  AGRI in  TABLES 2-A and 2-B revea l 
th a t  in d u s tr ia l  development provides an expansion o f  job oppor­
tu n i t i e s .  Hie negative e f fe c t  o f  AGRI a lso  in fe rs  non pecuniary 
b e n e f its  frcm so c ia liz in g  w ith  o th e r people in  th e  labor market 
(Shapiro and Shaw 1983).
The p o s itiv e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  ED v a r ia b le  in  th e  labor supply 
equation by th e  e ld e r ly  (LF60) in  TABLES 2-A and 2-B are  s ta ­
t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  and s ta b le . Hie e f fe c t  o f  th e  ED v a r i­
ab le  o p era tes  in  th e  expected d ire c tio n  (Bo skin , 1977). An 
in crease  in  th e  q u a li ty  o f  education, vAiich i s  associa ted  w ith 
a  r is in g  opportun ity  co s t, encourages in d iv id u a ls  toward a  longer 
working year o r  more p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  th e  labor market during 
th e  l i f e  cy c le . An expanding choice o f  job o p p o rtu n itie s , com­
bined w ith  a  high q u a lity  o f  education, persuades th e  e ld e r ly  
no t to  withdraw com pletely frcm th e  labor market a f t e r  r e t i r in g  
frcm th e  main life t im e  job.
In  Japan th e  in fluence o f  a n tic ip a te d  so c ia l se c u rity  re -
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t i r a n e n t  b e n e f its  (SSWG o r  SSWN) o r  so c ia l s e c u rity  re t ire n e n t 
tax  co n trib u tio n s  (SSOON) on th e  labor supply o f  the  e ld e r ly  i s  
n eg lig ib le  in  th i s  tim e-se rie s  study.
The r e s u l ts  fo r the  estim ated labor supply suggest th a t  the  
re tirem en t d ec is io n  (represen ted  by LF60) i s  mainly a ffec ted  by 
l i f e -c y c le  savings, l i f e -c y c le  incane, an incen tive  to  ob ta in  
houses, a  change in  in d u s tr ia l  s tru c tu re  (namely, th e  dec lin e  
in  th e  a g r ic u ltu ra l  s e c to r) , and th e  q u a lity  o f  education.
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5.2 Summary
The savings-inccme ratio in Japan remains quite high. One 
plausible reason for the relatively small impact of social secu­
rity benefits upon personal savings is perhaps due to the feet 
that with the ever-increasing Japanese lifespan, social security 
retirement benefits are still too snail to support the consump­
tion for a long retirement period. The ambiguous improvement 
of the social security program and the uncertainty of future 
social security retirement benefits (Darby, 1979? and Hamermesh, 
1984), and its insufficiency of benefits in Japan (Shinohara,
1983) will induce individuals to keep a substantially high 
savings-inccme ratio. In terms of social security retirement 
benefits the empirical study shews that the Japanese tend to 
save with a view toward a long-range life rather than a short- 
range one.
The empirical results of this study reveal that social secu­
rity retirement benefits have a negative inpact upon personal 
savings and that the labor force participation over the age of 
sixty is inversely related to personal savings. The usually 
hypothesized "dual effects" of social security retirement bene­
fits exists. The benefit effect dominates the retirement effect 
in Japan. An empirical study by Burkhauser and Turner (1982 b)
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suggests th a t  th e  e f fe c t  o f  so c ia l se c u rity  cn th e  e ld e r ly  work­
e rs  in  th e  United S ta te s . Hie so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t bene­
f i t s  do not v is ib ly  a f f e c t  labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  the  
e ld e r ly  in  th i s  tim e -se rie s  study in  Japan, however. The r e s u l ts  
may stem frcm d if f e re n t  so c ia l norms. The study e x p l ic i t ly  
id e n t i f ie s  an interdependency between personal savings and th e  
labo r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly , namely, re tirem en t- 
behavior p a tte rn .
Although th e  b e n e f it  e f fe c t  i s  g re a te r  than th e  re tire n e n t 
e f fe c t ,  a  h igh personal saving r a t io  e x is ts  in  Japan. This h igh 
saving r a t io  p a r t ly  stems frcm obtain ing  a house in  a l i f e ­
cycle  a s se ts  plan (Shinchara, 1983). Personal savings a re  
re la te d  negatively  to  re ta in ed  earnings, b u t p o s itiv e ly  to  
government su rp lus and to  physica l w ealth accunulation .
The labor force p a r tic ip a tio n  o f  those over th e  age o f  six ­
ty , i . e . ,  th e  re tirem en t dec is ion , has been influenced since  
th e  1940s by in d u s tr ia l iz a t io n . The in crease  in  th e  q u a li ty  o f  
education allows th e  e ld e r ly  to  remain longer in  the  labor mar­
k e t.  The physical a s se ts  accunulation, m otivated by bequest 
purposes, induces th e  in d iv id u a l to  work longer in  h is  l ife t im e .
Understanding th e  e f f e c t  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t bene­
f i t s  upon personal savings and the  labor supply o f  th e  e ld e r ly  
remains c ru c ia l in  determ ining so c ia l and economic p o lic ie s .
Savings by in d iv iduals  a re  u t i l iz e d  by th e  f in a n c ia l market to  
purchase stocks, bonds and o ther f in a n c ia l a s se ts ,  which, in  
tu rn , finance c a p ita l  form ation in  th e  p r iv a te  se c to r. In th e  
long run, th e  r e la t iv e ly  high r a te  o f  personal savings would 
remarkably a f fe c t  th e  r a te  o f  p r iv a te  c a p ita l  stocks and conse­
quently  th e  growth -of n a tio n a l inccme.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER V
1 The c a lc u la tio n  o f  SSWs: g ro ss  so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth 
(SSWG) and n e t so c ia l s e c u r ity  w ealth (SSWN) v a ria b le s  a re  based 
on F e ld ste in  (1974) and Minnell (1974). There a re  seme modi­
f ic a tio n s  o f  c a lc u la tio n . The r a te  o f  b e n e f its  and so c ia l 
se c u r ity  ta x  payments per c a p ita  in  r e la t io n  to  d isposab le  
incane i s  changed in  each year by using th e  cu rre n t r a te .  L ife  
expectaion based cm cu rre n t male l i f e  expectancies. The r a te  
o f  in te r e s t  i s  a  c u rre n t y ie ld  lev e l o f  1 0  years long term bond'.
2 Net so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth  (SSWN) equals g ross so c ia l 
s e c u rity  w ealth (SSWG) minus th e  p resen t value o f  so c ia l secu-
3 SSOON rep re sen ts  th e  per person co n trib u tio n s  (o ld-age, 
su rv ivo rs  and d i s a b i l i ty  insurance under the  Welfare Pension 
program div ided  by CPI) .  Munnell examines th e  impact o f  th is  
so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth measure on personal savings in  h e r study 
(1974).
4 A method o f  c a lc u la tio n  i s  adapted frcm Shapiro and Shaw
(1983).
The in s ig n if ic a n t and /or weak e f fe c ts  in  o th e r s tu d ie s  a re  
due to  f a i lu r e  to  hold labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  (LF) held  con­
s ta n t .  Munnell employs LF w ith  income. She assumes th a t  savings 
a re  a  function  o f  inccme and a re  in d ire c tly  a  function  o f  re ­
tirem en t years which a f f e c t  a  leng th  o f  working years: namely 
earn ings. Munnell uses LF65 ( labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  o f  
age 65 and older) w ith  inccme as a  proxy v a riab le  to  measure r e ­
tirem en t p a tte rn .
To be sp e c if ic  consider th e  following v a r ia b le s  model;
S = a 0 + a x SSW + a 2 L F   1,
where S i s  personal savings, SSW i s  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  and LF i s  labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  v a r ia b le s . a i < 0 , 
and ct2 < 0 .
I f  we em it IF , th e  estim ate  i s
s = a0 + a* ssw   2.
Fran equation 1,
Z S.SSW/ 1 SSW 2 = <x1 +  a 2 ZxF.SSW/ 2 SSW 2 ........... 3.
Fran equation  2, we g e t
z s.ssw/ z ssw2 = a *  4 .
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Based on th e  em itted  v a r ia b le  formula we have
a* = a1 + a2 b   5,
where a x < 0 , ot2 < 0 , b  < 0 , and a 2b > 0 . b  i s  th e  reg res­
sion  c o e f f ic ie n t  o f  LF cn SSW ( LF = b 0 + bSSW ).
I f  magnitudes o f  and a 2b a re  equal, both o f f s e t  each
o th er. 6l*  s 0. tends to  b ia s  toward zero, i f  LF i s  em itted  
frcm th e  savings fanction .
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TABLE 1
D efin itio n s  o f  V ariab les
V ariable
nane
D efin itio n
S re a l  per c a p ita  personal savings in  1 , 0 0 0  yen.
LF.60 labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  o f  males aged 60 and 
over.
SSWG re a l  per c a p ita  g ross so c ia l s e c u rity  vrealth, in  
1,000 yen, based cn QASDI program as  defined by 
F e ld s te in  and Munnell. There a re  seme m odifications 
o f  c a lc u la tio n . The r a te  o f  b e n e f its  and so c ia l s e ­
c u r i ty  ta x  payments per c a p ita  in  r e la t io n  to  d is ­
posable incane i s  changed in  each year by using th e  
c u rre n t r a te .  L ife  expecta tion  based on c u rre n t male 
l i f e  expectancies.
SSWN r e a l  per c a p ita  n e t so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth , in  1 , 0 0 0  
yen, based cn QASDI program a s  defined by F e ld ste in  
and Munnell. Net so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth (SSWN) equals 
g ross so c ia l s e c u rity  w ealth (SSWG) minus the  p resen t 
value o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  ta x e s .
SSOON re a l  per person co n trib u tio n s , in  1,000 yen, (QASDI 
program: o ld -age, su rv ivo rs  and d i s a b i l i ty  insurance 
under th e  W elfare pension program), o f  workers w ith  
earn ings tax ab le  by so c ia l se cu rity  a s  defined by 
Munnell.
SS re a l  so c ia l s e c u r ity  b e n e f its  (OASDI program: o ld- 
age, surv ivors and d i s a b i l i ty  insurance under th e  
W elfare Pension program) per re c ip ie n t in  1,000 yen, 
m u ltip lied  by th e  r a t io  o f  th e  nutiber o f workers w ith 
earn ings tax ab le  by so c ia l s e c u rity  to  the  to t a l  labor 
fo rce , as  defined by Barro (1978)'.
YD re a l  per c a p ita  personal d isposab le  inccme in  1 , 0 0 0  
yen.
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (c o n tin u e d )
D efin itio n s  o f  V ariab les
V ariable
name
Definition
WREESTA re a l  per c a p ita  expense o f personal r e s id e n tia l
co n stru c tio n  in  1 , 0 0 0  yen in  p r iv a te  se c to r  a t  the 
beginning o f  th e  year.
WLIQUID re a l  per c a p ita  n e t l iq u id ty  w ealth: s tocks, bonds, 
t r u s t s  and l i f e  insurance, in  1 , 0 0 0  yen, a t  th e  be­
ginning o f  th e  year.
LMALE.YD th e  product o f  male unemployment r a te  and re a l  per 
c a p ita  personal d isposab le  incane.
RE re a l  p er c a p ita  corporate  re ta in ed  earnings in  1,000
yen.
SLR re a l  per c a p ita  surp lus o f  th e  c e n tra l govemnent
sec to r in  1 , 0 0 0  yen.
AGRI th e  r a t io  o f  th e  number o f  workers in  a g r ic u ltu ra l  sec to r
to  th e  t o t a l  labor fo rce .
ED th e  r a t io  o f  th e  number o f  graduates frcm koto-
sermon gakko ( in  Japan equ ivalen t to  ju n io r co lleg e ), 
ju n io r co lleg e , sen io r co lleg e  and u n iv e rs ity  gradu­
a te s  to  ju n io r highschool graduates who complete 
th e  n ine-year compulsory education in  Japan.
TABLE 2-A
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Saving and Labor Supply of the Elderly 
(Expanded Life-Cycle Saving Madel)
Independent
v a riab le
S w ith 
SSWG
LF60 w ith 
SSWG
S w ith 
SSWN
LF60 w ith 
SSWN
S -.0 3 9
(-1.73)
-.0 3 9
(-1.75)
LF60 -2.031
(-2.23)
----- -2.172 
(-2.40)
YD .379
(2.57)
-.129
(-4.27)
.359
(2.50)
-.129
(-4.37)
T O - 1
.061
(.55)
.063
(3.71)
.065
(.60)
.063
(3.73)
WREESTA .733
(2.58)
.246
(3.75)
.726
(2.60)
.247
(3.76)
WLIQUID .427
( 1 . 6 6 )
-.018
( -4 6 )
.428
(1.69)
-.017
(-.45 )
UMALE.YD .007
( . 8 8 )
-.003E-1
(-.18)
. 0 1 0
(1.16)
-.003E-1
( -1 8 )
RE -.481
(-4.64)
-.486
(-4.76) -----
SLR .570
(2.37)
.607
(2.54)
AGRI ----- -.732(- 6 . 1 2 )
-.734
(-6.06)
ED .312
(2.14)
.313
(2.15)
SSWG
SSWN
-.004
(-4.82)
-.005E-3
(-.03 )
-7005
(-4 .99)
-.003E-3
( - . 0 2 )
INTER 103.547
(1.69)
112.682
(14.66)
113.545
(1 . 8 6 )
112.789
(14.58)
D.W.
SER
R2
1.83*
8.74
.993
2 . 1 2 *
1.44
.936
1.83*
8.67
.993
2 - 1 1 *
1.44
.936
Note: INTER is the intercept. Asterisks for the Durbin-Watson 
statistics represent the acceptance of the null hypothesis after 
correction for serial correlation ** 2.5% level and * 5% level. 
SER is the standard error of the regression. R2 is the adjusted 
R-squared, the parentheses belew the coefficient estimates give 
t-statistics. For explanations of the symbols, see TABLE 5 (Def­
initions of Variables) .
TABLE 2-B
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Saving and Labor Supply of the Elderly 
(Expanded Life-Cycle Saving Model)
Independent
v a ria b le
S w ith 
SSOON
LF60 w ith 
SSOON
S w ith 
SS
LF60 w ith 
SS
S -.040 -.035
(-1.79) .. . . ■ (-1.52)
LF60 -1.539 -.280
(-1.51) ( - . 2 1 ) ___
YD .046 -.134 .144 -.128
(.31) (-5.43) (.71) (-5.91)
YO-l .150 .065 .048 .058
(1.19) (3.84) (.33) (3.38)
WREESTA .407 .259 .545 .233
(1.18) (3.58) (.92) (3.73)
WLIQUID .352 -.017 -.264 -.014
(1 . 2 0 ) (-.43) (-.77) (-.36)
UMALE.YD .016 -.005E-1 -.007 - . 0 0 1
(1.41) (-.28) (-.52) (-.70)
RE -.399 -.271
(-3.42) . . ■ (-1.59) -----
SUR .491 .154
(1.77) (.40) -----
AGRI -.758 -.775
(-6 .18) (-7.77)
ED .314 .350
■ - (2.18) (2.38)
SSOON -.979 .085E-1
(-3.49) (.19)
SS -7036 7013
(-.27 ) (.69)
INTER 95.688 114.311 9.697 115.092
(1.32) (15.80) (.09) (20.33)
D.W. 1.91** 2 . 1 2 * 1.76 2 . 1 0 **
SER 9.61 1.44 9.99 1.43
R2 .989 .934 .981 .933
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Nbte: INTER i s  th e  in te rc e p t.  A sterisk s fo r  the  Durbin-Watson 
s t a t i s t i c s  rep resen t th e  acceptance o f  th e  n u ll  hypothesis a f te r  
co rrec tio n  fo r  s e r ia l  c o r re la tio n  * *  2.5% le v e l and * 5% le v e l. 
SER i s  th e  standard  e r ro r  o f  th e  reg ressio n . R2  i s  th e  ad justed  
R-squared. The parentheses belcw th e  c o e ff ic ie n t estim ates  give 
t - s t a t i s t i c s .  Ebr explanations o f  th e  symbols, see TABLE 5 (Def­
in i t io n s  o f  V ariables) .
Year
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
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TABLE 3
Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of
Personal Savings S®B/YD SST/YD
to per person per person
Disposable Incane
24.9 14.9 7 .4
-46 .6 7.2 5.0
-47.2 35.2 5 .4
-19.9 45.4 7.8
12.5 45.2 6 .5
18.9 44.1 5.5
17.6 39.9 4 .9
1 1 . 2 35.8 3.9
10.4 40.2 5.8
12.4 37.1 5.8
13.3 34.7 5 .4
14.2 31.3 5.0
13.5 29.8 5 .0
16.7 27.3 4.4
18.7 24.9 5.3
20.9 2 1 . 8 5.2
18.3 19.4 5.2
18.3 17.3 4.8
18.4 15.7 4.6
15.8 33.0 7.1
15.1 29.7 7.3
15.6 26.4 6.9
16.7 23.6 6.5
17.3 33.6 6.7
18.2 29.4 7.5
17.9 29.3 7.8
18.2 26.3 8 . 0
20.9 47.9 8 . 2
23.7 44.7 9.5
2 2 . 1 48.8 9.7
22.4 53.0 1 1 . 2
2 1 . 0 53.2 12.5
2 0 . 6 52.9 12.3
18.7 51.8 1 2 . 1
19.2 54.9 13.0
19.7 55.9 14.5
17.7 56.1 14.5
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Source: "ffemily Income and Expenditure Survey," 1951-1983, 
S ta t i s t ic s  Bureau o f  Prime M in is te r 's  O ffice. "National Income 
C alcu la tion ,"  1965-1983, Economic Planning Agency. "Annual 
Economic S ta t i s t i c s ,"  1966-1983, Bank o f Japan. "Social Insur­
ance Agency Annual Report," 1965-1983, S ocial Insurance Agency 
Japanese Government.
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TABLE 4
Source o f  Income o f  Aged Oouple Households with 
Wife aged 60 and over
RURAL
Household
age
Social 
se cu rity  (%)
Earning 
income (%)
Non earning 
income (%)
Other
(%)
under 60 7.237 86.582 1.159 4.589
60-64 26.768 68.766 1.273 3.054
65-69 37.598 57.180 1.156 4.075
70-74 49.809 42.008 1.532 6.651
75-79 57.204 29.217 2.273 11.306
80-84 61.732 19.462 2.921 15.885
85 and over 68.577 11.145 3.139 17.139
URBAN
Household Social Earning Non earning Other
age se c u rity  (%) income (%) income (%) (%)
under 60 6.238 85.467 2.967 4.356
60-64 29.857 64.356 3.242 2.406
65-69 40.112 53.100 4.067 2.605
70-74 50.018 39.152 5.894 4.776
75-79 52.939 29.394 8.639 8.831
80-84 53.028 22.094 11.401 13.212
85 and over 54.612 16.151 13.593 15.186
Note: Non earning income i s  re n t,  in te r e s t ,  divindend and in ­
surance. Other i s  w elfare , re n itta n c e  and o th e r liv e lih o o d  
p ro te c tio n .
Source: "1980 Population Census o f  Japan," O ffice o f  th e  Prime 
M inister, Bureau o f  S ta t i s t i c s .
CHAPTER VI
SLMMARY
The pioneer study o f  th e  impact o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  bene­
f i t s  upon personal savings i s  done by P eldste in  (1974). Cn th e  
b a s is  o f  h is  estim ated tim e -se rie s  r e s u l ts ,  expected so c ia l 
se c u rity  b e n e f its  reduce personal savings by more than  30%.
The study by Munnell (1974) a lso  supports P e ld s te in 1 s  conclu­
sion .
Darbey (1979) suggests th a t  th e  reduction  o f  personal sav­
ings i s  sm aller than P e ld ste in  and Munnell re p o rt. Leimer and 
Lesnoy (1982) s ta te  th a t  th e  r e s u l ts  d i f f e r  no t only th e  under 
sp e c if ic a tio n  and co n stru c tio n  o f  so c ia l se cu rity  wealth v a r i­
ab les  b u t a lso  according to  th e  period o f  estim ation  examined. 
Barro (1978), though, shows th a t  so c ia l se c u rity  w ealth o r  
b e n e f its  do no t r e a l ly  a f f e c t  personal savings.
In th e  United S ta tes  an e a r ly  and frequently  c ite d  study 
by Boskin (1977) sheds seme l ig h t  on th e  r e la t io n  between so c ia l 
s e c u rity  and th e  r e t ir a n e n t  behavior o f  e ld e rly  workers. He 
s tre s s e s  th a t  so c ia l s e c u rity  re t ir a n e n t  b e n e f its  in fluence the  
e ld e r ly  to  leave th e  job o r to  r e s t r i c t  market work, thereby
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reducing th e  lab o r supply o f  th e  e ld e r ly . B linder, Gordon and 
Wise (1980), and Hamermesh (1984), however, m aintain  th a t  so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f i ts  tend to  delay  th e  re tirem en t o f 
th e  e ld e r ly . Hurd and Boskin (1984), and M itchell and F ields
(1984) id e n tify  induced re tirem en t by so c ia l se c u rity . Recent 
s tu d ie s  by Honig and Hanoch (1985) t r y  to  explain  a  t ra n s i t io n a l  
s ta te  fran  th e  main life t im e  job to  p a r t ia l  re tirem en t and then 
to  complete r e t ir a n e n t .
Very few em pirica l s tu d ie s  concerning the  e f f e c t  o f  so c ia l 
s e c u rity  r e t ir a n e n t  b e n e f its  on savings and re t ira n e n t  behavior 
o f  e ld e r ly  workers have been done, and in  Japan study o f  th i s  
f ie ld  has no t th e o re t ic a l ly  and em pirica lly  been accomplished 
y e t.
The recent development of a social security system in Japan 
could possibly stimulate an earlier retiranent by elderly vork­
ers. However, the ratio of personal savings to disposable 
income is remarkably high compared with that of the United 
States. In Japan the ratios were 18.7% in 1960, 18.2% in 1970, 
19.2% in 1980, and 19.7% in 1981, vAiile those ratios in the 
United States ware historically between 5.0% and 8.5%.
In o rder to  c la r i f y  th e  afbranentioned, in c o n s is ten t em­
p i r i c a l  r e s u l ts  based on U.S. d a ta , i t  i s  necessary  and in te r ­
e s tin g  to  apply previous re sea rch e rs 1 consuner expenditure and
saving functions and to  expand those functions fo r  Japanese 
d a ta , a tim e -se rie s  d a ta  1946-1982. Examined are  influence 
o f  so c ia l se c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  on personal savings and 
labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  ever th e  age o f  s ix ty  under d if f e r e n t  
denographic and socio-economic backgrounds in  the con tex t o f  
ord inary  le a s t  squares and a sim ultaneous-equation model.
According to  th e  em pirical r e s u l ts  o f  th i s  study, th e  fo l­
lowing conclusions a re  supported:
(1) Ther i s  an interdependency between personal savings and the 
labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly .
(2) S ocial s e c u rity  r e t ir e n e n t  b e n e f its  c le a r ly  have a negative 
impact on personal savings, and th e  b e n e f it  e f f e c t  i s  
g re a te r  than th e  re t ir a n e n t  e f fe c t .
(3) Personal savings are  s ig n if ic a n tly  re la te d  to  lab o r fo rce  
p a r t ic ip a tio n  over th e  age o f  s ix ty , to  p r iv a te  w ealth, to  
re ta in ed  earn ings, and to  government su rp lu s .
(4) Unlike th e  u n ited  S ta te s , so c ia l s e c u rity  r e t ir a n e n t  bene­
f i t s  do no t d e f in i te ly  a f f e c t  labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  
over the  age o f  s ix ty  in  Japan.
(5) Labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  over th e  age o f  s ix ty  i s  s ig n if i ­
can tly  a ffec te d  by education and by th e  expense o f  personal 
r e s id e n tia l  co n stru c tio n , which i s  m otivated by bequest 
m o tivations.
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(6 ) The declin ing  a g r ic u ltu re  sec to r, because o f  th e  develop­
ment o f  in d u s tr iz a tio n , r e f le c ts  th e  s ig n if ic a n tly  negative 
e f f e c t  on labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  over the age o f  s ix ty . 
As fo r th e  usua lly  hypothesized "dual e ffe c ts"  o f so c ia l 
s e c u rity  re t ir a n e n t b e n e f its ,  th e  b e n e f it  e f fe c t  dominates the  
r e t ir a n e n t e f f e c t  in  Japan. The a n p ir ic a l work o f  th is  study 
a tta n p ts  to  d isen tan g le  the previous in co n s is te n t estim ates  on 
th e  impact o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tira n e n t b e n e f its  on personal 
savings and th e  lab o r supply behavior o f  th e  e ld e r ly . Such 
a study a lso  a s s i s ts  both  in  p red ic tin g  behavior p a tte rn s  con­
cerning savings and re t ir a n e n t  and in  guiding p o licy  a c tio n .
SUPPLEMENT
ENVIRONMENT AND RETIREMENT DECISIONS 
OF THE ELDERLY WORKERS IN JAPAN
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Introduction
The Japanese a re  p re sen tly  experiencing a  demographic s h i f t  
o f  i t s  labor force. This has tr ig g e re d  government ac tio n . At 
th e  request o f  th e  government, Japanese firms have recen tly  
begun to  extend mandatory re tirem en t beyond the tr a d it io n a l  age 
o f  f i f ty - f iv e .  The Japanese government a lso  req u ires  business 
firm s and in s t i tu t io n s  to  achieve a  leg a l employment quota by 
employing a t  le a s t  6 % o f  th e  e ld e r ly  workers aged 55 and over 
among th e i r  to t a l  reg u la r employees.  ^ In  1980 the  r a t io s  o f  
businesses w ith  a  mandatory re tirem en t age systen  were 39.7%
(a t  age 55 and le s s ) ,  20.1% (56-59) and 39.7% (60 and over).
The r a t io s  changed to  35.5% ( a t  age 55 and le s s ) ,  18.2% (55-59)
2and 56.9% (60 and over) in  1982. D espite th e  fear o f  sane dur­
ing th e  recession  o f  th e  l a t e  70s and ea r ly  80s, th e  gradual in ­
crease in  th e  age o f  th e  lab o r force d id  no t have a  la rg e , 
adverse impact on th e  Japanese economic performance under a 
s e n io r ity  and life tim e  employment s tru c tu re  (Osaka, 1982).
At p resen t Japan, along w ith  most o th er highly-developed 
co u n trie s , i s  becoming an "aging socie ty" as a r e s u l t  o f  th e  
aging o f  i t s  labor force. Some eoonanists m aintain th a t  job 
vacancies fo r the  young w ill  be crea ted  by encouraging e ld e rly  
workers to  leave th e  labor market and concom itantly by providing
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them w ith so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its . This i s  seen as 
an app ropria te  sharing o f  the  n a t io n 's  labor resources. Other 
economists a re  concerned th a t  th e  number o f  r e t i r e e s  w il l  ex­
haust the  esoncmy and p lace a heavy burden on th e  younger gen­
e ra tio n s . There is  a fu rth e r  concern: i f  o ld er workers a re  ab le 
to  continue working and a re  w illin g  to  work, i s  th i s  no t a 
m atter o f  p o licy  w asting a valuab le  economic a s se t ?
Under the  changing socio-economic condition , th e  so c ia l 
so c ia l s e c u rity  system has a l le v ia te d  th e  f in an c ia l problems o f  
th e  e ld e r ly  s ince i t s  implementation. Social sec u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  have created  a trend  toward e a r l ie r  re tirem en t in  th e  
United S ta te s , (Boskin, 1977; P e llech io , 1979; Burkhauser and 
Turner, 1982; Hurd and Boskin, 1984; and M itchell and F ie ld s,
1984). In  Japan the  W elfare Pension was in s t i tu te d  in  1942 and 
th e  N ational Pension in  1961^ (both b e n e f its  comprise th e  pro­
gram o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f i t s ) . The system o f  
so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  was completed in  1961, 
though i t s  program i s  s t i l l  in  p rogress. The recen t development 
o f  a so c ia l sec u rity  system in  Japan could possib ly  s tim u la te  
an e a r l i e r  re tirem en t o f  o ld e r workers.
Takayama (1982) mentions th a t  th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  earnings 
t e s t  by th e  program o f  W elfare Pension i s  u n lik e ly  to  a f f e c t  
many re tirem en t d ec is io n s , though h is  statem ent i s  not derived
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fran  an em pirical examination. His reasoning stems from a d i f ­
f ic u lty  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  to  find a s a tis fa c to ry  employ­
ment except for a  su b s ta n tia l ly  lew vage compared to  th e i r  p re­
re tirem en t wages in  th e  Japanese labor market. His statem ent 
c a s ts  th re e  questions. (1) How does th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  r e t i r e ­
ment b e n e f its  a f fe c t  work e f fo r t?  (2) How does th e  labor market 
s i tu a t io n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  in fluence th e i r  re tirem en t decision?
(3) How does th e i r  wage r a te  a f f e c t  th e i r  work incen tive?
I to  (1983) analyzes th e  re tirem en t process o f  e ld e r ly  men 
and uses 1981 survey d a ta  compiled on males aged 55 and over in  
th e  Tokyo a rea . He p o in ts  ou t th a t  th e  d ec is io n  to  continue to  
s tay  in  th e  lab o r market depends upon so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its ,  unemployment b e n e f its  and to ta l  b e n e f its . An in crease  
in  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  induce th e  e ld e r ly  to  
prolong s p e lls  o f  unemployment and to  lin g e r  in  the  labor market. 
They t r y  to  maximize both b e n e f its  and then are  eager to  find 
jobs vhen th e  unemployment insurance b e n e f its  exp ire . I to  finds 
th a t  the  a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  th e  period  o f  unemployment insurance 
b e n e f its  a f fe c ts  th e  elderly* s in cen tiv e  to  find  a  job. The 
r e a l i ty  i s  th a t  th e  longer they s ta y  w ithout a  job in  th e  labor 
market, th e  lower t h e i r  wages becane.
In Japan a study in  th i s  f ie ld  has not th e o re t ic a l ly  and 
em p irica lly  been accomplished y e t. Understanding th e  elderly* s
d ec is io n  to  r e t i r e  i s  o f  c r i t i c a l  importance. I t s  increasing  
segment o f  th e  labor force by demographic s h i f t s  i s  o f  g re a t 
consequence. A d e ta ile d  examination i s  requ ired  to  understand 
th e  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  in  the  labor m arket. Why 
and how do e ld e r ly  w rk e rs  r e t i r e ,  fo r  example, and when do 
they r e t i r e  ? This paper w il l  explore such qu estio n s.
M ethod o f  A n a ly s is
The p ro b a b ility  o f  r e t ir a n e n t  by th e  e ld e r ly  w il l  be in d i­
cated  by a  lab o r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  r a te  under th e  cum ulative 
d is t r ib u t io n  o f  re se rv a tio n  and market wages (Ben-Porath, 1973). 
Even i f  ind iv id u als  have id e n tic a l re se rv a tio n  wages which 
r e f l e c t  th e  m arginal ra te s  o f  re tu rn  from econcmic a c t iv i t i e s ,  
th e  in d iv id u a ls  w ill  have d i f f e r e n t  degrees o f  th e  socio-economic 
and h e a lth  (Rones, 1980) conditions th a t  cause re tirem en t.
The e ld e r ly  aged 60 and over tend to  ra is e  t h e i r  r e s e r ­
v a tio n  wages due to  e l i g i b i l i t y  fo r so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its ,  which r a is e s  th e  opportun ity  c o s t o f  being in  th e  
labo r m arket. Cn th e  con trary , p o te n tia l  employers o f fe r  lower 
wages to  th e  e ld e r ly  fo r th e i r  dec lin in g  labor p ro d u c tiv ity  and 
r e la t iv e ly  high unemployment r a te  under th e  e x is tin g  cond itions. 
According to  th e  Year Book o f  Labor S ta t i s t i c s  (1982), age pro­
f i l e s  fo r male earnings peaked in  th e  age range 45-50 fo r  reg u la r 
employees and in  th e  age range 50-54 fo r managerial and p ro fes­
s io n a l enplcyees. Recently Ho nig and Hanoch (1985) e x p l ic i t ly  
d iscu ss  th e  dec lin in g  wages o f  e ld e r ly  workers, using th e  Re­
tirem en t H isto ry  Survey in  th e  U nited S ta te s .
I t  w il l  be r e a l i s t i c  and th e o re t ic a l ly  c o n s is te n t t o  assure 
th a t  as  th e  wage r a te  d ec lin es  th e  e ld e r ly  work a  le s s e r  number
o f  hours in stead  o f  zero working hours a f te r  th e  normal r e t i r e ­
ment age o f  60 and/or a re tirem en t age o f f i c i a l ly  designated 
by firm s. Although four o u t o f  f iv e  business firm s e i th e r  r e ­
employ newly r e t i r e d  employees o r cond itionaly  postpone th e i r  
re tirem en t year by up to  severa l years a f te r  th e  o f f ic ia l ly  
sp ec ified  re tirem en t age in  Japan (Osaka 1982), th e  White Paper 
o f  Labor (1983) shows th a t  as age in creases , th e  r a t io  o f  long 
working to  t o t a l  employed d ec lin es  from 85.0% ( in  th e  age range 
55-59), 71.0% (60-64) to  61.0% (65-69) and the  r a t io  o f  sh o rt 
working to  t o t a l  employed r is e s  from 14.7% ( in  th e  age range 55- 
59), 28.7% (60-64) to  38.7% (65-69) in  1980. A s im ila r  p a tte rn  
i s  a lso  seen in  th e  study o f  th e  United S ta te s  by Gustman and 
S te irm eier (1983), and Honig and Hanoch (1985). Thus, by in ­
volving fu ll- t im e  work, p a rt-tim e  work, unemployed and r e t i r e d , 
and by separa ting  th re e  age groups: aged 60-64, 65-69, and 70 
and over, we can c le a r ly  Observe th e  t r a n s i t io n  to  re t ir a n e n t  
o f  th e  e ld e r ly  workers under d if f e re n t  cond itions o f  socio- 
eoononic in te ra c tio n .
This an a ly s is  seeks to  examine th e  e f fe c ts  o f  th e  socio ­
economic and h e a lth  environment on e ld e r ly  workers. G enerally, 
i t  a tta n p ts  to  model th e  r e t ir a n e n t  behavior o f  th e  e ld e r ly  
workers. We observe re tirem en t ages and how they re a c t under the  
in fluence o f  socio-economic and h e a lth  f a c to rs . The probabil­
i t y  o f  s e le c tin g  one o f  th e  s ta te s  in  z w ill  show a tra n s i t io n  
fran  a  s in g le  s ta te .  There a re  four m utually exclusive options: 
fu ll- tim e  work, p art-tim e  work, unemployed or r e t i r e d .  Hie in ­
d iv id u a l w ill  make a  c e r ta in  choice according to  given fa c to rs . 
Hie p ro b a b ility  o f  choosing one s ta te  depends upon th e  a t t r a c ­
tiv en ess  o f  re tirem en t throughout the  s ta te  and i s  sp ec ified  
as lo g is t ic  p ro a b ili ty  function:
(1 )
m
P. = [e x p (a . + I  (b k  . ) ) / ( l+  z  e*p(a. +D,z j , z  ^  k , : , z  Tc,] z j , z
m
I  (b. . X. . ) ) ) ] ,k=l k , ] , z  k , 3
where k  = 1 ,  ,m and z = f , p, u and r .
P i s  th e  p ro b a b ility  th a t  workers in  age group j  w i l l  
j/Z
change a  s ta te  fran  one s ta te  in  z to  an a lte rn a tiv e  s ta te ,  e .g . ,  
r  ( tire d )  in  z . X, , k = l , . . . ,m ,  a re  explanatory fac to rs , fo r
K.
workers in  age group j .  z can be f  ( fu ll- tim e  work), p (p a rt-  
tim e work), u (unemployed) and r  ( r e t i r e d ) . b  i s  an unknown 
param eter to  be estim ated , b  simply gives an e f fe c t  o f  one u n it  
r i s e  in  X on log adds r a t io  attached  to  th e  explanatory fac to rs  
a ffe c tin g  a  change in  among s ta te s ,  e sp e c ia lly  re tirem en t be­
hav io r .
The equation o f  th e  n a tu ra l logarithm  o f  th e  observed odds 
r a t io  i s :
m(2) ln( P . /P . ) = a .
Where k  = 1 , ..........,m.
P i s  th e  proportion  o f  male fu ll- tim e  workers in
j / f ( z )
age group j  in  th e  to t a l  male population  o f  age group j . P .j , r ( z )
i s  th e  p roportion  o f  th e  r e t i r e d  in  age group j  in  th e  t o t a l  
male population o f  age group j .  P^ ^  ( th e  p roportion  o f
male p a rt-tim e  workers in  age group j ) , P , , 4 (th e  p roportionJ ,u (z )
o f  male unemployed in  age group j)  and P . . . ( th e  p roportionJ ,r (z )
o f  th e  r e t i r e d  in  age group j)  w il l  be su b s titu te d  fo r P ^  ^ ^  . 
The dependent v a r ia b le  in  th i s  model i s  simply th e  logarithm  
o f  th e  odds o f  one o f  the  s ta te s  in  z to  s ta te  r .
The marginal e f fe c t  i s  found by tak ing  th e  p a r t ia l  d e riv a ­
t iv e  o f  equation  (3) fo r each o f  th e  explanatory  v a r ia b le s .
(3) 3 P . /  9  X, = P . [b , -  ( I  b , _ * _ ) ] ,
3 rz kfZ j , z  k ,z  z kfZ j/Z
where z = f ,  p , u and r .  The equation o f  th e  marginal e f ­
fe c t  on th e  r e t i r e d  i s
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(4) 9 P. / a x
3 ,z= r k ,z= r s O p . /  ax  )z 3 , 2  k ,z
where k = 1 m and z = f , p and u
The rrodel w il l  be estim ated  using a  GLS technique to  cor­
r e c t  fo r h e te ro sc e d a s tic ity . The lo g i t  equation i s  estim atied  
sep a ra te ly  fo r  th re e  age groups: male workers aged 60-64, 65- 
69, and 70 and over. Because d if f e re n t  groups may reveal d i f ­
fe re n t responses, (which th is  study wants to  in v e s t ig a te ) , to  
socio-economic and h e a lth  fa c to rs . Thus, weight in  age group j
1/2
(5) w eight. = [ ( t o t a l  male age group j)  * P . * P . . . ]
3 , 2  3 , 2  3 ,^ \2 )
4
where z = f , p, and u.
i s :
Ehipirical Estim ates
This s tu d y 's  estim ation  i s  based p r in c ip a lly  on th e  Wage
Census o f  1980, and th e  1980 Population Census o f  Japan"*, using
6
th e  c ro ss -se c tio n a l urban areas o f  the  47 p re fec tu re s  in  Japan . 
Dependent v a ria b le s  a re  th re e  s ta tu s :  fu ll- tim e  workers,
p a rt-tim e  workers and th e  unemployed, and a re  c la s s i f ie d  accord-
7
ing to  age groups: 60-64, 65-69, and 70 and over. These c la s ­
s if ic a t io n s  w il l  rep resen t th e  changing re tirem en t behavior 
as influenced by th e  in te rn a l  and ex tern a l environment. This 
i s  fundamentally a  t e s t  o f  vhether o r not the  estim ated para­
m eters f o r  th e  th re e  age groups are  m eaningfully d if f e re n t  from 
one another.
This study employs th e  following explanatory fac to rs : f u l l -
8tim e male wages, p a rt-tim e  male wages , unemployment r a te ,  so c ia l 
s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its ,  non-labor incane, personal savings, 
educational le v e ls , presence o f  spouse, fam ily s tru c tu re , tension  
and h e a lth  v a riab le s .
An in crease  in  fu ll- t im e  wages possib ly  discourages labor 
market p a r tic ip a tio n  among e ld e r ly  workers. Although so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  b e n e f its  a re  h e ld  constan t, e ld e r ly  workers im p lic itly  
a d ju s t th e i r  working e f f o r t  t o  th e  ru le  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re ­
t i r a n e n t  b e n e f its .  I f  an earning incane i s  below 150 thousand
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yen between ages 60 and 64, a worker g e ts  a  20% to  80% deduction 
o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  according to  h is  earn ings.
He i s  not e n t i t le d  to  receive  th ese  b e n e f its  i f  h i s  earnings ex­
ceed 150 thousand yen. Over age 65, i f  h is  earning incane exceeds
g
150 thousand yen, he  w il l  rece iv e  80% o f  th e  b e n e f its .  The e ld ­
e r ly  age 60 and over t r y  to  a d ju s t both so c ia l s e c u rity  r e t i r e ­
ment b e n e f its  and wages in  order to  tnaxmize th e i r  to ta l  inccme 
under th e  c o n s tra in t o f  th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  earnings t e s t  ( I to ,
1983). Another reason i s  th a t  w ith  increasing  age th e  incane 
e f fe c t  may daninate th e  s u b s titu tio n  e f fe c t .
The re tirem en t age i s  a  t r a n s i t io n a l  period charac terized  
by q u it t in g  th e  main life t im e  job and possib ly  en te rin g  a new 
type o f  employment befo re  formal re tirem en t. P o te n tia l employ­
e rs  o f te n  tend to  lower wages to  the  e ld e r ly  because o f  the fa c t  
th a t  labor p ro d u c tiv ity  on t h e i r  p a r t  tends to  d ec lin e  due to  
d ec lin in g  physical and/or job re la te d  s k i l l ,  re su lt in g  in ' sh o rte r  
working hours and/or reduced job r e s p o n s ib il i t ie s .  An in crease  
in  th e  p a rt-tim e  wage i s  l ik e ly  to  have s ig n if ic a n t in fluence 
on fu ll- tim e  and p a rt-tim e  workers.
Even though many companies have s te a d ily  increased  the  
mandatory re tirem en t to  a t  le a s t  age 60, job  o p p o rtu n itie s  o f  
th e  e ld e r ly  r e ta in  low. The e f fe c tiv e  demand/supply r a t io  o f  
age 55 and over has been about 20% as compared to  th e  general
average e f fe c tiv e  demand/supply r a t io  (about 70% on average in  
1980). A fter the mandatory o r normal re tirem en t age, few jobs 
a re  av a ila b le  fo r e ld e r ly  workers a t  p rev a ilin g  p rere tirem en t 
wages (Takayama, 1982). Unless they accep t su b s ta n tia l wage 
cu ts , jobs a re  d i f f i c u l t  to  find , consequently, they may 
choose to  remain unemployed and to  rece iv e  unemployment b e n e f its  
o r , i f  r e t i r e d ,  s o c ia l  s e c u rity  r e t ir a n e n t  b e n e f its  ( i to ,  1983).
Every ind iv idual has a  d if f e re n t  re se rv a tio n  wage which 
w i l l  a f f e c t  h is /h e r  re tirem en t d ec is io n  (Ben-Porath, 1973).
The a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  s o c ia l  s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  ra is e s  
th e  minimum acceptance wage o f  in d iv id u a ls  s ix ty  and ever. These 
guaranteed re tirem en t b e n e f its  may a lso  reduce th e  c o s t o f  being 
unemployed. Under th e  con d itio n  o f  a  mandatory re t ir a n e n t  
system, employers w il l  probably o f fe r  lower wages than th e  
e ld e r ly  w orker's  acceptance wages (namely, re se rv a tio n  wages).
The widening gap between th e  e ld e r ly  w orker's o f fe r  and th e  
em ployer's o f f e r  induces th e  e ld e r ly  t o  leave th e  lab o r market 
o r to  withdraw fran  th e  main life t im e  job  when th e  unemployment 
r a te  i s  h igh . Therefore job o p p o rtu n itie s  among th e  e ld e r ly  
w il l  dwindle during periods o f  h ig h er o r increasing  unemployment 
r a te s  (Rones, 1983).
Workers s u b s t i tu te  so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  for 
w ealth in  t h e i r  p o r tfo lio s  o f  accunulated a s se ts  fo r th e  r e t i r e ­
ment period . Boskin (1977), P e llech io  (1979), Hurd and Boskin 
(1984), and M itchell and F ie ld s (1984) m aintain th a t  so c ia l 
s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  ex e rt in fluence on th e  re t ira n e n t 
dec ision  and w il l  induce e a r l i e r  re t ir a n e n t .  B linder, Gordon 
and Wise (1980), and Hamermesh (1984), however, s ta te  th e  so c ia l 
se cu rity  r e t ir a n e n t  b e n e f its  cause the  e ld e r ly  under age 65 to  
s ta y  in  th e  labor market longer because o f  an in crease  in  de­
ferred  re t ir a n e n t  b e n e f its .
As fo r Japanese s tu d ie s , Takayama (1982) a s s e r ts  th a t  th e  
discouraged e f fe c t ,  due to  lack  o f  job opportun ity , has a g re a te r  
in fluence on th e  r e t ir a n e n t  d ec is io n  o f  the  e ld e r ly  than  th e  
induced e f fe c t  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re t ir a n e n t  b e n e f its .  I to
(1983) re p o rts  th a t  so c ia l se c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  a re  one 
o f  th e  major fa c to rs  which in fluence the  re tirem en t behavior o f  
e ld e r ly  workers.
TABLE 1 shows th a t  th e  incanes o f  couples in  t h e i r  e a rly  
60s in  both  ru ra l  and urban a reas  cane fran  earn ings, non earn­
ings, and o th e r  sources. The r a t io s  o f  inccme fran  so c ia l se ­
c u r i ty  re tirem en t b e n e f its  to  t o t a l  incane befo re  age 74 a re  
r e la t iv e ly  s im ila r  fo r both ru ra l  and urban o ld er couples. Ih e  
r e la t iv e ly  h i^ i  non-earning inccme fo r aging couples in  urban 
areas compared to  those o f  aging couples in  ru ra l  a reas reveals  
th a t  urban o ld e r couples accunulate a s se ts  fo r th e i r  re tirem en t
period . The o ld e r couples in  ru ra l  a reas re ly  more on so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  re t ir a n e n t  b e n e f its  than those in  urban areas a f te r  
the  age o f  75. Hie 1980 Population Census o f  Japan r e f le c ts  
th e  fa c t  th a t  aging couples consider so c ia l s e c u r ity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its  le s s  r e l ia b le  than o th e r inccme in  th e  ea rly  s tag e  o f 
th e  re tirem en t period .
Concerning non-labor inccme, the  replacement r a te s  were 
48.8% in  1975, 52.9% in  1978, 54.9% in  1980, 55.9% in  1981 and 
56.1% in  1982. ^  In s u f f ic ie n t  so c ia l se c u rity  re tirem en t bene­
f i t s  fo r aging couples force in d iv id u a ls  to  accumulate wealth 
during th e  working period  fo r  consumption during th e  re tirem en t 
period . Workers b u ild  up w ealth in  th e  form o f  r e a l  a s se ts ,  
such as housing, as w ell as f in a n c ia l a s se ts  (stocks and bonds) 
during the  working period . NOn-labor inccme p resen ts a  proxy 
v a ria b le  fo r th e  w ealth  o f  workers. Unlike liq u id  a s se ts  such 
as personal savings, non-labor income may have a  d if fe re n t im­
pac t on th e  re tirem en t d ec is io n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly .
I f  goods and le isu re  a re  complements in  th e  production o f  
canm odities fo r th e  household, in d iv id u a ls  w ith  a  la rg e  con­
sumption o f  goods a t  one po in t in  tim e in  a c ro ss -sec tio n  frame­
work w il l  consume la rg e r  amounts o f  le isu re , holding o th er 
th in g s  co n stan t. In terms o f  jo in tn ess  o f  le isu re  and goods 
consumption, th e  study by Hamermesh (1984) provides a  th eo re t-
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ic a l  model toy using m icrodata, and i t s  r e s u l t s  t e l l  th e  comple­
m entarity  o f  le isu re  and goods consumption in  household produc­
tio n . This im p lic itly  assumes we exclude th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  th a t  
le is u re  i s  an in fe r io r  good. The study deals  w ith household 
savings in  a  c ro ss -sec tio n  framework.
M otivation fo r saving ccmes in  sev era l v a r ie t ie s , which 
include th e  tra n sac tio n , p recau tionary , sp ecu la tiv e  and bequest 
purposes. These savings a re  in terchangeable. The amount o f  
accumulated savings during th e  working period  depends upon th e  
in d iv id u a l 's  expected r e t ir a n e n t  age, le v e l o f  consumption, 
and nuriber o f  re tirem en t y ea rs . Accumulated savings has an 
in fluence on th e  re tirem en t d ec is io n .
For th e  above-mentioned reasons and keeping o th e r th in g s  
constan t, i t  i s  lo g ic a lly  p o ssib le  to  have a p o s itiv e  r e la t io n ­
sh ip  between savings and labo r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  in  a  c ro ss- 
s ec tic n , b u t a  negative re la tio n s h ip  in  a  tim e-se rie s  frame work,
In o th e r words, consumption and earnings a re  p ro cy c lica l in  a  
t im e -se r ie s . Hence, i t  w il l  d i f f i c u l t  to  conclude th a t  savings 
and labo r force p a r tic ip a tio n  have an inverse  re la tio n sh ip  in  
a  s t a t i c  and c ro ss -se c tio n  a n a ly s is .
The q u a lity  o f  education r e f le c ts  th e  q u a lity  o f  human 
c a p ita l ,  and in fluences th e  e ld e r ly  in  th e  dec is io n  to  w ith­
draw fran  th e  lab o r market. An in c rease  in  p ro d u c tiv ity  provides
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pecple w ith an in cen tiv e  to  work more hours during th e  year, and 
add fu rth e r years o f  p a r t ic ip a tio n  (Banoch and Honig, 1983) and 
a  sh o rte r  re tirem en t (M odigliani, 1986). An in crease  in  th e  
q u a li ty  o f  education not only  improves job market prospects 
through h igher wages and b e t te r  working conditions, b u t can a lso  
in fluence th e  re tirem en t plan regarding the  main life tim e  job, 
by providing o p p o rtu n itie s  fo r and by widening a c c e s s ib i l i ty  to  
new types o f  employment before complete withdrawal from th e  labor 
market during th e  t r a n s i t io n a l  period .
In  add ition  to  economic (namely, pecuniary re tu rn ) in f lu ­
ences, a changing so c ia l environment a lso  a f fe c ts  th e  e ld e rly  
w orker's  re tirem en t d ec is io n . Why i s  th is ?
M arita l s ta tu s  and fam ily s tru c tu re  may e lu c id a te  th e  
behavior o f  th e  labor force p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  e ld e r ly  workers, 
(Burkhauser and Turner, 1982; Hanoch and Honig, 1983; Duggan, 
1984; Gustman and Steinm eier, 1984). Family liv in g  arrange­
ments a re  im portant fo r  personal w ell-being , as they h e lp  th e  
in d iv id u a l avoid is o la tio n  (Hughes and Gove, 1981).
S ocial p ressu re  and ten sio n  a re  so c ia l environmental fac­
to r s .  Crime, noise, population d en s ity  and heavy t r a f f i c  due 
t o  u rban ization  cause ten sio n  to  r i s e .  A changing work envi­
ronment involving new and un fam ilia r technology causes s tr e s s  
in  o ld er workers. S tre s s  i s  a  major fac to r co n trib u tin g  to  high
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blood p ressu re , h e a r t  d isea se , s tro k e , and o th e r physical a i l ­
ments. Another category o f  workers exposed to  s tr e s s  a re  .those 
who have chosen h ig h -r isk  jobs fo r h igh pecuniary re tu rn s , and 
who tend to  wear o u t fo s te r  than o th e r workers (Frenkel, P r ie s t  
and Ashford, 1980). Job  s tr e s s  has psychological as w ell as 
physica l consequences. The monetary equ ivalan t o f  th e  in d ire c t  
u t i l i t y  co s t i s  a  shortening o f  economic a c t iv i ty  in  th e  l i f e ­
tim e. S ocial s tr e s s  may lead  to  coping s tr a te g ie s  defined  
by th e  use o f  a lcohol and drugs, and th i s  in  tu rn  may cause 
secondary fam ily and h e a lth  problems. In  the  long run so c ia l 
p ressu re  and ten sio n  due to  u rban ization  may have an adverse 
impact on life tim e  working e f fo r ts .  The working e f fo r t  in ­
cen tiv es  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  a re  influenced fcy th ese  fa c to rs . Hence 
th is  study uses q u a n tity  o f  noise as a  proxy o f  p ressu re  and 
ten s io n  v a ria b le s .
The ro le  o f  h e a lth  fa c to rs  in  th e  lab o r force p a r t ic ip a ­
t io n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  cannot be ignored. There a re  th re e  types 
o f  h e a lth  fa c to rs : in s t i tu t io n a l ,  environmental and t a s t e  foo­
t e r s .  In s t i tu t io n a l  fa c to rs  la rg e ly  depend upon th e  govern­
ment' s  budget a llo c a tio n s , which a re  based on co s ts  and bene­
f i t s .  H ealth improvement a f fe c ts  th e  working e f fo r ts  o f  th e  
e ld e r ly  (Rones, 1980; and Fuchs, 1984).
The main b e n e f it  o f  environmental reg u la tio n  i s  to  improve
hunan h e a lth . In d iv iduals  a re  o f te n  unaware o f  the  i l l  e f f e c t  
on h e a lth  by environmental p o llu tio n . A reduction  in  p o llu tio n  
decreases i l ln e s s  and lowers th e  r is k s  posed to  hunan l i f e .  
Therefore an improved environment lengthens th e  working l ife tim e . 
There i s  a  c le a r  l in k  between environmental p o llu tio n  and th e  
d ec is io n  to  r e t i r e  fu r h e a lth  reasons, whether i t  be h ig h - le v e l/  
sho rt-te rm  environmental p o llu tio n , o r low -level/ long-term  
p o llu tio n  (Gerking and Schulze, 1981; and Cropper, 1981).
L ife s ty le  h e a lth  h a b its  such as c ig a re t te  smoking, a lco ­
h o lic  consumption, d ie t ,  and m edical care  consumption have an 
in fluence on h e a lth  vhich c le a r ly  a f fe c ts  labor force p a r t ic i ­
p a tio n  (Wolfe, 1984). A l i f e s ty l e  o f  r isk - ta k in g  consumption 
p a tte rn s  e x is ts  a t  various income le v e ls  (Rosen, 1981; and 
Hausnan, O stro and Wise, 1984). The ra tio n a l consumer may 
a c t  as a s e l f  reg u la to r  by consciously  opting fo r h ea lth y  
h a b its  over unhealthy o n e s .^
R esults
TABLES 2, 3 and 4 rep resen t th e  r e s u l ts  o f  th e  reg ression  
an a ly s is  fo r th re e  age groups (60-64, 65-69, and 70 and over), 
showing d if f e re n t  s ta tu s  o f  eooncmic a c t iv i ty  and using a 
lo g is t ic  estim ation  model th a t  contains findings on th e  economic 
fac to rs  p rev iously  d iscussed . Raw c o e f f ic ie n ts  appear on th e  
ta b le s . The m arginal e f fe c t  i s  obtained from th e  ap p lica tio n  
o f  equation 3 o r  4 . The v a riab le s  a re  defined  in  th e  APPENDIX.
One s tr ik in g  asp ec t o f  th e  r e s u l t  o f  TABLES 2 through 4 i s  
th a t  th e  v a r iab le s  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  have 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t c o e ff ic ie n ts  in  th e  fu l l  tim e, p a r t  
tim e and unemployed equations. The r e s u l ts  o f  th e  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  re tirem en t b e n e f its  v a r ia b le  reveal th a t  th e  p ro b a b ility  
o f  re tirem en t in creases  o r  labor force p a r tic ip a tio n  d ec lin es  as 
so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  a re  ra ise d . Estimated 
e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  p ro b a b ility  o f  re tirem en t w ith  re sp ec t to  so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  a re  - .4 0  ( f u l l  tim e), - .0 1  (p a r t  
time) and .15 (unemployed) in  age group 60-64, - .3 9  ( f u l l  tim e), 
- .0 2  (p a rt time) and .07 (unemployed) in  age group 65-69, and
- .1 9  ( f u l l  tim e), - .0 1  (p a r t time) and .02 (unemployed) in  age 
12group 70 and over. A 1 percen t in crease  in  so c ia l s e c u rity  
re tirem en t b e n e f its  w i l l  lead to  approxim ately a  .4% decrease  in  
fu ll- tim e  labor force p a r tic ip a tio n  among th e  age groups 60-64
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and 65-69. The impact i s  much a n a lle r  w ith in  age group 70 and 
over. The e f fe c ts  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  on 
p a rt-tim e  workers o f  a l l  age groups a re  sm aller than  th a t  on 
fu ll- t im e  vrorers, in d ica tin g  th a t  th e  earnings t e s t  vould be 
le s s  e f fe c tiv e  on p a rt-tim e  workers. The p o s itiv e  signs o f  th e  
unemployed on so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  (SSRB) fo r a l l  
age groups in  column 3 support th e  an a ly s is  by I to  (1983). The 
e l i g i b i l i t y  o f  bo th  unemployment insurance b e n e f its  and so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  provides seme o f  the  e ld e r ly  w ith 
mi in cen tiv e  to  maximize both th e i r  e n t i t le d  b e n e f its  by stay ing  
in  th e  lab o r market.
In  th e  United S ta te s  th e  l i t e r a tu r e  in  th i s  f ie ld  revea ls  
s o c ia l  s e c u rity  to  be one o f  th e  major stim ulan ts in  th e  recen t 
r i s e  fo r e a r l i e r  r e t ir a n e n t  (P e ld s te in , 1974; Boskin, 1977;
P e llech io , 1979; Bould, 1980; Hurd and Boskin, 1984; and M itchell 
and F ie ld s , 1984). However, th e re  a re  counter arguments by 
B linder, Gordon and Wise (1980), and Hamermesh (1984). Social 
s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  in  Japan have c le a r ly  induced 
e ld e r ly  workers to  leave th e  lab o r market a t  th e  age o f  e l i g i -  
b l i t y  fo r b e n e f its .
Another su rp ris in g  r e s u l t  i s  th a t  an increase  in  th e  unem­
ployment r a te  fo rces th e  e ld e r ly  to  leave th e  labor market in  
Japan. In  TABLES 2 through 4, th e  p ro b a b ili t ie s  o f  reducing
labo r force p a r tic ip a tio n  among a l l  age groups (60-64, 65-69, 
and 70 and over) o f  fu ll- tim e  and p a rt-tim e  workers a re  substan­
t i a l l y  h ig h er due more to  the  discouragement e f fe c t  than to  an 
induced re tirem en t e f f e c t  re su ltin g  fran  so c ia l s e c u rity  r e t i r e ­
ment b e n e f its .  The r e s u l ts  support th e  assumption by Thkayama 
(1982) th a t  re tirem en t among o ld e r workers i s  a  consequence o f  
th e i r  having d i f f ic u l ty  finding  jobs. Bould (1980) rep o rts  th e  
major ro le  o f  unemployment in  th e  United S ta te s  as compelling 
workers to  leave th e  labor market and to  en te r  in to  e a r ly  re ­
tirem en t. Rones (1983) a lso  d iscusses the  case o f  th e  ea rly  
1980s in  th e  United S ta te s . In  Japan, th e  m arginal e f fe c ts  o f  
unemployment on fu ll- tim e  work among a l l  age groups a re  much 
g re a te r  than  those  o f  th e  p a rt-tim e  work. A one percentage 
po in t in crease  in  th e  unemployment r a te  reduces th e  labo r force 
p a r tic ip a tio n  o f  fu ll- tim e  work by 4.1 percentage p o in ts  (age 
60-64), 4 .0  percentage p o in ts  (65-69), and 3.0 percentage po in ts 
(70 and over) and o f  p a rt-tim e  work by .01 percentage p o in ts
(age 60-64), .08 percentage p o in ts  (65-69), and .018 percentage
13p o in ts  (70 and o v e r) . D eclining m arginal e f fe c ts  o f  th e  un­
employment r a te  on th e  unemployed a re  .98 percentage p o in ts  (age 
60-64), .46 percentage p o in ts  (65-69) and .04 percentage p o in ts  
(70 and o v e r) . This dec lin in g  r a te  i s  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  two 
causes. The e ld e r ly  face th e  dilemma o f  discouragement v h ile
searching  fo r  jobs and th e  stigma o f  unemployment. Dwindling 
job o p p o rtu n itie s  fo r  th e  e ld e r ly  during a period  o f  increasing  
unemployment encourages them to  e x i t  th e  job market because o f  
th e  e l i g ib l i ty  o f  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its .
In  TABLE 2 o f  age group 60-64, th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  fu ll ­
time work w il l  increase  as fu ll- tim e  male wages r is e  and decrease 
w hile p a rt-tim e  male wages in c rease . An in crease  in  fu ll- tim e  
male wages tends to  reduce the  p ro b a b ility  o f  p art-tim e  work and 
to  r a is e  th e  unemployed. The t o t a l  m arginal e f fe c t  o f  fu ll- tim e  
male wages on the  r e t i r e d  i s  8 .3  percentage p o in ts  which means 
th a t  th e  r e t i r e d  among age group 60-64 ten d  to  re en te r  th e  labor 
market as fu ll- t im e  male wages r i s e  by 1,000 yen. The m arginal 
e f f e c t  o f  p a rt-tim e  male wages on th e  r e t i r e d  among age group 
60-64 i s  p o s itiv e , and th e  r e t i r e d  w il l  be ra ise d  by 13.6 p er­
centage p o in ts  as p a rt-tim e  male wages r i s e  by 1,000 yen. The 
r e s u l ts  o f  th e  t o t a l  m arginal e f fe c ts  imply th a t  workers among 
age group 60-64 a re  le s s  s e n s itiv e  to  a  reduction  o f  so c ia l 
s e c u r ity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  (earnings t e s t )  by an increase  in  
fu ll- tim e  wages than  by an in crease  in  p a rt-tim e  wages.
In TABLES 2, 3 and 4, p a rt-tim e  work (60-64), (65-69) and 
(70 and over) a re  p o s itiv e ly  a ffec ted  by an increase  in  p a r t-  
tim e male wages. However none o f  th e  c o e f f ic ie n ts  a re  s t a t i s t i ­
c a l ly  s ig n if ic a n t .  The p ro b a b ili t ie s  o f  reducing unemployment
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because o f  an increase  in  p a rt-tim e  male wages a re  r e la t iv e ly  
h igher among a l l  age groups -.705  (60-64), - .6 8 4  (65-69) and 
-.755  (70 and over), ccrpared to  those o f  fu ll- tim e  male wages.
In column 1 o f  TABLES 3 and 4 th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  fu ll- tim e  work 
o f  age groups 65-69 and 70 and over would decrease by a r i s e  
in  f u l l  and p a rt-tim e  wages. Two reasons fo r the  negative signs 
a re  probable. Cne i s  th e  e f f e c t  o f  th e  earn ings t e s t ,  and 
th e  o th e r i s  th a t  the  incane e f fe c t  o f  those age groups domi­
n a tes  the  su b s ti tu tio n  e f f e c t  as Hanoch and Honig (1983) d iscu ss .
G enerally , incane i s  o f te n  considered an in d ic a to r  o f  eco­
nomic w ell-being . Hurd and Shaven (1982) examine th e  co rre la ­
tio n  between th e  incane le v e l o f  households and th e i r  wealth 
accumulation, they  find  an inaccuracy o f  th e  in d ic a to r  o f  
economic w ell-being  measured by incane and shew s ta b i l i ty  o f  
w ealth  d is tr ib u tio n . In  column 2 o f  TABLES 2, 3 and 4, we find  
th a t  th e  lo g i t  c o e ff ic ie n ts  o f  non-labor incane (a proxy v a r ia b le  
o f  wealth) a re  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t and s ta b le . An in crease  
in  non-labor incane (economic w ell being) reduces th e  p ro b a b ility  
o f  p art-tim e  work.
Concerning th e  r e s u l ts  o f  personal savings, a t  any given 
age in  th e  tim e o f  a  c ro ss -se c tio n  framework workers w ill  con­
sume le s s  goods le is u re  and i f  they  s ta y  longer in  th e  labor 
market. Considering th e  jo in tn e ss  o f  le is u re  and good consump­
tio n , th e  p o s it iv e  lo g i t  c o e f f ic ie n ts  r e f l e c t  th e  complementary 
o f  le isu re  and goods consumption (Hamermesh, 1984) by th e  e ld e r ly  
vo rk ers . D iscern ib le  m arginal e f fe c ts  a re , however, scmewhat 
small and range .001 and .009 percentage po in ts  as th e  balance 
o f  personal savings r is e s  1 , 0 0 0  yen per person.
The signs o f  lo g i t  c o e f f ic ie n ts  cn education a re  a l l  com­
p a tib le  w ith  theory  as v e i l  as  th e  e a r l i e r  findings by Duggan
(1984), and Honig and Hanoch (1985) as i s  th e  case in  th e  United 
S ta te s . Among a l l  age groups increased  education tends to  en­
courage th e  e ld e r ly  to  work longer reg a rd less  whether i t  i s  on 
a  fu ll- tim e  o r  a  p a rt-tim e  b a s is . Hence th e  p ro b ab lity  o f  labor 
force p a r t ic ip a tio n  by th e  e ld e r ly  r i s e s .  Negative c o e ff ic ie n ts  
o f  th e  unemployed in  colunn 3 in  a l l  age groups cure a t t r ib u ta b le  
to  a h igher le v e l o f  education, which makes i t  e a s ie r  for th e  
unemployed e ld e r ly  to  find  jobs; th u s , th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  unem­
ployment low ers. However only the  c o e f f ic ie n t o f  p a rt-tim e  
vorkers age 60-64 i s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t.
The lo g i t  c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  presence o f  spouse in  a l l  age 
groups o f  fu ll- t im e  work cure s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  a t  the  
one-percent le v e l o f  s ig n if ic a n ce . These p o s it iv e ly  high proba­
b i l i t i e s  suggest th a t  e ld e r ly  men w ith  wives a re  b e t te r  in te ­
g ra ted  in to  th e i r  ccm nunities as vorkers and/or have f in a n c ia l 
r e s p o n s ib il i ty  fo r th e i r  spouses. Indeed, th e  t o t a l  marginal
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e f fe c ts  on the  r e t i r e d  by equation 4 a re  negative and substan­
t i a l :  -1 .00  (age 60-64), - .7 3  (65-69) and -.7 3  (70 and over).
A one percentage in crease  in  th e  p roportion  o f  th e  population . 
w ith the  presence o f  a  spouse r a is e s  th e  labor force p a r t ic i ­
p a tio n  o f  th e  e ld e rly  by .73 through 1.0 percentage p o in ts . The 
r e s u l ts  o f  an in crease  in  labo r force p a r tic ip a tio n  a re  congruent 
w ith  th e  study by Gustman and S te irm eier (1984) as i s  th e  case 
in  th e  United S ta te s .
The signs o f  lo g i t  c o e f f ic ie n ts  on family s tru c tu re  a re  
co n s is te n t through a l l  age groups and th e i r  labor s ta te s .  As 
fo r fu ll- t im e  work among a l l  age groups, th e  c o e f f ic ie n ts  on th e  
fam ily s tru c tu re  have negative s ig n s. An increase  in  th e  num­
b e r o f  e ld e rly  liv in g  w ith th e i r  ch ild ren  and grandchildren 
lower th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  p a r t ic ip a tio n  by th e  e ld e r ly  as f u l l ­
time workers in  th e  labor market. The e ld e r ly  liv in g  w ith a 
one o r  tv o  generation  fam ily seem to  have le s s  f in a n c ia l r e s ­
p o n s ib i l i t ie s  and tend to  reduce economic a c t iv i ty  as fu ll- tim e  
workers in  th e  labor m arket. The p o s itiv e ly  high p ro b a b ility  
o f  family s tru c tu re  in  th e  second column (p a r t  time) among a l l  
age groups suggests th a t  th e  fam ily s tru c tu re  in fluences e ld e r ly  
workers to  spend a  considerab le  amount o f  tim e in  th e  interm e­
d ia te  s ta te  as  p a rt-tim e  workers before en tering  complete 
re tirem en t.
As regards th e  ten sio n  v a riab le , th e  r e s u l ts  o f  i t s  lo g i t  
c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  th e  ten sio n  v a riab le  a re  com patible w ith th i s  
s tu d y 's  hypothesis. In  general, an increase  in  ten sio n  de­
creases th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  fu ll- tim e  and p a rt-tim e  work, as w ell 
as th e  nunber o f  unemployed, namely, th e  labor force p a r t ic i -  
p a r t ic ip a tio n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly . As fo r th e  unemployed in  colunn 
3, th ese  p ro b a b il i t ie s ,  r e la t iv e ly  h igh when compared to  f u l l  
tim e and p a r t  tim e, shew a n egative ly  increasing  p ro b a b ility  
w ith  age and imply th a t  th e  nunber o f  unemployed e ld e r ly  de­
creases as age r i s e s .  These m arginal e f fe c ts  suggest th a t  an 
in crease  in  ten sio n  by a 1  percentage po in t change lowers un­
employed by .34 percentage p o in ts  (age 60-64), by .74 percentage 
p o in ts  (65-69) and by .45 percentage p o in ts  (70 and o v e r) . In 
colunn 1 , an in crease  in  ten sio n  decreases th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  
fu ll- tim e  work among a l l  age groups. The m arginal e f fe c ts  a re  
-4 .1  percentage p o in ts  (age 60-64), -5 .0  percentage p o in ts  (65— 
69) and -3 .5  percentage p o in ts  (70 and o v e r) . The impact o f  
ten sio n  on fu ll- tim e  workers in  terms o f  m arginal e f fe c t  i s  much 
la rg e r  than cn th e  unemployed. Moreover, th e  r i s e  in  ten sio n  
compels th e  e ld e r ly  to  withdraw from th e  labor market, namely, 
in to  re t ir a n e n t .  A one percentage p o in t in crease  in  tension  
r a is e s  th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  re tirem en t by 4 .4  percentage po in ts  
(age 60-64), 5 .5  percentage p o in ts  (65-69) and 3 .9  percentage
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p o in ts  (70 and o v e r) . The r e s u l ts  show th a t  ten sio n  in v erse ly  
in fluences th e  working e f f o r t  and shortens th e  economic a c t iv i ty  
in  th e  l ife tim e .
Poor h e a lth  no t only l im its  th e  amount o f  work (Hanoch and
Honig, 1983) b u t can a lso  cause lo ss  o f  employment. The r e s u l ts
o f  th i s  study show how e ld e r ly  workers respond i f  th e  p red ic ted
l i f e  expectancy (a proxy measure o f  h e a lth  q u a lity )  r i s e s .  The
lo g i t  c o e f f ic ie n ts  o f  th e  l i f e  v a r ia b le  in  column 1 in  TABLES
*
2, 3 and 4 mean th a t  th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  fu ll- tim e  work w ill  in ­
crease  as  th e  p red ic ted  l i f e  expectancy r is e s .  The r e s u l ts  a re  
congruent w ith th e  re p o rt o f  Honig and Hanoch (1985) th a t  h e a lth  
lim ita tio n s  in d ica te  an adverse in fluence on th e  work e f fo r t  o f  
th e  e ld e r ly . There a re  suggestive p o s itiv e  s igns in  colunn 3 
o f  TABLES 2 ,  3 and 4 th a t  th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  unemployment would 
seem to  r i s e ,  a s  a r e s u l t  o f  s tay in g  in  th e  labor market as long 
as th e  h e a lth  cond ition  allow s, although th e  lo g i t  c o e f f ic ie n t 
i s  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  in  only one age group (60-64). 
In te re s tin g ly , th e  r e s u l ts  o f  th e  m arginal e f fe c t  fo r th e  re ­
t i r e d  age are  negative: -.132 (age 60-64), -.015 (65-69) and 
-.4 0 8  (70 and o v e r) . These negative s igns a re  compatible w ith 
th e  find ings by Gustman and Steinm eier (1984 and 1985) as  i s  
th e  case in  th e  United S ta te s . As long as th e  h e a lth  cond ition  
allow  th e  e ld e r ly  to  have economic a c t iv i ty ,  they  tend to  work 
longer and/or re e n te r  th e  labor m arket.
Conclusion
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The major finding in  th i s  study o f  Japanese e ld e r ly  vorkers 
i s  th a t  th e i r  re tirem en t d ec is io n  i s  mainly determined by un­
employment and so c ia l se c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its . D iscern­
ib le  wage and h ea lth  e f fe c ts  on th e  re tirem en t d ec is io n  o f  
e ld e r ly  vorkers a re  weak.
Rapid progress in  so c ia l se c u rity  programs has had th e  e f ­
fe c t  o f  discouraging e ld e r ly  vorkers from stay ing  in  th e  labo r 
market when they became e l ig ib le  fo r so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f i ts .  The q u a l i ta t iv e ly  co n s is ten t r e s u l ts  o f  th i s  study 
suggest th a t  th e  impact o f  s o c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  
on fu ll- tim e  workers among th e  age group® 60-64, 65-69, and 70 
and over i s  much g re a te r  than th a t  on p a rt-tim e  w orkers. The 
so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  would, however, seem to  
in crease  th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  unemployed in  Japan.
One su rp ris in g  and im portant r e s u l t  o f  unemployment i s  
th a t  th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  a  reduction  o f  lab o r force p a r t ic ip a tio n  
among a l l  age groups (60-64, 65-69, and 70 and over) o f  f u l l ­
tim e workers i s  s u b s ta n tia lly  h igher. This i s  due to  th e  d is ­
couragement e f f e c t .  Moreover, th e  marginal e f fe c ts  o f  th e  un­
employed on fu ll- tim e  workers among a l l  age group® (ranging 3 .0 -  
4 .1 ) a re  much g re a te r  than  th a t  o f  p art-tim e  workers (ranging 
. 0 1  -  .08 ).
These r e s u l ts  suggest th a t  unemployment Insurance b e n e f its
and so c ia l secu cu rity  re tirem en t b e n e f its  tend to  prolong th e  job
15search  fo r  those e ld e r ly  e l ig ib le  fo r both  b e n e f its .  The la rg e  
e x i t  fra n  th e  labo r market i s  a t t r ib u ta b le  mainly to  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  re t ir e n e n t  b e n e f its  and dwindling job o p p o rtu n itie s  fo r th e  
e ld e r ly .
An in crease  in  p a rt-tim e  wages would decrease th e  proba­
b i l i t y  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  unemployed. Higher wages mean h ig h er in ­
come, and an income e f fe c t  would seem to  dominate th e  age groups 
(65-69, and 70 and over) o f  f u l l  tim e workers. High and p o s itiv e  
p ro b a b ili ty  in d ic a te s  th a t  th e  e ld e r ly  w ith spouses tend to  have 
fu ll- t im e  work. The e ld e r ly  l iv in g  w ith a  one o r  two generation  
fam ily in  th e  labor market seem to  lower fu ll- tim e  work a c t iv i ty  
and to  r a is e  p a rt-tim e  work a c t iv i ty .
I t  would be in ap p ro p ria te  to  conclude th i s  study w ithout 
emphasizing th e  ten sio n  and h e a lth  in fluences on th e  re tirem en t 
d ec is io n  o f  e ld e r ly  workers during th e  t r a n s i t io n a l  period . The 
r e s u l t s  confirm  th a t  an increase  in  ten sio n  has an adverse e f fe c t  
on working e f f o r t  and shortens th e  economic a c t iv i ty  o f  the  
e ld e r ly . An improvement o f  h e a lth  q u a lity  r a is e s  the  proba­
b i l i t y  o f  fu ll- tim e  work by th e  e ld e r ly .
A popular proposal to  expand job o p p o rtu n itie s  fo r th e  eld ­
e r ly  as w ell as to  reduce th e  cu rre n t d efic iency  in  so c ia l secu­
r i t y  re t ir e n e n t  funds i s  to  r a is e  th e  mandatory re tirem en t age.
I f  th e  h igh unemployment r a te  o f  those age 60 and over p e r s is ts ,
i
th e  high r a te  w ill  imply th a t  th e  e ld e r ly  a re  try in g  to  s tay  in  
th e  lab o r market. An in crease  in  job o p p o rtu n itie s  fo r  workers 
by government in i t i a t iv e  and/or superv ision  might be e f fe c tiv e  
Another way to  encourage in d iv id u a ls  to  remain in  th e  labor 
m arket could be by a  reduction  o f  th e  so c ia l s e c u rity  tax ^ fb r 
workers over s ix ty  and /or an in crease  in  th e  age o f  e l i g i b i l i t y  
fo r  so c ia l s e c u rity  re tire n e n t b e n e f its .
We must le a rn  to  value and u t i l i z e  th e  lo n g -cu ltiv a ted  
a s s e ts  -  t h e i r  experience and t h e i r  knowledge -  o f  th e  e ld e r ly . 
This would be accomplished by expanding th e  o p p o rtu n itie s  o f  th e  
e ld e r ly  by help ing  them no t to  withdraw carp i e te ly  from th e  labor 
market when they become e l ig ib le  fo r so c ia l s e c u rity  re tirem en t 
b e n e f its .  This study examines th e  in fluence on re tirem en t pat­
te rn s  among th e  d if f e r e n t  age groups o f  e ld e r ly  workers in  v a r i­
ous work s ta te s .  Changes in  labor force p a r tic ip a tio n  among th e  
e ld e r ly  depend upon th e  complex in te ra c tio n s  o f  various fa c to rs . 
To understand th e  lab o r market in  Japan o f  th e  e ld e r ly  and th e i r  
economic a c t iv i ty ,  more s tu d ie s  o f  t h i s  type a re  requ ired  in  
o rder to  p re d ic t th e  behavioral p a tte rn s  which in fluence th e  de­
c is io n  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  to  r e t i r e .  Only then can th e  proper socio­
economic and h e a lth - re la te d  p o licy  a c tio n  be implemented.
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NOTES
* I  am indebted to  M ichael Grossman, Robin Carey, M. Anne
H ill ,  M arjorie Honig and Tadashi Yamada fo r th e i r  h e lp fu l com­
ments on th e  f i r s t  d r a f t  o f  th i s  paper. However, th e  views 
expressed in  th i s  study a re  th e  so le  r e s p o n s ib il i ty  o f  th e  au­
th o r. E a r l ie r  d r a f t  o f  t h i s  research  was presented  a t  Rutgers 
U n iv ersity  (February 1986), and a t  th e  Eastern  Economic Asso­
c ia t io n  12th Annual Convention (A pril 1986).
1 White Paper o f  Labor, Showa 58 Neriban, 1983, p .69 . Under 
t h i s  law, th e  r a t io  o f  th e  e ld e r ly  vorkers (55 and over) has 
been g radually  increased  5.8% in  1979, 6.2% in  1980, 6.6% in  
1981 and 6.9% in  1982.
2 White Paper o f  Labor, Showa 58 Nenban, 1983, pp .66-70.
3 The N ational Pension i s  ^for self-enrployed vo rk ers .
4 See Yamada, Yamada and Chaloupka (1985) fo r  a  s im ila r  
method.
5 We aw ait th e  a v a i la b i l i ty  o f  in d iv id u a l d a ta  fo r fu rth e r  
in s ig h t in to  th e  re tirem en t behavior o f  in d iv id u a l e ld e r ly  in  
Japan. O btaining m icro-based da ta  i s  extrem ely d i f f i c u l t  un less 
a re search er i s  a f f i l i a t e d  w ith Japanese government agencies.
See th e  advantages in  using grouped d a ta  as  described  by 
Cain and Dooley (1976), Link and S e t t le  (1981), and Duggan (1984), 
and th e  disadvantages by Dooley (1982), and Greenlees and 
Zieschang (1984).
6 Japan i s  ad m in is tra tiv e ly  d iv ided  in to  fo rty -seven  p re ­
fec tu re s , o f  which one c a r r ie s  th e  s u ff ix  To, one c a r r ie s  Do, 
two ca rry  Fu and fo r ty - th re e  c a rry  Ken. Each p re fe c tu re  i s  
fu rth e r  subdivided in to  S h i(c ity )  and Gun( ru ra l  county). Gun 
i s  fu rth e r  subdivided in to  Cho( town) and Mura( v i l l a g e ) . This 
study o f  urban a reas r e fe r s  to  S h is (c i t ie s )  in  Japan.
7 The d e f in it io n s  o f  fu ll- tim e  work, p a rt-tim e  work and 
th e  unemployed r e f e r  to  th e  1980 Population Census o f  Japan 
(pp.XI-XXI) and Year Bock o f  Labor S t a t i s t i c s  (pp .310-313). 
"'Employed1 parsons r e f e r  to  a l l  parsons who d id  any work dur­
ing th e  week befo re  th e  census d a te  fo r pay o r p r o f i t ,  such as
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wage, sa la ry , allowance, business p r o f i t ,  e tc , as w ell as p e r­
sons who had a  job o r business b u t d id  not work a t  a l l  during 
th e  week befo re  th e  census da te  because o f  vacation , i l ln e s s ,  
bad w eather, labor d isp u te  o r  personal reasons."  Major sub­
d iv is io n s  o f  "employed" a re  "persons mainly working o r m ostly 
worked" and "persons secondarily  working o r  working besides 
doing housework". There a re  no s p e c if ic a tio n  o f  working hours 
and weeks in  terms o f  "person mainly working" and "persons sec­
o n d arily  working" in  th e  1980 Population Census o f  Japan and 
Year Bock o f  Labor S ta t i s t i c s .  This study re fe rs  to  "persons 
mainly working" as fu ll- tim e  workers and "persons secondarily  
working" as  p a rt-tim e  workers. The d e f in it io n  o f  th e  unemployed 
i s  th a t  Unemployed' persons r e f e r  to  those  who had no job b u t 
were ab le  to  work and a c tu a lly  seeking a  job during the week 
befo re  th e  census date".
8 F u ll-tim e male wages a re  "scheduled cash earnings (co n trac t 
cash earn ings, excluding overtim e allowance, which means th e  
allowances paid fo r overtim e work in  working days, h o liday  work, 
n ig h t work, n ig h t o r  day watch)" d iv ided  by schedule hours (the  
nunber o f  hours a c tu a lly  worked between th e  s ta r t in g  and term i­
na ting  hours o f  employment determined by work reg u la tio n s  o f  th e  
es tab lish m en t), d e f la te d  by c o s t-o f - liv in g  in  1980.
There a re  no s t a t i s t i c s  fo r p a rt-tim e  male wages in  Japan. 
However th e re  a re  good s t a t i s t i c s  on p art-tim e  female wage r a te s .  
The study u t i l i z e s  th e  d a ta  o f  p a rt-tim e  female wages from th e  
Wage Census 1980. To estim ate  p a rt-tim e  male wages, p a rt-tim e  
female r e a l  wage i s  f i r s t  reg ressed  on years o f  tenure by female 
p a rt-tim e  workers, a square o f  years o f  tenu re  by female p a r t-  
time workers, and female education le v e l (the  r a t io  o f  th e  
nunber o f  graduates from sen io r h igh  school, ju n io r co lleg e , 
koto-sermon gakko, sen io r co lleg e  and u n iv e rs ity  graduates, to  
ju n io r  high school graduates who complete th e  n ine-year compul­
sory  education ), using genera lized  lea s t-sq u a re s  technique (GLS). 
Then, th e  estim ated  c o e f f ic ie n ts  a re  applied  to  th e  re lev an t 
male v a r ia b le s  to  p re d ic t th e  p a rt-tim e  male wage r a te s .  See 
Gustman and Steirxneir (1982) fo r  th e  s im ila r  issu e .
9 Unlike th e  United S ta te s , th e  e ld e r ly  in  Japan could fo r­
m ally s t a r t  to  rece ive  so c ia l s e c u rity  re t ir e n e n t  b e n e f its  a t  
age 60 fo r men and 55 fo r women up t i l l  1985. Those w ith  a  
spouse p resen t a re  e n t i t le d  to  rece ive  an ad d itio n a l resource 
fa r  th e  fam ily (15 thousand yen a month from th e  W elfare 
P ension). Most o f  th e  e ld e r ly  do not have dependent ch ild ren  
a t  th i s  age. In  1986, th e  age o f  en titlem en t w ill  be ra ised
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t o  age 65 fo r men and 60 fo r  women, w ith  c a re fu lly  graduated 
adjustm ents u n t i l  th e  y ear 2000.
10 Source: “Family Inccme and Expenditure Survey," 1951-1983, 
S ta t i s t i c s  Bureau o f  Prime M in is te r 's  O ffice . "N ational Income 
C alcu la tion ,"  1965-1983, Economic Planning Agency. "Annual 
Economic S ta t i s t i c s ,"  1966-1983, Bank o f  Japan. "Social In ­
surance Agency Annual R eport," 1965-1983, S ocial Insurance 
Agency Japanese Government.
11 The p red ic ted  h e a lth  v a r iab le  i s  used employing a GLS 
mathod as follow s:
InLIFE = F(CARE, MI SO, POLLUTION, INSPECTION, SANITATION, 
NUTRITION, CIGARETTE, EDUCATION).
LIFE i s  male l i f e  expectancy as a  proxy measure o f  h ea lth  
q u a li ty . CARE i s  expenditure o f  medical care per household o f
1.000 yen in  c i t i e s  in  1980. MISO i s  a  Japanese s a l ty  p aste , a 
ty p ic a l d a ily  d ie t  p er household o f  100g in  c i t i e s  in  1980. 
POLLUTION i s  q u an tity  o f  su lfu rous acid  gas ppn and suspended 
p a r t ic u la te s  mg/m3 in  urban areas in  1980. INSPECTION i s  inspec- 
t iv e  f a c i l i t i e s  o f  environment s a n ita tio n  per 1,000 persons in  
1980. SANITATION i s  in sp ec tiv e  f a c i l i t i e s  o f  food s a n ita tio n  
p er 1,000 persons in  1980. NUTRITION i s  t o t a l  persons given nu­
t r i t i o n  guidance p e r  1,000 persons in  1980. CIGARETTE i s  expend­
i tu r e  o f  c ig a re t te  consumption per person aged 18 and over, o f
1.000 yen d e f la ted  by c o s t-o f- liv in g  in  1980. EDUCATION i s  the  
r a t io  o f  th e  nunber o f  graduates frcm sen io r high school, ju n io r 
co lleg e , koto-sermon gakko, sen io r co lleg e  and u n iv e rs ity  gradu­
a te s  who canp le te  th e  n ine-year canpulsary education in  '1980.
See a lso  re la te d  issu es  Liu (1979), Cropper (1981), Gerking 
and Schulze (1981), and Rosen (1981).
12 A ll e l a s t i c i t i e s  a re  computed a t  th e  po in t o f  th e  means o f  
each o f  th e  independent v a riab le s .
13 The m arginal e f f e c t  i s  obtained from the a p p lic a tio n  o f  
equation 3 o r  4 .
14 The r e s u l ts  using lagged personal savings a re  a lso  q u a li­
ta t iv e ly  co n s is ten t w ith th i s  finding .
15 The s ta te d  period  o f  unemployment insurance b e n e f its  i s  
300 days and in  ad d itio n  an extension i s  allowed from 60 days 
t o  a  maximum 90 days under the  condition .
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Source o f  Incane o f  Older Cbuple Households w ith  
Wife Age 60 and over
RURAL
Household
age
Social 
s e c u r ity  (%)
Earning 
incane (%)
Non earning 
incane {%)
Other
(%)
under 60 7.237 86.582 1.159 4.589
60-64 26.768 68.766 1.273 3.054
65-69 37.598 57.180 1.156 4.075
70-74 49.809 42.008 1.532 6.651
75-79 57.204 29.217 2.273 11.306
80-84 61.732 19.462 2.921 15.885
85 and over 68.577 11.145 3.139 17.139
URBAN
Household 
age 4
S ocial 
se c u rity  (%)
Earning 
inoane {%)
Non earning 
inocme (%)
Other
(%)
under 60 6.238 85.467 2.967 4.356
60-64 29.857 64.356 3.242 2.406
65-69 40.112 53.100 4.067 2.605
70-74 50.018 39.152 5.894 4.776
75-79 52.939 29.394 8.639 8.831
80-84 53.028 22.094 11.401 13.212
85 and over 54.612 16.151 13.593 15.186
Note: Non earning incane i s  re n t, in te r e s t ,  divindend and in su r­
ance. Other i s  w elfare , rem ittance and o th e r liv e lih o o d  p ro tec ­
t io n . Source: "1980 Population Census o f  Japan," O ffice o f  th e  
Prime M in ister, Bureau o f  S ta t i s t i c s .
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TABLE 2
Labor Supply o f  the E lderly Workers
Age 60-64
Independent
variable
le(Pf/Pr) 
full time 
( 60-64 )
ln(Pp/Pr) 
part time 
( 60-64 )
ln(Pu/Pr) 
unemployed 
{ 60-64 )
Full-time male 0.506* -0.941* 0.661**
wage(60-64) (0.29) (0.53) (0.34)
Part-time male -0.844** 0.152 -0.705
wage(60-64) (0.37) (0.70) (0.44)
Unemployment -20.473*** -15.167*** -0.589
(2.84) (5.30) (3.18)
SSRB -1.567E-3*** -1.424E-3*** 0.718E-3**
(0.27E-3) (0.50E-3) (0.30E-3)
Non-labor 1.619E-3*** -2.451E-3** 0.180E-3
incane (0.57E-3) (1.08E-3) (0.63E-3)
Personal 0.108E-3 0.345E-3** 0.225E-3**
savings (0.09E-3) (0.16E-3) (0.10E-3)
Education 0.191 2.089** -0.404
(60-64) (0.42) (0.77) (0.47)
Presence of 7.007*** -2.784 -2.453
spouse (60-64) (1.45) (3.13) (1.66)
Family -1.349** 2.889** -1.219
structure (0.63) (1.07) (0.75)
Tension -0.264** -0.142 -0.254*
(0.11) (0.19) (0.13)
Life (In) 2.854 -9.846 11.181**
(3.92) (7.31) (4.34)
Intercept -15.497 43.521 -48.037**
(16.92) (31.63) (18.72)
F- statistic 28.08 12.19 12.52
R-squared 0.90 0.79 0.80
Standard E rro rs  a re  in  parenthese. A ste risk s  rep resen t s ig ­
n if ic a n t  lev e ls  o f  lo g i t  c o e ff ic ie n ts  a s  follow s: * * *  99% 
le v e l, ** 95% le v e l, and * 90% le v e l fo r  a( tw o -ta iled  t e s t .
A (In) next to a variable indicates the natural logarithm of 
the variable.
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TABLE 3
L a b o r S u p p ly  o f  t h e  E ld e r ly  W orkers
Age 65-69
Independent
v a riab le
le (P f/P r)  
f u l l  time 
( 65-69 )
ln(Pp/Pr) 
p a r t  time 
( 65-59 )
ln(Pu/Pr) 
unemployed 
( 65-59 )
F u ll-tim e male -0.285 -0.151 -0.222
wage(65 and over) (0.28) (0.47) (0.36)
Part-tim e male -0.218 0.282 -0.684**
wage(65 and over) (0.23) (0.44) (0.28)
Unemployment •16.670*** -14.032** 1.211
(3.15) (5.84) (3.72)
SSRB -1.354E-3*** -1.509E-3** 0.640E-3*
(0.32E-3) (0.57E-3) (0.37E-3)
Non-labor 0.473E-3 -0.160E-2 1.463E-3**
incane (0.56E-3) (0.10E-2) (0.62E-3)
Personal 0.254E-3*** 0.423E-3** 0.248E-3**
savings (0.09E-3) (0.16E-3) (0.11E-3)
Education 0.832 0.224 -0.207
(65 and over) (0.56) (1.01) (0.66)
Presence o f 3.120*** 3.892*** 2.819***
spouse (65-69) (0.56) (0.90) (0.65)
Family -0.775 1.853* -2.521***
s tru c tu re (0.65) (1.09) (0.83)
Tension -0.236* -0.085 -0.321**
(0.12) (0.20) (0.15)
L ife  (In ) 0.097 -6.387 5.342
(4.24) (7.69) (4.89)
In te rce p t -1.103 22.217 -28.114
(18.16) (32.91) (20.91)
F - s ta t i s t i c 22.78 14.16 15.38
R-squared 0.88 0.82 0.83
Standard E rro rs  a re  in  paren these. A ste risk s  rep resen t s ig ­
n if ic a n t  le v e ls  o f  lo g i t  c o e f f ic ie n ts  as fo llow s: * * *  99% 
le v e l, * *  95% le v e l, and * 90% le v e l fo r  a  tw o -ta iled  t e s t .
A (In) next to  a  v a r ia b le  in d ica te s  th e  n a tu ra l logarithm  o f  
th e  v a ria b le .
TABUS 4
L a b o r S u p p ly  o f  t h e  E ld e r ly  W orkers
Age 70 an d  O ver
Independent
v a ria b le
le (P f/P r)  
f u l l  time 
(70 and over)
ln(Pp/Pr) 
p a r t  time 
(70 and ewer)
ln(Pu/Pr) 
unemployed 
(70 and ewer)
F u ll-tim e  male -0.609** -0.613 0.017
wage(65 and over) (0.24) (0.47) (0.48)
P art-tim e  male -0.216 0.027 -0.755*
wage(65 and over) (0.21) (0.44) (0.38)
Unemployment ■14.630*** -14.198** -1.367
(2.91) (6.11) (5.36)
SSRB -0.797E-3** -0.851E-3 1 .017E-3*
(0.30E-3) (0.62E-3) (0.55E-3)
Noil-labor 0.297E-3 -2.948E-3*** 1.413E-3*
income (0.46E-3) (0.95E-3) (0.79E-3)
Personal 0.398E-3*** 0.735E-3*** 0.534E-3***
savings (0.08E-3) (0.16E-3) (0.14E-3)
Education 0.210 0.888 -0.628
(65 and over) (0.49) (0.99) (0.93)
Presence o f  spo- 3.892*** -3.126 0.087
use(70 and over) (1.16) (2.48) (2.02)
Family -0.931 1.682 -4.633***
s tru c tu re (0.59) (1.14) (1.21)
Tension -0.176* -0.010 -0.407**
(0.10) (0.19) (0.19)
L ife  (In) 8.194** 6.461 5.908
(3.84) (8.40) (6.91)
In te rc e p t -37.743** -28.401 -30.432
(16.38) (34.33) (29.44)
F - s t a t i s t i c 27.03 12.05 23.17
R-squared 0.90 0.79 0.88
Standard E rro rs  a re  in  parenthese. A ste risk s  rep resen t s ig ­
n if ic a n t  lev e ls  o f  lo g i t  c o e ff ic ie n ts  as follow s: *** 99% 
le v e l, ** 95% le v e l, and * 90% le v e l fo r  a  tw o -ta iled  t e s t .
A (In) next to a variable indicates the natural logarithm of 
the variable.
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APPENDIX 
V ariab les in  th e  Equation
Mean Values and (standard Deviations) 
V ariab les age group age group age group
60-64 65-69 70 and over
F u ll-tim e male 0.707 0.562 0.293
worker (Pf) (0.050) (0.056) (0.046)
P art-tim e  male 0.012 0.018 0.019
Vforker (Pp) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Unenployed 0.070 0.043 0.013
(Pu) (0.015) (0.009) (0.004)
R etired  (Pr) 0.211 0.377 0.675
(0.040) (0.055) (0.049)
F u ll-tim e 0.924 0.840 0.837
ffele Wage (0.117) (0.090) (0.090)
P art-tim e 0.571 0.623 0.624
Male Wage (0.063) (0.079) (0.079)
Unsiplojment 0.027 0.027 0.027
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
SSRB 1158.01 1157.56 1155.08
(63.093) (62.085) (62.962)
No-labor 196.088 196.986 196.262
Income (72.843) (72.877) (72.203)
Personal 1752.95 1760.50 1765.83
Savings (319.81) (318.33) (316.76)
Education 0.374 0.310 0.309
(0.094) (0.081) (0.080)
Presence o f 0.921 0.897 0.756
Spouse (0.015) (0.033) (0.015)
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V a r ia b le s  i n  t h e  E q u a tio n
Mean Values and (Standard Deviations) 
V ariab les age group age group age group
60-64 65-69 70 and over
Family 0.150 0.150 0.151
S tru c tu re (0.054) (0.055) (0.054)
Tension 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.133) (0.133) (0.135)
L ife 4.299 4.299 4.299
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
BUll-time male worker (Pf) — P roportion  o f  fu ll- tim e  male 
workers aged 60-64, 65-69, and 70 and over in  c i t i e s  in  1980 
fo r age groups 60-64, 65-69, and 70 and over re sp e c tiv e ly . See 
FOOTNOTE 7.
P art-tim e  male worker (Pp) — Proportion  o f  p a rt-tim e  male 
workers aged 60-64, 65-69, and 70 and over in  c i t i e s  in  1980 
fo r  age groups 60-64, 65-69, and 70 and over re sp e c tiv e ly . See 
FOOTNOTE 7.
Unemployed (Pu) — P roportion  o f  male unenployed aged 60-64, 
65-69, and 70 and over in  c i t i e s  in  1980 for age groups 60-64, 
65-69, and 70 and over re sp ec tiv e ly . See FOOTNOTE 7.
R etired  (Pr) — Proportion o f  r e t i r e d  aged 60-64, 65-69, and 70 
and over in  c i t i e s  in  1980 fo r  age groups 60-64, 65-69, and 70 
and over re sp e c tiv e ly . See FOOTNOTE 7.
F u ll-tim e  male wage — hourly  fu ll- tim e  male wage aged 60-64, 
one thousand yen d e f la te d  by co s t o f  liv in g  in  1980, fo r age 
group 60-64. Hourly fu ll- t im e  male wage aged 65 and over, one 
thousand yen d e f la te d  by c o s t o f  l iv in g  in  1980 fo r age groups 
65-69, and 70 and over. See BOCTNOTE 8.
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Part-time male wage —  Hourly part-time male wage aged 60-64, 
cne thousand yen deflated by cost of living in 1980 for age 
group 60-64. Hourly part-time male wage aged 65 and over, one 
thousand yen deflated by cost of living in 1980, for age groups 
65-69, and 70 and over. See FOOTNOTE 8.
Unemployment —  Proportion of total labor force aged 15 and 
over, unemployed, in cities in 1980 for all age groups.
SSRB —  Average of annual social security retirement benefits 
for a retired person, in one thousand yen deflated by cost of 
living in 1980, for all age groups.
Non-labor income —  Nonrlabor income; interests, dividends, and 
rent, per person in houshold sector in one thousand yen deflated 
by cost of living in 1980 for all age groups.
Personal savings —  The balance of personal savings per parson 
in one thousand yen deflated by cost of living in 1980 for all 
age groups.
Education —  Proportion of male aged 60-64 with at least a 
senior high school education in cities in 1980 for age group 
60-64. Proportion of male aged 65 and over with at least a 
senior high school education in 1980 for age groups 65-69, and 
70 and over.
Presence of spouse —  Proportion of male aged 60-64, 65-69, and 
70 and over living with wife in cities in 1980 for age groups 
60-64, 65-69, and 70 and over respectively.
Family structure —  Proportion of elderly family living with 
two or three generations together in cities in 1980.
Tension —  A percentage change in complaints received by windows 
for public nuisances (noise pollution) of local public bodies 
in 1980.
Life —  P red ic ted  l i f e  expectancy as a proxy measure o f  h e a lth  
q u a li ty . See FOOTNOTE 11.
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